External corporate venture capital investment: Towards a framework for capturing and measuring strategic value

This paper presents the initial results of on-going research in the field of external Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) investments, i.e. equity investments of large corporations in entrepreneurial ventures which originated outside the corporation. The research is motivated by the fact that external CVC plays an increasingly important role within the strategy of corporations. Driven by a general trend towards a more open approach to innovation, companies see particular value in external corporate venturing as a tool to gain, for example, access to complementary technologies and a general window on technology developments. The review of literature in the field of external corporate venturing clearly reveals that theoretical gaps exist in understanding mechanisms for capturing value and measurements of this value. To help close these gaps, the research addresses the underlying question "How do corporations and start-ups capture and measure strategic value through external CVC investments" by using embedded, multiple case studies. Following an initial set of case studies, steps towards the development of a framework for capturing and measuring strategic value from CVC investments are outlined within this paper and the resulting preliminary framework is presented. The paper closes with an outlook on ongoing and future research steps. © 2009 PICMET.

Do firms always want to learn from corporate venture capital investments?

In this paper, the learning intentions and outcomes for corporate venture capital are questioned. Through qualitative research in the oil and gas sector, we identified a desire to control the direction and pace of innovation as the main driver for this type of investments. A new model and framework for CVC are presented. Contrary to the traditional model of CVC, which features a dyadic relation between corporate investor and venture entrepreneur, our model shows that CVC investments create a more complex conjoint of relations between multiple stakeholders. These relations challenge the neo-Schumpeterian model of competition. Using the grounded theory approach, we created a theoretical framework explaining and predicting outcomes of corporate venture capital other than learning. At firm level, our framework conceptualizes CVC programs as dynamic capabilities, and suggests a competitive advantage for the corporate investor through its ability to faster and better integrate the new technology. At market level, we proposed that CVC investments positively affect the pace of innovation in the market through an increased speed of acceptance of technologies supported by corporate investors.

Corporate Venture Capital: How established firms use external resources to create new competencies

This Doctoral Dissertation is triggered by an emergent trend: firms are increasingly referring to investments in corporate venture capital (CVC) as means to create new competencies and foster the search for competitive advantage through the use of external resources. CVC is generally defined as the practice by non-financial firms of placing equity investments in entrepreneurial companies. Thus, CVC can be interpreted (i) as a key component of corporate entrepreneurship - acts of organizational creation, renewal, or innovation that occur within or outside an existing organization– and (ii) as a particular form of venture capital (VC) investment where the investor is not a traditional and financial institution, but an established corporation. My Dissertation, thus, simultaneously refers to two streams of research: corporate strategy and venture capital. In particular, I directed my attention to three topics of particular relevance for better understanding the role of CVC. In the first study, I moved from the consideration that competitive environments with rapid technological changes increasingly force established corporations to access knowledge from external sources. Firms, thus, extensively engage in external business development activities through different forms of collaboration with partners. While the underlying process common to these mechanisms is one of knowledge access, they are substantially different. The aim of the first study is to figure out how corporations choose among CVC, alliance, joint venture and acquisition. I addressed this issue adopting a multi-theoretical framework where the resource-based view and real options theory are integrated. While the first study mainly looked into the use of external resources for corporate growth, in the second work, I combined an internal and an external perspective to figure out the relationship between CVC investments (exploiting external resources) and a more traditional strategy to create competitive advantage, that is, corporate diversification (based on internal resources). Adopting an explorative lens, I investigated how these different modes to renew corporate current capabilities interact to each other. More precisely, is CVC complementary or substitute to corporate diversification? Finally, the third study focused on the more general field of VC to investigate (i) how VC firms evaluate the patent portfolios of their potential investee companies and (ii) whether the ability to evaluate technology and intellectual property varies depending on the type of investors, in particular for what concern the distinction between specialized versus generalist VCs and independent versus corporate VCs. This topic is motivated by two observations. First, it is not clear yet which determinants of patent value are primarily considered by VCs in their investment decisions. Second, VCs are not all alike in terms of technological experiences and these differences need to be taken into account.

The Life Cycle of Corporate Venture Capital

This paper establishes the life-cycle dynamics of Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) to explore the information acquisition role of CVC investment in the process of corporate innovation. I exploit an identification strategy that allows me to isolate exogenous shocks to a firm's ability to innovate. Using this strategy, I first find that the CVC life cycle typically begins following a period of deteriorated corporate innovation and increasingly valuable external information, lending support to the hypothesis that firms conduct CVC investment to acquire information and innovation knowledge from startups. Building on this analysis, I show that CVCs acquire information by investing in companies with similar technological focus but have a different knowledge base. Following CVC investment, parent firms internalize the newly acquired knowledge into internal R&D and external acquisition decisions. Human capital renewal, such as hiring inventors who can integrate new innovation knowledge, is integral in this step. The CVC life cycle lasts about four years, terminating as innovation in the parent firm rebounds. These findings shed new light on discussions about firm boundaries, managing innovation, and corporate information choices.

