Expanding our Constitutional Horizons: A Comprehensive Study of Quasi-Constitutionality in Canada

A number of laws in Canada which uphold rights are referred to as quasi-constitutional by the courts in recognition of their special importance. Quasi-constitutional statutes are enacted through the regular legislative process, although they are being interpreted and applied in a fashion which has become remarkably similar to constitutional law, and are therefore having an important affect over other legislation. Quasi-constitutionality has surprisingly received limited scholarly attention, and very few serious attempts at explaining its significance have been made. This dissertation undertakes a comprehensive study of quasi-constitutionality which considers its theoretical basis, its interpretation and legal significance, as well as its similarities to comparable forms of law in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. Part I examines the theoretical basis of quasi-constitutionality and its relationship to the Constitution. As a statutory and common law form of fundamental law, quasi-constitutionality is shown to signify an association with the Canadian Constitution and the foundational principles that underpin it. Part II proceeds to consider the special rules of interpretation applied to quasi-constitutional legislation, the basis of this interpretative approach, and the connection between the interpretation of similar provisions in quasi-constitutional legislation and the Constitution. As a statutory form of fundamental law, quasi-constitutional legislation is given a broad, liberal and purposive interpretation which significantly expands the rights which they protect. The theoretical basis of this approach is found in both the fundamental nature of the rights upheld by quasi-constitutional legislation as well as legislative intent. Part III explores how quasi-constitutional statutes affect the interpretation of regular legislation and how they are used for the purposes of judicial review. Quasi-constitutional legislation has a significant influence over regular statutes in the interpretative exercise, which in some instances results in conflicting statutes being declared inoperable. The basis of this form of judicial review is demonstrated to be rooted in statutory interpretation, and as such it provides an interesting model of rights protection and judicial review that is not conflated to constitutional and judicial supremacy.

La constitutionnalisation de la juridiction inhérente au Canada : origines et fondements

Bien que la juridiction inhérente des cours superIeures constitue une notion souvent utilisée par les tribunaux au Canada, plusieurs facettes importantes de cette notion demeurent inconnues et incomprises. Le présent mémoire s'attarde à retracer l'origine et les fondements des pouvoirs inhérents afin d'en expliquer la constitutionnalisation dans l'ordre constitutionnel canadien contemporain. Pour ce faire, nous avons retracé l'essence des pouvoirs inhérents au moyen d'une démarche historique afin d'énoncer une théorie constitutionnelle cohérente des pouvoirs inhérents qui permettra de juger du bien-fondé de leurs nombreuses manifestations contemporaines. L'enchâssement de la juridiction inhérente dans la Constitution canadienne repose sur le statut, la nature et les caractéristiques uniques des cours supérieures. Plus particulièrement, le principe constitutionnel de l'indépendance judiciaire constitue le fondement contemporain de la constitutionnalisation de la juridiction inhérente. Cette constatation permet alors d'avancer l'idée selon laquelle les pouvoirs inhérents nécessaires au maintien de l'indépendance judiciaire des cours supérieures doivent être élevés au rang de normes constitutionnelles supralégislatives.

Why UK public lawyers need to be legal and political theorists

My aim in this article is to encourage UK public lawyers to engage with contemporary debates in legal, political and constitutional theory. My argument is motivated by three related concerns. First, there is an extricable link between these disciplines: behind every proposition of public law can be found a theory of law, govenment, the state and so on; secondly, public lawyers have historically neglected or fudged theory in their work; finally, a growing number of public lawyers are now using cutting-edge legal and political theories to fashion radical new understandings of the British constitution: other (more conservative-minded) public lawyers have no option, I argue, but to answer these new challenges. I illustrate my argument with reference to debates about Parliamentary sovereignty, the constitutional foundations of judicial review, political constitutionalism, and judicial deference.

Theology and politics in Richard Hooker's thought

Although Richard Hooker’s private attitudes were clericalist and authoritarian, his constitutional theory subordinated clergymen to laymen and monarchy to parliamentary statute. This article explains why his political ideas were nonetheless appropriate to his presumed religious purposes. It notes a very intimate connection between his teleological conception of a law and his hostility towards conventional high Calvinist ideas about predestination. The most significant anomaly within his broadly Aristotelian world-view was his belief that politics is nothing but a means to cope with sin. This too can be linked to his religious ends, but it creates an ambiguity that made his doctrines usable by Locke.

Neoconstitucionalismo e os novos desafios da teoria constitucional

O neoconstitucionalismo surge no horizonte da teoria constitucional trazendo novos elementos de debate para problemas antigos e novos. Os rumos que essa visão irá tomar ou que contribuições concretas poderá trazer na dinâmica social, ainda não sabemos, mas é quase certo que uma nova visão sobre a teoria constitucional parece estar em curso.

