The government as proprietor, preserver and user of copyright material under the Copyright Act 1968 (CTH)

This thesis examines the role of government as proprietor, preserver and user of copyright material under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and the policy considerations which Australian law should take into account in that role. There are two recurring themes arising in this examination which are significant to the recommendations and conclusions. The first is whether the needs and status of government should be different from private sector institutions, which also obtain copyright protection under the law. This theme stems from the 2005 Report on Crown Copyright by the Copyright Law Review Committee and the earlier Ergas Committee Report which are discussed in Chapters 2 and 8 of this thesis. The second is to identify the relationship between government copyright law and policy, national cultural policy and fundamental governance values. This theme goes to the essence of the thesis. For example, does the law and practice of government copyright properly reflect technological change in the way we now access and use information and does it facilitate the modern information management principles of government? Is the law and practice of government copyright consistent with the greater openness and accountability of government? The thesis concludes that government copyright law and practice in each of the three governmental roles recognised under the Copyright Act 1968 has not responded adequately to the information age and to the desire and the ability of individuals to access information quickly and effectively. The solution offered in this thesis is reform of the law and of public policy that is in step with access to information policy, the promotion of better communication and interaction with the community, and the enhanced preservation of government and private copyright materials for reasons of government accountability, effective administration and national culture and heritage.

Are the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) legitimate and effective? : an analysis based in harm and social norms theory

This thesis examines the effectiveness of offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) in the online environment. The application of social norm theories suggests that the offences will be ineffective in creating an effective deterrent to non-commercial copyright infringement.

Copyright exceptions beyond the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)

Exceptions are an important part of the Australian copyright law landscape due to the role they play in delineating the extent of the rights held by copyright owners and, correspondingly, the permitted activities of users of copyright materials. The nature and scope of copyright exceptions has been examined in several reviews of copyright law and are again being considered by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) as part of the ‘Copyright and the Digital Economy’ review which is currently underway. The ALRC’s terms of reference require it to examine, inter alia, ‘whether the exceptions and statutory licences in the Copyright Act 1968, are adequate and appropriate in the digital environment.’ While the ALRC inquiry focuses on exceptions provided under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (“Copyright Act”), there are several copyright exceptions in other Commonwealth statutes which are of relevance and which should not be overlooked.

District Court of Queensland Act 1968 s 68 : jurisdiction in pre-proceedings applications under Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002

In Woolworths Ltd v Graham [2007] QDC 301 Searles DCJ struck out a pre-proceedings application under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld)on the basis that the material before the Court was not sufficient to attract the jurisdiction of the District Court.The decision serves more broadly as a reminder that the District Court is an inferior court of defined and limited jurisdiction and that any proceedings brought in it must be demonstrably within the jurisdiction conferred on that court by legislation.

Crown copyright

Copyright protects much of the creative, cultural, educational, scientific and informational material generated by federal, State/Territory and local governments and their constituent departments and agencies. Governments at all levels develop, manage and distribute a vast array of materials in the form of documents, reports, websites, datasets and databases on CD or DVD and files that can be downloaded from a website. Under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), with few exceptions government copyright is treated the same as copyright owned by non-government parties insofar as the range of protected materials and the exclusive proprietary rights attaching to them are concerned. However, the rationale for recognizing copyright in public sector materials and vesting ownership of copyright in governments is fundamentally different to the main rationales underpinning copyright generally. The central justification for recognizing Crown copyright is to ensure that government documents and materials created for public administrative purposes are disseminated in an accurate and reliable form. Consequently, the exclusive rights held by governments as copyright owners must be exercised in a manner consistent with the rationale for conferring copyright ownership on them. Since Crown copyright exists primarily to ensure that documents and materials produced for use in the conduct of government are circulated in an accurate and reliable form, governments should exercise their exclusive rights to ensure that their copyright materials are made available for access and reuse, in accordance with any laws and policies relating to access to public sector materials. While copyright law vests copyright owners with extensive bundles of exclusive rights which can be exercised to prevent others making use of the copyright material, in the case of Crown copyright materials these rights should rarely be asserted by government to deviate from the general rule that Crown copyright materials will be available for “full and free reproduction” by the community at large.

