990 resultados para Consummation of the transaction


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This paper draws from a wider research programme in the UK undertaken for the Investment Property Forum examining liquidity in commercial property. One aspect of liquidity is the process by which transactions occur including both how properties are selected for sale and the time taken to transact. The paper analyses data from three organisations; a property company, a major financial institution and an asset management company, formally a major public sector pension fund. The data covers three market states and includes sales completed in 1995, 2000 and 2002 in the UK. The research interviewed key individuals within the three organisations to identify any common patterns of activity within the sale process and also identified the timing of 187 actual transactions from inception of the sale to completion. The research developed a taxonomy of the transaction process. Interviews with vendors indicated that decisions to sell were a product of a combination of portfolio, specific property and market based issues. Properties were generally not kept in a “readiness for sale” state. The average time from first decision to sell the actual property to completion had a mean time of 298 days and a median of 190 days. It is concluded that this study may underestimate the true length of the time to transact for two reasons. Firstly, the pre-marketing period is rarely recorded in transaction files. Secondly, and more fundamentally, studies of sold properties may contain selection bias. The research indicated that vendors tended to sell properties which it was perceived could be sold at a ‘fair’ price in a reasonable period of time.

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As property lawyers, we are all familiar with the general principle that a contract for the sale of land, which is capable of specific performance, operates in equity so as to confer a trust on the purchaser pending completion of the sale. Although some controversy exists as to the exact nature of the trust, it is well established that, upon exchange of contracts, equity will ‘‘treat that as done which ought to be done’’1 with the consequence that the purchaser acquires equitable ownership even though full (legal) title to the land will not pass until completion (and registration). As land is unique, specific performance is readily available in the context of sales of land where damages would, clearly, not be an adequate remedy. The same cannot be said for contracts for the purchase of personal property where invariably the subject matter is not unique and where a substitute can easily be acquired in the open market. In circumstances, however, where the property is unique or scarce (for example, a rare painting or vintage car), the maxim that ‘‘equity treats as done that which ought to be done’’ may be invoked so as to confer on the seller an equitable obligation to transfer the property to the purchaser in fulfilment of the contract. Where, therefore, the contract is specifically enforceable in this way, the seller, it is submitted, will again hold the property on trust for the purchaser where, as in a contract for the sale of land, there is an interval between the date of the contract and completion of the sale. The notion that a seller holds personal property upon trust for the purchaser pending completion of the sale is admittedly controversial, but this article seeks to argue that the same principles governing equity’s intervention in sales of land should apply in the context of sales of personalty. It is submitted that equity’s role in imposing a trust on the vendor both in relation to sales of land and personalty may be important in safeguarding the interests of the purchaser prior to, as well as after, completion of the transaction.

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Em 29 de maio de 2012 entrou em vigor a Lei nº 12.529/2011, que introduziu no Brasil o sistema de análise prévia dos atos de concentração. Nesse novo regime, as empresas deverão preservar as condições de concorrência entre si e não mais poderão consumar a operação antes de sua aprovação pelo Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE), sob pena de violarem as regras do sistema de análise prévia das operações, i.e., praticarem gun-jumping ilegal. Contudo, nem a Nova Lei, nem o Novo Regimento Interno do CADE especificaram quais práticas implicariam a consumação da operação. Dessa forma, o presente trabalho buscou identificar parâmetros, através da experiência americana e europeia e da análise de acordos de preservação da reversibilidade da operação, que pudessem auxiliar as empresas a conduzirem suas atividades no momento que antecede a aprovação da operação.

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Until now, there has been little empirical evidence that EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) transaction costs are incurred at firm level. The transaction costs (internal costs, capital costs, consultancy and trading costs) incurred by Irish firms under the EU ETS during its pilot phase (2005-2007) were measured and analysed. Evidence for the sources of transaction costs, their magnitude and the distribution of costs shows that these were mainly administrative in nature. Considerable variation in costs was found due to economies of scale, as the costs per tonne of CO2 were lower for participants with larger allocations. For the largest firms - accounting for over half the emissions - average transaction costs were €0.05 per tonne. However, for small firms, average transaction costs were €2.02 - over 18% of the current allowance price. This supports the concerns that transaction costs are excessive for smaller participants. The immediate policy implication is that additional attention will be needed to address different sizes of firms, number of installations per firm, and the size of the initial allocations.

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One of the many results of the Global Financial Crisis was the insight that the financial sector is under-taxed compared to other industries. In light of the huge bailouts and continued subsidies for financial institutions that are characterized as too-big-to-fail demands came on the agenda to make finance pay for the mega-crisis it caused. The most prominent examples of such taxes are a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) and a Financial Activities Tax (FAT). Possible effects of such taxes on the economic constitution and increasingly in particular on the European Single Market have been discussed controversially over the last decades already. Especially with the decision of eleven EU member states to adapt an FTT using the enhanced cooperation procedure a number of additional legal challenges for implementing such a tax have emerged. This paper analyzes how tax measures of indirectly regulating the financial industry differ, what legal challenges they pose, and what their overall contribution would be in making the financial system more stable and resilient. It also analyzes the legal arguments against enhanced cooperation in this area and the legal issues related to the British lawsuit against the Commission’s Directive proposal in the European Court of Justice on grounds of the extra-territoriality application of tax. The paper concludes that the feasibility of an FTT is legally sound and given the FTT’s advantages over a FAT the EU Directive should be implemented as a first step for a European-wide FTT. However, significant uncertainties about its implementation remain at this stage.

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The Portuguese National Statistical Institute intends to produce estimations for the mean price of the habitation transation.

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Local level planning requires statistics for small areas, but normally due to cost or logistic constraints, sample surveys are often planned to provide reliable estimates only for large geographical regions and large subgroups of a population.

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We develop a transaction cost economics theory of the family firm, building upon the concepts of family-based asset specificity, bounded rationality, and bounded reliability. We argue that the prosperity and survival of family firms depend on the absence of a dysfunctional bifurcation bias. The bifurcation bias is an expression of bounded reliability, reflected in the de facto asymmetric treatment of family vs. nonfamily assets (especially human assets). We propose that absence of bifurcation bias is critical to fostering reliability in family business functioning. Our study ends the unproductive divide between the agency and stewardship perspectives of the family firm, which offer conflicting accounts of this firm type's functioning. We show that the predictions of the agency and stewardship perspectives can be usefully reconciled when focusing on how family firms address the bifurcation bias or fail to do so.

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Transaction costs, one often hears, are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems. Like physicists, economists can sometimes neglect friction in formulating theories; but like engineers, they can never neglect friction in studying how the system actually does let alone should work. Interestingly, however, the present-day economics of organization also ignores friction. That is, almost single-mindedly, the literature analyzes transactions from the point of view of misaligned incentives and (especially) transaction-specific assets. The costs involved are certainly costs of running the economic system in some sense, but they are not obviously frictions. Stories about frictions in trade are not nearly as intriguing as stories about guileful trading partners and expensive assets placed at risk. But I will argue that these seemingly dull categories of cost what Baldwin and Clark (2003) call mundane transaction costs actually have a secret life. They are at least as important as, and quite probably far more important than, the more glamorous costs of asset specificity in explaining the partition between firm and market. These costs also have a secret life in another sense: they have a secret life cycle. I will argue that these mundane transaction costs provide much better material for helping us understanding how the boundaries among firms, markets, and hybrid forms change over time.