Annual Administration Report on the Working of Cooperative Societies

Title Varies: Annual Report on the Working of the Cooperative Societies

China builds for democracy : a story of cooperative industry /

"Printed in China".

Report on workmen's co-operative societies in the United Kingdom, with statistical tables.

Mode of access: Internet.

A study of cooperative consumer associations for rural electrification /

Mode of access: Internet.

Cooperative approach to crafts /

Mode of access: Internet.

The cooperative approach to crafts /

Caption title.

Cooperative approach to crafts for senior centers /

Includes appendices.

Le società cooperative di produzione : contributo allo studio della questione operaia /

"Opera premiata dal Reale istituto lombardo di scienze e lettere."

Consumer cooperative leadership;

Mode of access: Internet.

Manager's manual for cooperative stores.

Includes index.

Sociedades cooperativas: mercantilidad y operaciones con terceros. Un comentario

En este trabajo se hace referencia a la posible consideración de las sociedades cooperativas como sociedades mercantiles, cumpliéndose determinadas circunstancias, y ello sin pérdida de sus características específicas en cuanto a la toma de decisiones, el reparto de beneficios y la búsqueda de la satisfacción de fines de interés general. Asimismo, se analizan las consecuencias de aumentar el porcentaje de operaciones realizadas con terceros no socios, respecto del total de operaciones realizadas por la sociedad cooperativa, y su incidencia en la cuantía de los fondos de la cooperativa y en la retribución del socio cooperativista. Se realiza en este punto una comparación con las sociedades capitalistas convencionales (S.A., S.L.). Finalmente, se propone una reforma legislativa al objeto de permitir aumentar el porcentaje de realización de operaciones cooperativizadas con terceros no socios, y ello sin pérdida de su tratamiento fiscal favorable. PALABRAS CLAVE: Cooperativas, mercantilidad, mutualismo, operaciones con terceros, régimen fiscal, reformas legislativas. CLAVES ECONLIT: P130, Q130, L310

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Cooperativisme i associacionisme agraris a Catalunya: els propietaris rurals i l'organització dels interessos agraris al primer terç del segle XX

Aquesta tesi doctoral centra l'atenció en la participació dels propietaris en el cooperativisme i l'associacionisme agraris del primer terç del segle XX, com una de les expressions de la reorganització dels interessos agraris després de la crisi del final del segle XIX. S'estructura en dues parts diferenciades segons l'àmbit d'anàlisi. La primera aborda la participació dels propietaris en l'associacionisme agrari a Catalunya, se centra fonamentalment en el model associatiu de les cambres agrícoles i destaca el protagonisme de l'Institut Agrícola Català de Sant Isidre en l'organització dels interessos agraris. La segona utilitza la comarca del Vallès Oriental com a banc de proves de la primera, i com que és un àmbit més reduït, permet ser més exhaustius en la descripció del moviment associatiu, identificar els seus protagonistes i analitzar la seva resposta als canvis econòmics i socials que es van produir durant el primer terç del segle XX.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Psykologinen omistajuus - synty ja seuraukset S-ryhmän osuuskaupoissa

Pro gradu - tutkielman tavoitteena on selvittää kokeeko osuuskauppojen henkilöstö psykologista omistajuutta organisaatiotaan kohtaan sekä kuinka psykologinen omistajuus kohdistuu organisaation eri ulottuvuuksiin. Tavoitteena on selvittää mitkä tekijät ovat johtaneet psykologiseen omistajuuteen ja mitä vaikutuksia psykologisella omistajuudella on henkilöstön odottamien oikeuksien ja vastuuntunnon kannalta. Näihin tavoitteisiin on pyritty kvantitatiivisten tutkimusmenetelmien avulla. Tutkimuksessa käsitellään lyhyesti myös organisaatioon sitoutumista, organisaatioon identifioitumista ja sisäistämistä psykologisen omistajuuden erottamiseksi näistä. Käsitteiden erojen ymmärtämiseen on pyritty kvalitatiivisin tutkimusmenetelmin. Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, että henkilöstön organisaatiota kohtaan kokema psykologinen omistajuus johtaa henkilöstön henkilökohtaiseen vastuuseen organisaatiosta, organisaatioon kuulumisen tunteeseen ja haluun säilyttää organisaation jäsenyys.