The stewardship paradigm : an enquiry into the ethical obligation associated with being in control of resorces

The resource allocation and utilization discourse is dominated by debates about rights particularly individual property rights and ownership. This is due largely to the philosophic foundations provided by Hobbes and Locke and adopted by Bentham. In our community, though, resources come not merely with rights embedded but also obligations. The relevant laws and equitable principles which give shape to our shared rights and obligations with respect to resources take cognizance not merely of the title to the resource (the proprietary right) but the particular context in which the right is exercised. Moral philosophy regarding resource utilisation has from ancient times taken cognizance of obligations but with ascendance of modernity, the agenda of moral philosophy regarding resources, has been dominated, at least since John Locke, by a preoccupation with property rights; the ethical obligations associated with resource management have been largely ignored. The particular social context has also been ignored. Exploring this applied ethical terrain regarding resource utilisation, this thesis: (1) Revisits the justifications for modem property rights (and in that the exclusion of obligations); (2) Identifies major deficiencies in these justifications and reasons for this; (3) Traces the concept of stewardship as understood in classical Greek writing and in the New Testament, and considers its application in the Patristic period and by Medieval and reformist writers, before turning to investigate its influence on legal and equitable concepts through to the current day; 4) Discusses the nature of the stewardship obligation,maps it and offers a schematic for applying the Stewardship Paradigm to problems arising in daily life; and, (5) Discusses the way in which the Stewardship Paradigm may be applied by, and assists in resolving issues arising from within four dominant philosophic world views: (a) Rawls' social contract theory; (b) Utilitarianism as discussed by Peter Singer; (c) Christianity with particular focus on the theology of Douglas Hall; (d) Feminism particularly as expressed in the ethics of care of Carol Gilligan; and, offers some more general comments about stewardship in the context of an ethically plural community.

El estatuto de la persona humana como centro del actual debate justificatorio de los derechos fundamentales y sus consecuencias

Resumen: El presente artículo aborda el tema del estatuto de la persona humana desde distintas concepciones: 1) la concepción política del constructivismo contractualista de Rawls; 2) la concepción relacional de la hermenéutica de Kauffmann; 3) la concepción ontológica del iusnaturalismo clásico de Hervada. Una vez analizadas las distintas concepciones aborda cómo se aplica al caso del embrión humano y cuáles son las consecuencias éticas y jurídicas de cada una de estas posiciones.

Neutrality and the social contract

Given the fact of moral disagreement, theories of state neutrality which rely on moral premises will have limited application, in that they will fail to motivate anyone who rejects the moral premises on which they are based. By contrast, contractarian theories can be consistent with moral scepticism, and can therefore avoid this limitation. In this paper, I construct a contractarian model which I claim is sceptically consistent and includes a principle of state neutrality as a necessary condition. The principle of neutrality which I derive incorporates two conceptions of neutrality (consequential neutrality and justificatory neutrality) which have usually been thought of as distinct and incompatible. I argue that contractarianism gives us a unified account of these conceptions. Ultimately, the conclusion that neutrality can be derived without violating the constraint established by moral scepticism turns out to rely on an assumption of equal precontractual bargaining power. I do not attempt to defend this assumption here. If the assumption cannot be defended in a sceptically consistent fashion, then the argument for neutrality given here is claimed to be morally minimal, rather than fully consistent with moral scepticism.

La política como ejercicio de la libertad

Hannah Arendt esboza una fuerte crítica a las teorías políticas modernas y a la inclusión de la economía en los asuntos del Estado con el surgimiento de la economía política. Según ella, en esta línea del pensamiento moderno se encuentran las razones que explican la crisis actual de lo político; crisis representada en el surgimiento de los totalitarismos del siglo XX y en la actual indiferencia política de las masas. Este texto expondrá los argumentos por los cuales se puede afirmar que la crítica de Hannah Arendt se refiere al pensamiento contractualista, tomando como modelo a Thomas Hobbes y John Locke, para replantear el concepto de libertad moderno, y con éste los conceptos de poder y autoridad. Replanteamiento en el que se encontrará una respuesta teórica frente a la pregunta por el verdadero sentido de lo político en su tesis de la acción. De igual forma, se expondrá el pensamiento de James Buchanan como un contraejemplo a lo que Arendt esboza como sentido de lo político y la libertad con la que los hombres entran a participar de la comunidad política.