Managing a portfolio of corporate venture units : challenges in achieving within-unit focus and between-unit coordination

Principal Topic: There is increasing recognition that the organizational configurations of corporate venture units should depend on the types of ventures the unit seeks to develop (Burgelman, 1984; Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008). Distinction have been made between internal and external as well as exploitative versus explorative ventures (Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008; Narayan et al., 2009; Schildt et al., 2005). Assuming that firms do not want to limit themselves to a single type of venture, but rather employ a portfolio of ventures, the logical consequence is that firms should employ multiple corporate venture units. Each venture unit tailor-made for the type of venture it seeks to develop. Surprisingly, there is limited attention in the literature for the challenges of managing multiple corporate venture units in a single firm. Maintaining multiple venture units within one firm provides easier access to funding for new ideas (Hamel, 1999). It allows for freedom and flexibility to tie the organizational systems (Rice et al., 2000), autonomy (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003), and involvement of management (Day, 1994; Wadwha and Kotha, 2006) to the requirements of the individual ventures. Yet, the strategic objectives of a venture may change when uncertainty around the venture is resolved (Burgelman, 1984). For example, firms may decide to spin-in external ventures (Chesbrough, 2002) or spun-out ventures that prove strategically unimportant (Burgelman, 1984). This suggests that ventures might need to be transferred between venture units, e.g. from a more internally-driven corporate venture division to a corporate venture capital unit. Several studies suggested that ventures require different managerial skills across their phase of development (Desouza et al., 2007; O'Connor and Ayers, 2005; Kazanjian and Drazin, 1990; Westerman et al., 2006). To facilitate effective transfer between venture units and manage the overall venturing process, it is important that firms set up and manage integrative linkages. Integrative linkages provide synergies and coordination between differentiated units (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Prior findings pointed to the important role of senior management (Westerman et al., 2006; Gilbert, 2006) and a shared organizational vision (Burgers et al., 2009) to coordinate venture units with mainstream businesses. We will draw on these literatures to investigate the key question of how to integratively manage multiple venture units. ---------- Methodology/Key Propositions: In order to seek an answer to the research question, we employ a case study approach that provides unique insights into how firms can break up their venturing process. We selected three Fortune 500 companies that employ multiple venturing units, IBM, Royal Dutch/ Shell and Nokia, and investigated and compared their approaches. It was important that the case companies somewhat differed in the type of venture units they employed as well as the way they integrate and coordinate their venture units. The data are based on extensive interviews and a variety of internal and external company documents to triangulate our findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). The key proposition of the article is that firms can best manage their multiple venture units through an ambidextrous design of loosely coupled units. This provides venture units with sufficient flexibility to employ organizational configurations that best support the type of venture they seek to develop, as well as provides sufficient integration to facilitate smooth transfer of ventures between venture units. Based on the case findings, we develop a generic framework for a new way of managing the venturing process through multiple corporate venture units. ---------- Results and Implications: One of our main findings is that these firms tend to organize their venture units according to phases in the venture development process. That is, they tend to have venture units aimed at incubation of venture ideas as well as units aimed more at the commercialization of ventures into a new business unit for the firm or a start-up. The companies in our case studies tended to coordinate venture units through integrative management skills or a coordinative venture unit that spanned multiple phases. We believe this paper makes two significant contributions. First, we extend prior venturing literature by addressing how firms manage a portfolio of venture units, each achieving different strategic objectives. Second, our framework provides recommendations on how firms should manage such an approach towards venturing. This helps to increase the likelihood of success of their venturing programs.

Do private equity and venture capital backed firms have better corporate governance after going public?

Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas

Um estudo sobre o poder de certificação dos fundos de private equity e venture capital nos IPOs realizados no mercado brasileiro

A melhora na situação econômica do Brasil, observada nos últimos anos, resultou em um aumento expressivo no número de IPOs realizados no mercado brasileiro tornando o mecanismo de desinvestimento através do mercado de capitais em uma boa opção para os fundos de Private Equity/Venture Capital, fato que não era visto no período anterior a 2004. No período de janeiro de 2004 a maio de 2007 foi possível notar um fato inédito para o mercado brasileiro, dos 61 IPOs que ocorreram, 26 foram realizados por firmas que tinham um fundo de Private Equity/Venture Capital como acionista. Devido a assimetria de informação, o preço de emissão é tipicamente inferior ao preço de mercado da ação após o IPO, sendo esse “fenômeno” conhecido na literatura como underpricing. Essa dissertação busca examinar o papel de certificação que um fundo de Private Equity/Venture Capital pode exercer nas emissões de ações no Brasil no período de 2004 a maio de 2007, reduzindo assim a assimetria de informação existente, através de uma análise do underpricing dos IPOs de empresas que tem fundos de Private Equity/Venture Capital como acionistas, e de empresas que não tem. Encontramos evidência que sugere que no mercado brasileiro apenas empresas com um bom grau de governança e transparência tem acesso ao Mercado de capitais através de IPOs, tirando, desta forma, a importância do poder de certificação exercido pelos fundos de Private Equity/Venture Capital em reduzir a assimetria de informação existente.

ACE research vignette 030 : Is venture capital investment the key to success?

This series of research vignettes is aimed at sharing current and interesting research findings from our team of international Entrepreneurship researchers. This vignette, written by Professor Per Davidsson, reports on a paper which synthesizes available research on the effects of VC funding on the performance of the funded firm.

What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising in India: An Empirical Analysis of Systematic and Non-Systematic Factors

In this paper, we develop a consolidated Supply-Demand framework of the Venture Capital (VC) ecosystem for India. Further, we empirically analyze the supply side of this ecosystem to ascertain the influence of systematic (macro) and non-systematic (micro) factors on VC fundraising. At the macro level, our results indicate that relatively strong fundamentals of the Indian economy in the past decade as compared with the severe recessionary tendencies in the developed economies have been critical in determining the aggregate volume of VC fundraising. Among the micro factors, past performance and reputation of the individual fund managers have been instrumental in determining their fund raising potential.