Battling in a virtual world: a proposal for increased copyright protection of multimedia products in Australia

This article discusses the adequacy of copyright protection afforded to multimedia products pursuant to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and in response to international obligations. The paper critically evaluates the effect that the most recent amendments to the Copyright Act have had on the protection of copyright in multimedia products. An outline of some practical measures of protection available to copyright owners as alternatives or complements to the current statutory regime is provided, ultimately concluding that the current legislative protection is ineffective. The paper closes by considering possible future reform by way of statutory amendments to the Copyright Act aimed at increasing protection of copyright in multimedia products.

Closing the gap between copyright and designs : an age of enlightnement or state of confusion?

The arena of intellectual property encompasses streams that often interrelate and overlap in protecting different aspects of intellectual property. Australian commentators suggest that ‘one of the most troublesome areas in the entire field of intellectual property has been the relationship between copyright protection for artistic works under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and protection for registered designs under the Designs Act 1906 (Cth).’ [McKeough, J., Stewart, A., & Griffith, P. (2004). Intellectual property in Australia (3rd ed.). Chatswood, NSW: Butterworths.] [Ricketson, S., Richardson, M., & Davison, M. (2009). Intellectual property: Cases, materials and commentary (4th ed.). Chatswood, NSW: LexisNexis Butterworths.] This overlap has caused much confusion for both creators of artistic works and industrial designs, as there is an uncertainty of whether protection against infringement is afforded under the Copyright Act 1988 (Cth) or whether the Designs Act 2003 (Cth) will apply. In Australia, there is limited precedent that examines the crossover between copyright and designs. Essentially, the cases that have tested this issue remain unclear as to whether a design applied industrially will invoke copyright protection. The cases demonstrate that there is an inconsistency in this area despite the aims of the new provisions of the Designs Act 2003 (Cth) to close the loopholes between copyright and designs. This paper will discuss and evaluate the relationship between copyright protection for artistic works and protection for registered designs with respect to the Designs Act 2003 (Cth).

Copyright and computer generated materials : is it time to reboot the discussion about authorship?

Computer generated materials are ubiquitous and we encounter them on a daily basis, even though most people are unaware that this is the case. Blockbuster movies, television weather reports and telephone directories all include material that is produced by utilising computer technologies. Copyright protection for materials generated by a programmed computer was considered by the Federal Court and Full Court of the Federal Court in Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd. The court held that the White and Yellow pages telephone directories produced by Telstra and its subsidiary, Sensis, were not protected by copyright because they were computer-generated works which lacked the requisite human authorship. The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) does not contain specific provisions on the subsistence of copyright in computer-generated materials. Although the issue of copyright protection for computer-generated materials has been examined in Australia on two separate occasions by independently-constituted Copyright Law Review Committees over a period of 10 years (1988 to 1998), the Committees’ recommendations for legislative clarification by the enactment of specific amendments to the Copyright Act have not yet been implemented and the legal position remains unclear. In the light of the decision of the Full Federal Court in Telstra v Phone Directories it is timely to consider whether specific provisions should be enacted to clarify the position of computer-generated works under copyright law and, in particular, whether the requirement of human authorship for original works protected under Part III of the Copyright Act should now be reconceptualised to align with the realities of how copyright materials are created in the digital era.

Fair use and the future of copyright

The Australian Law Reform Commission’s Final Report, Copyright and the Digital Economy, recommends the introduction of a flexible fair use provision. In doing so, it has sought to develop a technology-neutral approach to copyright that is adaptive to new technologies and which promotes innovation.

