Lender liability in the Consumer Credit Market

In many countries consumer credit legislation provides for the extension of liability for product failure to the …nancial institution that advances credit to the consumer. In particular, lender liability is imposed on those credit grantors who closely operate with the supplier of the good. This paper provides a rationale for lender-responsibility in the consumer credit market. It shows that, when judicial enforcement is ine¢cient or there is risk of seller liquidation, lender-liability helps to protect consumers who systematically underestimate the probability of product failure and overestimate the extent to which they can obtain compensation.

Informational synergies in consumer credit

Lenders can tap into multiple sources of private information to assess consumer credit risk but little is known about the informational synergies between these sources. Using unique panel data on checking accounts and credit card accounts from the same customers during 2007-2014, we find that activity measures from both account types contain information beyond credit scores and other controls. Checking accounts display warning indications earlier and more accurately than credit card accounts. We also investigate the consistency of information, the reasons for defaults, and selection effects. The evidence highlights sizeable informational synergies that lenders can use to manage credit relationships.

How to advertise consumer credit : complying with the law.

"January 1990"--P. [4] of cover.

A new credit crunch? : the cost of credit for consumers and small businesses in New England : field hearing before the Subcommittee on Consumer Credit and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, October 12, 1994.

Mode of access: Internet.

Inaccurate and unfair billing practices : hearings before Subcommittee on Consumer Credit of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States, Ninety-third Congress, first session, on S. 1630 and S. 1914 ... May 21, 22, 23, and 24, 1973.

Mode of access: Internet.

Report to the Subcommittee on Judiciary of the Advisory Commission on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.

Mode of access: Internet.

Consumer credit code disclosure: Does it work?

Since 1996 all consumer credit transactions in Australia have been regulated by the Consumer Credit Code. The principal means by which the Code purports to protect consumers and prevent market failure is a detailed and prescriptive disclosure regime. There has been little empirical work done on whether or not such disclosure actually improves consumers’ understanding of their credit contracts. By exposing participants to typical consumer credit documents, this research discovered quite poor comprehension of important features of the relevant transactions. Most significantly, there appeared to be little difference in comprehension when the consumers read contracts which complied with the disclosure requirements of the Code, and when they read contracts which did not. These results cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Code disclosure regime.

Micro-Foundations of Financialization. Status Anxiety and the Market for Consumer Credit in Chile

This project investigates why people in Chile acquired so much consumer debt in contexts of material prosperity, and asks what the role of inequality and commodification is in this process. The case raises an important challenge to the literature. Insofar as existing accounts assume that the financialization of consumption occurs in contexts marked by wage stagnation and a general deterioration of the middle classes, they engender two contradictory explanations: while political economists argue that people use credit in order to smooth their consumption in the face of market volatility, economists maintain that concentration of wealth at the top pushes middle income consumers to emulate the expenditures of the rich and consume beyond their means. These explanations do not necessarily fit the reality of developing countries. Triangulating in-depth interviews with middle class families, multivariate statistical analysis and secondary literature, the project shows that consumers in Chile use credit to finance “ordinary” forms of consumption that do not aim either at coping with market instability or emulating and signaling status to others. Rather, Chileans use department store credit cards in order to acquire a standard package of “inconspicuous” goods that they feel entitled to have. From this point of view, the systematic indebtedness of consumers originates in a major concern with “rank”, “achievement” and "security" that – following De Botton -- I call “status anxiety”. Status anxiety does not stem from the desire to emulate rich consumers, but from the impossibility of complying with normative expectations about what a middle class family should be (and have) that outweigh wage improvements. The project thus investigates the way in which “status anxiety” is systematically reproduced by means of two broad mechanisms that prompt people to acquire consumer debt. The first mechanism generating debt stems from an increase of real wages and high levels of inequality. It is explained by a general sociological principle known as relative deprivation, which points to the fact that general satisfaction with one´s income, possessions or status, is assessed not in absolute terms such as total income, but in relation with reference groups. In this sense, I explore the mechanisms that operate as catalyzers of relative deprivation, by making explicit social inequalities and distorting the perception of others´ wealth. Despite upward mobility and economic improvement, Chileans share the perception of “falling behind,” which materializes in an “imaginary middle class” against which people compare their status, possessions and economic independence. Finally, I show that the commodification of education, health and pension funds does not directly prompt people to acquire consumer debt, but operate as “income draining” mechanisms that demand higher shares of middle class families’ “discretionary income.” In combination with “relative deprivation,” these “income draining” mechanisms leave families with few options to perform their desired class identities, other than learning how to bring resources from the future into the present with the help of department store credit cards.

The Cash discount act : the Fair credit practices act : hearing before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, second session, on H.R. 6928 ... H.R. 7038 ... April 23, 1980.

Mode of access: Internet.

Amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act : hearing before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and Coinage of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, second session, June 12, 1990.

Mode of access: Internet.

Meeting the credit needs of minority communities : hearing before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, second session, May 29, 1980.

"Serial no. 96-65."

Credit practices : final report to the Federal Trade Commission and proposed trade regulation rule (16 CFR part 444) /

"Staff report and recommendation on proposed trade regulation rule. 16 CFR part 444, public record 215-42."