La sécurité collective dans l’unipolarité : la crise nucléaire iranienne

L’argument central de notre thèse est qu’une structure internationale unipolaire non hégémonique favorise la sécurité collective. Après avoir montré que telle est la structure actuelle et avoir justifié notre positionnement théorique néolibéral, nous avons eu recours au modèle d’interaction du « leader-suiveur de Stackelberg », pour démontrer qu’une coopération conflictuelle entre États rationnels est possible, ce qui leur permet de surmonter leur dilemme de l’action collective. Une coopération possible en raison de l’existence d’un intérêt mutuel et d’un leader favorisant la coopération entre ces États, ainsi que de conditions leur permettant de mettre en place une ‘stratégie de la réciprocité’. Ils forment alors ce qu’on appelle le « groupe de Stackelberg ». Le suiveur de la périphérie, ou ‘défecteur’ doit, pour sa part, non seulement s’ajuster à l’intérêt mutuel ainsi défini, mais aussi coopérer et négocier avec le groupe, et ce, sous la pression de sanctions, voire d’un usage ultime de la force si besoin est. Après l’éventuel succès de ces négociations, un équilibre de Stackelberg favorisé par le leader, soit la puissance unipolaire et non hégémonique, est alors atteint et la coopération permet, alors, à chacun de retirer un bénéfice de cet intérêt mutuel. Dans notre cas, le groupe de Stackelberg est constitué des membres du G5 + 1, soit les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU et de l’Allemagne, agissant sous le leadership américain; l’Iran est un suiveur de la périphérie, soupçonné de défection, et l’intérêt mutuel est celui de la lutte contre la prolifération des ADM. Notre évaluation empirique montre que les conditions de la réciprocité des membres de ce groupe sont réunies et que celles de l’Iran sont en cours de négociation.

Developing a motorcycle and scooter safety compendium for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

Motorcycle and scooter crashes are significant contributors to road trauma in many low, medium and high income countries. The APEC Transportation Working Group has commissioned CARRS-Q to develop a compendium of best practice measures that can be used to reduce crashes, post-crash trauma and associated socio-economic costs. The compendium will be informed by findings from a literature review and an expert survey. The literature review examined motorcycle and scooter safety usage and fatalities along with socio-cultural factors which might influence safety in each economy. A discussion is provided regarding the processes involved in the expert survey and how this might be integrated with the findings from the literature review. The implications for developing the compendium are discussed as is the next step of a workshop to further disseminate findings. This will enable the identification of important motorcycle safety issues in APEC economies and implications for implementation of countermeasures.

International tax cooperation in the Post-GFC era

Over the last five years we have observed the fallout from the global financial crisis (GFC). International cooperation and jointly adopted policies have dominated many of the solutions to the problems which have arisen. Initially, many nations in response to the GFC, implemented a two pronged short term solution by undertaking fiscal intervention and delivering rescue packages aimed at first, bailing out financial institutions and second, preventing or minimising the impact of a recession. Both programs involved large amounts of domestic spending. It was difficult in early 2007 to foresee the reduction that nations were about the face in domestic revenue collected. Five years on, not only have the first line effects of the GFC reduced the revenue raised by governments around the world, but the consequential costs associated with the rescue packages have also depleted domestic revenue bases. The response by stakeholders has been to attempt to secure domestic revenue bases through fiscally sustainable measures. Domestic sovereignty allows the levying of taxes as a nation chooses. However, rather than raise domestic taxes, revenue may also be increased by stemming the flow of income and capital to low and no-tax jurisdictions. The intervening five-year period since the GFC allows a unique insight into the response by nations and international organisations to tax evasion, tax avoidance and aggressive tax competition through the cross border flows of capital and the resulting affect that the GFC has had on international tax cooperation. By investigating the change in the international tax landscape over the last five years, which reveals the work done by stakeholders in developing fiscally responsible responses to the problems that have arisen, it may be possible to predict the trajectory of the international tax landscape over the next five years.

Free-riding, cooperation, and 'peaceful revolutions' in copyright

Modern copyright law is based on the inescapable assumption that users, given the choice, will free-ride rather than pay for access. In fact, many consumers of cultural works – music, books, films, games, and other works – fundamentally want to support their production. It turns out that humans are motivated to support cultural production not only by extrinsic incentives, but also by social norms of fairness and reciprocity. This article explains how producers across the creative industries have used this insight to develop increasingly sophisticated business models that rely on voluntary payments (including pay-what-you-want schemes) to fund their costs of production. The recognition that users are not always free-riders suggests that current policy approaches to copyright are fundamentally flawed. Because social norms are so important in consumer motivations, the perceived unfairness of the current copyright system undermines the willingness of people to pay for access to cultural goods. While recent copyright reform debate has focused on creating stronger deterrence through enforcement, increasing the perceived fairness and legitimacy of copyright law is likely to be much more effective. The fact that users will sometimes willingly support cultural production also challenges the economic raison d'être of copyright law. This article demonstrates how 'peaceful revolutions' are flipping conventional copyright models and encouraging free-riding through combining incentives and prosocial norms. Because they provide a means to support production without limiting the dissemination of knowledge and culture, there is good reason to believe that these commons-based systems of cultural production can be more efficient, more fair, and more conducive to human flourishing than conventional copyright systems. This article explains what we know about free-riding so far and what work remains to be done to understand the viability and importance of cooperative systems in funding cultural production.