Review of penalties and additional damages : Trade Marks Act 1995

Effective enforcement of intellectual property (IP) rights has become a significant issue due to concerns about the effects of IP infringement, including trade mark counterfeiting. It is an important issue for the Australian Government as IP rights underpin a strong, modern economy. Criminal offences and civil remedies can be an important element of an enforcement regime. This review of penalties and additional damages in the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (Trade Marks Act) has been prompted by a recommendation made by the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP), recent changes to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (Copyright Act) and concerns raised by stakeholders. The purpose of this paper is to elicit comments on options which IP Australia is considering recommending to Government.

Duty and control in intermediary copyright liability: An Australian perspective

In the internet age, copyright owners are increasingly looking to online intermediaries to take steps to prevent copyright infringement. Sometimes these intermediaries are closely tied to the acts of infringement; sometimes – as in the case of ISPs – they are not. In 2012, the Australian High Court decided the Roadshow Films v iiNet case, in which it held that an Australian ISP was not liable under copyright’s authorization doctrine, which asks whether the intermediary has sanctioned, approved or countenanced the infringement. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 directs a court to consider, in these situations, whether the intermediary had the power to prevent the infringement and whether it took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the infringement. It is generally not difficult for a court to find the power to prevent infringement – power to prevent can include an unrefined technical ability to disconnect users from the copyright source, such as an ISP terminating users’ internet accounts. In the iiNet case, the High Court eschewed this broad approach in favor of focusing on a notion of control that was influenced by principles of tort law. In tort, when a plaintiff asserts that a defendant should be liable for failing to act to prevent harm caused to the plaintiff by a third party, there is a heavy burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a duty to act. The duty must be clear and specific, and will often hinge on the degree of control that the defendant was able to exercise over the third party. Control in these circumstances relates directly to control over the third party’s actions in inflicting the harm. Thus, in iiNet’s case, the control would need to be directed to the third party’s infringing use of BitTorrent; control over a person’s ability to access the internet is too imprecise. Further, when considering omissions to act, tort law differentiates between the ability to control and the ability to hinder. The ability to control may establish a duty to act, and the court will then look to small measures taken to prevent the harm to determine whether these satisfy the duty. But the ability to hinder will not suffice to establish liability in the absence of control. This article argues that an inquiry grounded in control as defined in tort law would provide a more principled framework for assessing the liability of passive intermediaries in copyright. In particular, it would set a higher, more stable benchmark for determining the copyright liability of passive intermediaries, based on the degree of actual, direct control that the intermediary can exercise over the infringing actions of its users. This approach would provide greater clarity and consistency than has existed to date in this area of copyright law in Australia.

Copyright, fair use and the Australian Constitution

There has been much debate over recent years about whether Australian copyright law should adopt a fair use doctrine. In this chapter we argue by pointing to the historical record that the incorporation of the term 'copyrights' in the Australian Constitution embeds a notion of balance and fair use in Australian law and that this should be taken into account when interpreting the Australian Copyright Act 1968. English case law in the 18th and 19th centuries developed a principle that copyright infringement did not occur where a person had made a fair use of a work. Fair use was generally established where the defendant had made a productive use that did more than alter the original work for the purpose of evading liability, and where the defendant had made an original contribution to the resulting work. Additionally, fairness was shown by a use that did not supersede or prejudice the market for the original work. At the time of including the copyright power in the Constitution, the UK Parliament’s understanding of “copyrights” included the notion of fair use as it had been developed in U.K. precedent. In this chapter we argue that the work “copyrights” in the Australia Constitution takes its definition from copyright in 1900 and as it has evolved since. Importantly, the word “copyrights” is infused with a particular meaning that incorporates the principle of copyright balance. The constitutional notion of copyright, therefore, is not that of an unlimited power to prevent all copying. Rather, copyright distinguishes between infringing copying and non-infringing copying and grants to the copyright owner only the power to control the former. Non-infringing copying includes well-accepted limitations on the copyright owner’s rights, including the copying of ideas, the copying of public domain works and the copying of insubstantial parts of copyrighted works. In this chapter we argue that non-infringing copying also includes copying to make a fair use of a work. The sections that distinguish infringing copying from non-infringing copying in the Copyright Act 1968 are sections 36(1) and 101(1), which define infringement as the doing, without licence, of an “act comprised in the copyright”. An infringing copy is an act comprised the copyright, whereas a non-infringing copy is not. We argue that space for fair uses of copyrighted works is built into the Copyright Act 1968 through these sections, because a fair use will not produce an infringing copy and so is not an act comprised in the copyright.

