Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games

We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.

Motor coordination: when two have to act as one.

Trying to pass someone walking toward you in a narrow corridor is a familiar example of a two-person motor game that requires coordination. In this study, we investigate coordination in sensorimotor tasks that correspond to classic coordination games with multiple Nash equilibria, such as "choosing sides," "stag hunt," "chicken," and "battle of sexes". In these tasks, subjects made reaching movements reflecting their continuously evolving "decisions" while they received a continuous payoff in the form of a resistive force counteracting their movements. Successful coordination required two subjects to "choose" the same Nash equilibrium in this force-payoff landscape within a single reach. We found that on the majority of trials coordination was achieved. Compared to the proportion of trials in which miscoordination occurred, successful coordination was characterized by several distinct features: an increased mutual information between the players' movement endpoints, an increased joint entropy during the movements, and by differences in the timing of the players' responses. Moreover, we found that the probability of successful coordination depends on the players' initial distance from the Nash equilibria. Our results suggest that two-person coordination arises naturally in motor interactions and is facilitated by favorable initial positions, stereotypical motor pattern, and differences in response times.

Foundations of macroeconomic policy coordination: fostering dialogue as a policy tool in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Coordination of public expenditure in transport infrastructure: analysis and policy perspectives for Latin America

Includes bibliography

Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.

Strategic Interaction and Conventions

The scope of the paper is the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people converge to a unique system of self-fulfilling expectations in presence of multiple, equally viable, conventions. While game theory explains the emergence of conventions relying on efficiency and risk considerations, the psychological view is more concerned with frame and labeling effects. The interaction between these alternative (and, sometimes, competing) effects leads to the result that coordination failures may well occur and, even when coordination takes place, there is no guarantee that the convention eventually established will be the most efficient.

Essays in partial identification and applications to treatment effects and policy evaluation.

Dans cette thèse, je me suis interessé à l’identification partielle des effets de traitements dans différents modèles de choix discrets avec traitements endogènes. Les modèles d’effets de traitement ont pour but de mesurer l’impact de certaines interventions sur certaines variables d’intérêt. Le type de traitement et la variable d’intérêt peuvent être défini de manière générale afin de pouvoir être appliqué à plusieurs différents contextes. Il y a plusieurs exemples de traitement en économie du travail, de la santé, de l’éducation, ou en organisation industrielle telle que les programmes de formation à l’emploi, les techniques médicales, l’investissement en recherche et développement, ou l’appartenance à un syndicat. La décision d’être traité ou pas n’est généralement pas aléatoire mais est basée sur des choix et des préférences individuelles. Dans un tel contexte, mesurer l’effet du traitement devient problématique car il faut tenir compte du biais de sélection. Plusieurs versions paramétriques de ces modèles ont été largement étudiées dans la littérature, cependant dans les modèles à variation discrète, la paramétrisation est une source importante d’identification. Dans un tel contexte, il est donc difficile de savoir si les résultats empiriques obtenus sont guidés par les données ou par la paramétrisation imposée au modèle. Etant donné, que les formes paramétriques proposées pour ces types de modèles n’ont généralement pas de fondement économique, je propose dans cette thèse de regarder la version nonparamétrique de ces modèles. Ceci permettra donc de proposer des politiques économiques plus robustes. La principale difficulté dans l’identification nonparamétrique de fonctions structurelles, est le fait que la structure suggérée ne permet pas d’identifier un unique processus générateur des données et ceci peut être du soit à la présence d’équilibres multiples ou soit à des contraintes sur les observables. Dans de telles situations, les méthodes d’identifications traditionnelles deviennent inapplicable d’où le récent développement de la littérature sur l’identification dans les modèles incomplets. Cette littérature porte une attention particuliere à l’identification de l’ensemble des fonctions structurelles d’intérêt qui sont compatibles avec la vraie distribution des données, cet ensemble est appelé : l’ensemble identifié. Par conséquent, dans le premier chapitre de la thèse, je caractérise l’ensemble identifié pour les effets de traitements dans le modèle triangulaire binaire. Dans le second chapitre, je considère le modèle de Roy discret. Je caractérise l’ensemble identifié pour les effets de traitements dans un modèle de choix de secteur lorsque la variable d’intérêt est discrète. Les hypothèses de sélection du secteur comprennent le choix de sélection simple, étendu et généralisé de Roy. Dans le dernier chapitre, je considère un modèle à variable dépendante binaire avec plusieurs dimensions d’hétérogéneité, tels que les jeux d’entrées ou de participation. je caractérise l’ensemble identifié pour les fonctions de profits des firmes dans un jeux avec deux firmes et à information complète. Dans tout les chapitres, l’ensemble identifié des fonctions d’intérêt sont écrites sous formes de bornes et assez simple pour être estimées à partir des méthodes d’inférence existantes.

On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy

Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective characteristic of team thinking. Other analyses, problematically, depict intentions ranging over others’ actions. I offer an analysis of collective intention which avoids these problems. A collective intention aims only at causing an individual action, but its propositional content stipulates its mirroring in other minds.

Popularity of reinforcement-based and belief-based learning models: an evolutionary approach

In an evolutionary model, players from a given population meet randomly in pairs each instant to play a coordination game. At each instant, the learning model used is determined via some replicator dynamics that respects payoff fitness. We allow for two such models: a belief-based best-response model that uses a costly predictor, and a costless reinforcement-based one. This generates dynamics over the choice of learning models and the consequent choices of endogenous variables. We report conditions under which the long run outcomes are efficient (or inefficient) and they support the exclusive use of either of the models (or their co-existence).