Tax compliance and psychic costs: Behavioral experimental evidence using a physiological marker

Although paying taxes is a key element of a well-functioning society, there is still limited understanding as to why people actually pay their taxes. Models emphasizing that taxpayers make strategic, financially motivated compliance decisions seemingly assume an overly restrictive view of human nature. Law abidance may be more accurately explained by social norms, a concept that has gained growing importance as research attempts to understand the tax compliance puzzle. This study analyzes the influence of psychic stress generated by the possibility of breaking social norms in the tax compliance context. We measure psychic stress using heart rate variability (HRV), which captures the psychobiological or neural equivalents of psychic stress that may arise from the contemplation of real or imagined actions, producing immediate physiologic discomfort. The results of our laboratory experiments provide empirical evidence of a positive correlation between psychic stress and tax compliance, thus underscoring the importance of moral sentiments for tax compliance. We also identify three distinct types of individuals who differ in their levels of psychic stress, tax morale, and tax compliance.

Cooperation and conflict in conspecific brood parasitism : an alternative reproductive tactic

Interactions among individuals give rise to both cooperation and conflict. Individuals will behave selfishly or altruistically depending on which gives the higher payoff. The reproductive strategies of many animals are flexible and several alternative tactics may be present from which the most suitable one is applied. Generally, alternative reproductive tactics may be defined as a response to competition from individuals of the same sex. These alternative reproductive tactics are means by which individuals may fine-tune their fitness to the reigning circumstances and which are shaped by the environment individuals are occupying as well as by the behaviour of other individuals sharing the environment. By employing such alternative ways of achieving reproductive output, individuals may alleviate competition from others. Conspecific brood parasitism (CBP) is an alternative reproductive strategy found in several egg laying animal groups, and it is especially common among waterfowl. Within this alternative reproductive strategy, four reproductive options can be identified. These four options represent a continuum from low reproductive effort coupled with low fitness returns, to high reproductive effort and consequently high benefits. It may not be evident how individuals should allocate reproductive effort between eggs laid in their own nest vs. in nests of others, however. Limited fecundity will constrain the number of eggs donated by a parasite, but also the tendency for hosts to accept parasitic eggs may affect the allocation decision. Furthermore, kinship, individual quality and the costs of breeding may play a role in complicating the allocation decision. In this thesis, I view the seemingly paradoxical effects of kinship on conflict resolution in the context of alternative reproductive tactics, examining the resulting features of cooperation and conflict. Conspecific brood parasitism sets the stage for investigating these questions. By using both empirical and theoretical approaches, I examine the nature of CBP in a brood parasitic duck, the Barrow's goldeneye (Bucephala islandica). The theoretical chapter of this thesis gives rise to four main conclusions. Firstly, variation in individual quality plays a central role in shaping breeding strategies. Secondly, kinship plays a central role in the evolution of CBP. Thirdly, egg recognition ability may affect the prevalence of parasitism. If egg recognition is perfect, higher relatedness between host and parasite facilitates CBP. Finally, I show that the relative costs of egg laying and post-laying care play a so far underestimated role in determining the prevalence of parasitism. The costs of breeding may outweigh possible inclusive fitness benefits accrued from receiving eggs from relatives. Several of the patterns brought out by the theoretical work are then confirmed empirically in the following chapters. Findings include confirmation of the central role of relatedness in determining the extent of parasitism as well as inducing a counterintuitive host clutch reduction. Furthermore, I demonstrate a cost of CBP inflicted on hosts, as well as results suggesting that host age reflects individual quality, affecting the ability to overcome costs inflicted by CBP. In summary, I demonstrate both theoretically and empirically the presence of cooperation and conflict in the interactions between conspecific parasites and their hosts. The field of CBP research has traditionally been divided, but the first steps have now been taken toward the acceptance of the opposite side of the divide. Especially the theoretical findings of chapter 1 offer the possibility to view seemingly contrasting results of various studies within the same framework, and may direct future research toward more general features underlying differences in the patterns of CBP between populations or species.