Duty and Control in Intermediary Copyright Liability: An Australian Perspective

In the internet age, copyright owners are increasingly looking to online intermediaries to take steps to prevent copyright infringement. Sometimes these intermediaries are closely tied to the acts of infringement; sometimes – as in the case of ISPs – they are not. In 2012, the Australian High Court decided the Roadshow Films v iiNet case, in which it held that an Australian ISP was not liable under copyright’s authorization doctrine, which asks whether the intermediary has sanctioned, approved or countenanced the infringement. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 directs a court to consider, in these situations, whether the intermediary had the power to prevent the infringement and whether it took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the infringement. It is generally not difficult for a court to find the power to prevent infringement – power to prevent can include an unrefined technical ability to disconnect users from the copyright source, such as an ISP terminating users’ internet accounts. In the iiNet case, the High Court eschewed this broad approach in favor of focusing on a notion of control that was influenced by principles of tort law. In tort, when a plaintiff asserts that a defendant should be liable for failing to act to prevent harm caused to the plaintiff by a third party, there is a heavy burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a duty to act. The duty must be clear and specific, and will often hinge on the degree of control that the defendant was able to exercise over the third party. Control in these circumstances relates directly to control over the third party’s actions in inflicting the harm. Thus, in iiNet’s case, the control would need to be directed to the third party’s infringing use of BitTorrent; control over a person’s ability to access the internet is too imprecise. Further, when considering omissions to act, tort law differentiates between the ability to control and the ability to hinder. The ability to control may establish a duty to act, and the court will then look to small measures taken to prevent the harm to determine whether these satisfy the duty. But the ability to hinder will not suffice to establish liability in the absence of control. This chapter argues that an inquiry grounded in control as defined in tort law would provide a more principled framework for assessing the liability of passive intermediaries in copyright. In particular, it would set a higher, more stable benchmark for determining the copyright liability of passive intermediaries, based on the degree of actual, direct control that the intermediary can exercise over the infringing actions of its users. This approach would provide greater clarity and consistency than has existed to date in this area of copyright law in Australia.

Comment la crainte de sous-protection engendrera la catastrophe de la surprotection:examen constitutionnel du Digital Millenium Copyright Act

Chaque apparition d’une nouvelle technologie remet inévitablement en cause le cadre législatif établi pour protéger les droits de propriété. Cependant, avec la numérisation de l’information et l’avènement d’Internet, il est de plus en plus facile de reproduire et de distribuer librement des œuvres protégées. Toutefois, depuis le 20 décembre 1996, l’Organisation Mondiale de la Propriété Intellectuelle (OMPI) a adopté deux traités ayant pour objectif principal d’adapter le cadre juridique du droit d’auteur aux nouvelles technologies. C’est pour se conformer à ces traités que l’administration Clinton a adopté le Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) en 1998. Cet article examine d’abord les dimensions constitutionnelle du Copyright américain, et plus spécifiquement certaines limites qui viennent tempérer les prérogatives exclusives des titulaires de droits, notamment le domaine public et les usages équitables possibles d’ une œuvre. Sont ensuite examinés le DMCA et sa conformité aux principes énoncés à la clause constitutionnelle, source du pouvoir législatif du Congrès américain en matière de Copyright. De plus, comme le DMCA interdit non seulement le contournement de technologies protégeant une œuvre en format numérique, mais également la fabrication et la diffusion de technologies permettant d’arriver à cette fin, cet article analyse les répercussions de cette loi sur la liberté d’expression.