How technological change affects power relations in global markets : remote developers in the console and mobile games industry

This paper focuses on Australian development firms in the console and mobile games industry in order to understand how small firms in a geographically remote and marginal position in the global industry are able to relate to global firms and capture revenue share. This paper shows that, while technological change in the games industry has resulted in the emergence of new industry segments based on transactional rather than relational forms of economic coordination, in which we might therefore expect less asymmetrical power relations, lead firms retain a position of power in the global games entertainment industry relative to remote developers. This has been possible because lead firms in the emerging mobile devices market have developed and sustained bottlenecks in their segment of the industry through platform competition and the development of an intensely competitive ecosystem of developers. Our research shows the critical role of platform competition and bottlenecks in influencing power asymmetries within global markets.

How small-sided and conditioned games enhance acquisition of movement and decision-making skills

This article summarizes research from an ecological dynamics program of work on team sports exemplifying how small-sided and conditioned games (SSCG) can enhance skill acquisition and decision-making processes during training. The data highlighted show how constraints of different SSCG can facilitate emergence of continuous interpersonal coordination tendencies during practice to benefit team game players.

Interpersonal coordination tendencies supporting the creation/prevention of goal scoring opportunities in futsal

Research on 1vs1 sub-phases in team sports has shown how one player coordinates his/her actions with his/her opponent and the location of a target/goal to attain performance objectives. In this study, we extended this approach to analysis of 5vs5 competitive performance in the team sport of futsal to provide a performance analysis framework that explains how players coordinate their actions to create/prevent opportunities to score goals. For this purpose, we recorded all 10 futsal matches of the 2009 Lusophony Games held in Lisbon. We analysed the displacement trajectories of a shooting attacker and marking defender in plays ending in a goal, a goalkeeper's save, and a defender's interception, at four specific moments during performance: (1) assisting attacker's ball reception; (2) moment of passing; (3) shooter's ball reception, and; (4) shot on goal. Statistical analysis showed that when a goal was scored, the defender's angle to the goal and to the attacker tended to decrease, the attacker was able to move to the same distance to the goal alongside the defender, and the attacker was closer to the defender and moving at the same velocity (at least) as the defender. This study identified emergent patterns of coordination between attackers and defenders under key competitive task constraints, such as the location of the goal, which supported successful performance in futsal.

Games with perceptions

We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's types, and payoffs are assumed to be type-independent. We analyze whether the mere possibility of different types playing different strategies generates discriminatory equilibria. Given a specific information structure we find that in equilibrium a player discriminates between her types if and only if her opponent does so. We also find that for dominant solvable 2x2 games no discriminatory equilibrium exists, while under different conditions of concordance between players' beliefs discrimination appears for coordination and for competitive games. A complete characterization of the set of Bayesian equilibria is provided.

Architecture for real-time coordination of multiple autonomous mobile units

Interest on using teams of mobile robots has been growing, due to their potential to cooperate for diverse purposes, such as rescue, de-mining, surveillance or even games such as robotic soccer. These applications require a real-time middleware and wireless communication protocol that can support an efficient and timely fusion of the perception data from different robots as well as the development of coordinated behaviours. Coordinating several autonomous robots towards achieving a common goal is currently a topic of high interest, which can be found in many application domains. Despite these different application domains, the technical problem of building an infrastructure to support the integration of the distributed perception and subsequent coordinated action is similar. This problem becomes tougher with stronger system dynamics, e.g., when the robots move faster or interact with fast objects, leading to tighter real-time constraints. This thesis work addressed computing architectures and wireless communication protocols to support efficient information sharing and coordination strategies taking into account the real-time nature of robot activities. The thesis makes two main claims. Firstly, we claim that despite the use of a wireless communication protocol that includes arbitration mechanisms, the self-organization of the team communications in a dynamic round that also accounts for variable team membership, effectively reduces collisions within the team, independently of its current composition, significantly improving the quality of the communications. We will validate this claim in terms of packet losses and communication latency. We show how such self-organization of the communications can be achieved in an efficient way with the Reconfigurable and Adaptive TDMA protocol. Secondly, we claim that the development of distributed perception, cooperation and coordinated action for teams of mobile robots can be simplified by using a shared memory middleware that replicates in each cooperating robot all necessary remote data, the Real-Time Database (RTDB) middleware. These remote data copies, which are updated in the background by the selforganizing communications protocol, are extended with age information automatically computed by the middleware and are locally accessible through fast primitives. We validate our claim showing a parsimonious use of the communication medium, improved timing information with respect to the shared data and the simplicity of use and effectiveness of the proposed middleware shown in several use cases, reinforced with a reasonable impact in the Middle Size League of RoboCup.

Dynamic coordination among heterogeneous agents

We study a dynamic model of coordination with timing frictions and payoff heterogeneity. There is a unique equilibrium, characterized by thresholds that determine the choices of each type of agent. We characterize equilibrium for the limiting cases of vanishing timing frictions and vanishing shocks to fundamentals. A lot of conformity emerges: despite payoff heterogeneity, agents’ equilibrium thresholds partially coincide as long as there exists a set of beliefs that would make this coincidence possible – though they never fully coincide. In case of vanishing frictions, the economy behaves almost as if all agents were equal to an average type. Conformity is not inefficient. The efficient solution would have agents following others even more often and giving less importance to the fundamental