Energy-Efficient Decentralized Routing with Localized Cooperation Suitable for Fast Fading

Wireless networks transmit information from a source to a destination via multiple hops in order to save energy and, thus, increase the lifetime of battery-operated nodes. The energy savings can be especially significant in cooperative transmission schemes, where several nodes cooperate during one hop to forward the information to the next node along a route to the destination. Finding the best multi-hop transmission policy in such a network which determines nodes that are involved in each hop, is a very important problem, but also a very difficult one especially when the physical wireless channel behavior is to be accounted for and exploited. We model the above optimization problem for randomly fading channels as a decentralized control problem – the channel observations available at each node define the information structure, while the control policy is defined by the power and phase of the signal transmitted by each node.In particular, we consider the problem of computing an energy-optimal cooperative transmission scheme in a wireless network for two different channel fading models: (i) slow fading channels, where the channel gains of the links remain the same for a large number of transmissions, and (ii) fast fading channels,where the channel gains of the links change quickly from one transmission to another. For slow fading, we consider a factored class of policies (corresponding to local cooperation between nodes), and show that the computation of an optimal policy in this class is equivalent to a shortest path computation on an induced graph, whose edge costs can be computed in a decentralized manner using only locally available channel state information(CSI). For fast fading, both CSI acquisition and data transmission consume energy. Hence, we need to jointly optimize over both these; we cast this optimization problem as a large stochastic optimization problem. We then jointly optimize over a set of CSI functions of the local channel states, and a corresponding factored class of control policies corresponding to local cooperation between nodes with a local outage constraint. The resulting optimal scheme in this class can again be computed efficiently in a decentralized manner. We demonstrate significant energy savings for both slow and fast fading channels through numerical simulations of randomly distributed networks.

Calling in the gap: competition or cooperation in littermates' begging behaviour?

Abstract: Offspring are frequently raised alongside their siblings and are provisioned early in life by adults. Adult provisioning is stimulated by offspring begging, but it is unclear how each offspring should beg, given the begging behaviour of their siblings. It has previously been suggested that siblings may compete directly through begging for a fixed level of provisioning, or that siblings may cooperate in their begging in order to jointly elevate the level of provisioning by adults. We studied the begging behaviour of meerkat Suricata suricatta pups, explored how it changed as the begging behaviour of their littermates altered, and asked how the adults responded to group-level changes in begging. We found conflicting evidence for classic models of competitive and cooperative begging. Pups reared in larger litters begged at higher rates, yet experimentally increasing begging levels within groups caused individual begging rates to decrease. Pups decreased begging rates when close to other begging pups, and pups spaced further apart were fed more. Adults increased their overall level of provisioning as group levels of begging increased, but per capita provisioning decreased. Adults preferred to provision speakers playing back recordings of two pups begging alternately to recordings of the same two pups begging simultaneously. Therefore, we suggest that meerkat pups avoid some of the costs of direct competition imposed by an escalation of begging as other pups beg, by begging in gaps between the bouts of others or avoiding littermates. Such behaviour is also preferred by provisioning adults, thus providing additional benefits to the pups.

Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.

The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.

Networks and RegionalCompetitiveness: Towards a Transaction Cost Approach of Small-Scale Cooperation

A preoccupation with competition often dominates the study of governance. A focus on competition often unnecessarily precludes the possibility that regional institutions can suspend competition in certain areas and facilitate cooperation among potential rivals, thereby potentially contributing to their mutual success. In many ways companies cooperating through these types of networks have a greater degree of flexibility than firms which are forced to rely solely on hierarchies or markets for solutions to their problems. In order to fully understand how such networks work, this article first parses out differences in definitions of networks in order to understand how the type of network mentioned above actually differs from other uses of this term. Then it develops a theory of governance that goes beyond hierarchies and markets by demonstrating how this type of network can lead to reductions in transaction costs. This claim is illustrated on hand from examples of alternative forms of organization in Germany and Italy.

Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC): new biregional trade and investment relations in a changing world economic environment$c

Includes bibliography

Cooperation on competition policy in Latin American and Caribbean bilateral trade agreements

Incluye Bibliografía

Latin American South-South integration and cooperation: from a regional public goods perspective

Includes bibliography

Regional integration in Latin America and dynamic gains from macroeconomic cooperation

Includes bibliography

Reciprocal cooperation between unrelated rats depends on cost to donor and benefit to recipient

Background Although evolutionary models of cooperation build on the intuition that costs of the donor and benefits to the receiver are the most general fundamental parameters, it is largely unknown how they affect the decision of animals to cooperate with an unrelated social partner. Here we test experimentally whether costs to the donor and need of the receiver decide about the amount of help provided by unrelated rats in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Results Fourteen unrelated Norway rats were alternately presented to a cooperative or defective partner for whom they could provide food via a mechanical apparatus. Direct costs for this task and the need of the receiver were manipulated in two separate experiments. Rats provided more food to cooperative partners than to defectors (direct reciprocity). The propensity to discriminate between helpful and non-helpful social partners was contingent on costs: An experimentally increased resistance in one Newton steps to pull food for the social partner reduced the help provided to defectors more strongly than the help returned to cooperators. Furthermore, test rats provided more help to hungry receivers that were light or in poor condition, which might suggest empathy, whereas this relationship was inverse when experimental partners were satiated. Conclusions In a prisoner's dilemma situation rats seem to take effect of own costs and potential benefits to a receiver when deciding about helping a social partner, which confirms the predictions of reciprocal cooperation. Thus, factors that had been believed to be largely confined to human social behaviour apparently influence the behaviour of other social animals as well, despite widespread scepticism. Therefore our results shed new light on the biological basis of reciprocity.