Reserva de cargos e empregos públicos a pessoas com deficiência: instituições federais de ensino no RN

With a focus on the need for effectiveness of fundamental rights of persons with disabilities, this dissertation held a scientific research to analyze the degree of implementation of reservation of positions and public jobs to people with disabilities in the Brazilian State, because the 1988 Federal Constitution expressly determined such a reservation in your article 37, VIII. Highlight that this subject is enough evidence, given the large number of open public competition in recent years in Brazil, as well as recent proposals to grant equal rights to blacks (Bill nº 6,738/2013). In addition, the wording the constitutional device comes fomenting heated discussions on the subject, which are flowing on the doors of the judiciary and are spicy because such protection Microsystem vulnerable group has several gaps in the regulation of this policy. However, the research produced, unlike other related theme, does not address the problem of inefficiency in its constitutional theory, that is, abstractly, but also focuses on a specific analysis of this ineffectiveness within Brazilian society, so that research based on a bibliographical analysis, plus a study case law, at the national level, as well as in field research, while case study, focusing on the technique of the analysis of everyday life, because it was believed that the degree of realization of the constitutional norm debated is not yet a satisfactory degree of effectiveness. Soon, the methodological procedures chosen confirmed such a hypothesis and contributed to the study of realization of the fundamental right to work of people with disabilities in Brazil, the light of a Constitutional State, proposing a constitutionally appropriate model the greater effectiveness of the constitutional norm studied

The Scottish Parliament in the 15th and 16th centuries

Earlier histories of the Scottish parliament have been somewhat constitutional in emphasis and have been exceedingly critical of what was understood to be parliament's subservience to the crown. Estimates by constitutional historians of the extreme weakness of parliament rested on an assessment of the constitutional system. The argument was that many of its features were not consistent with a reasonably strong parliament. Because the 'constitution' is apparently fragmented, with active roles played by bodies such as the lords of articles, the general council and the convention of estates, each apparently suggesting that parliament was inadequate, historians have sometimes failed to appreciate the positive role played by the estates in the conduct of national affairs. The thesis begins with a discussion of the reliability of the printed text of APS and proceeds to an examination of selected aspects of the work of parliament in a period from c 1424-c 1625. The belief of constitutional historians such as Rait that conditions In Scotland proved unfavourable to the interests and. effectiveness of parliament in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, is also examined. Chapter 1 concludes that APS is a less than reliable text, particularly for the reign of James I. Numerous statutes were excluded from the printed text and they are offered below for the first time. These statutes have been a useful addition to our understanding of the reign of James I. Chapter 2 analyses the motives behind the schemes for shire representation and concludes that neither constitutional theory nor political opportunism explains the support which James I and James VI gave to these measures. Both these monarchs were motivated by the realisation that their particular ambitions were dependent on winning the support of the estates whose ranks should include representatives from the shires. Chapter 3 examines the method of electing the lords of articles, the composition of this committee, and some aspects of its operation. The conclusion is that in the main the estates were the deciding force in the choice of the lords of articles. The committee's composition was more a reflection of a desire for a balance between representatives from north and south of the Forth and for the most important burghs and clergy to be selected than an attempt at electing government favourites. The articles did exercise a significant control over the items which came before parliament but this control was not absolute and applied to government as well as private legislation. Chapter 4 questions the traditional view that the general council and convention of estates were the same body. It is argued that they were two different institutions with different powers, but that they nevertheless worked within certain limits and were careful not to usurp the authority of parliament. Chapter 5 concedes that taxation was sometimes decided outside parliament; that the irregularity of taxation certainly weakened the bargaining power of the estates and that the latter did not appear to capitalise on these occasions when taxation was an issue. But the tendency was to ensure that, whether in or out of parliament, the decision to impose taxation was taken by a large number of each estate. The infrequency of taxation was a direct consequence of an unwillingness among the estates to agree to a regular taxation and their preference to ensure for the crown an alternative source of income. Moreover taxation was one issue, which more than any other, would be subject to contentious opposition by the estates, and could lead to the crown's defeat. Chapter 6 is concerned with ecclesiastical representation after the Reformation and the church's attitudes to the possibility of ministerial representation. Some ministers had doctrinal misgivings but the majority came to believe that the church's absence from parliament bad severely reduced. the influence of the church. That no agreement was forthcoming on a system of ministerial representation, particularly after 1597, is attributable to the estates' unwillingness to compromise and, not to the strength of opposition in the church. Chapter 7 examines the institutions which are sometime seen as 'rivals' of parliament and concludes that institutions such as the privy council were generally very careful in matters which needed the approval of parliament, and seemed aware of the greater authority of parliament. Chapter 8 which illustrates how parliament had the right to be consulted in all important matters of state, brings together the main points of the earlier chapters and offers further illustrations of the essential role which parliament played in the conduct of national affairs. Whether or not the system can be regarded as constitutionally sound, the estates in Scotland could observe parliament's day-to-day operation with some satisfaction. All in all, there is little convincing evidence that parliament was as weak as some historians would have us believe.

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.

Only if “je est un autre” Can I Recognise You: Reflections on Canada’s Process of Constitutional Recognition of the “Preexistence of Distinctive Aborignial Societies”

1er Prix du concours d'initiation à la recherche organisé par le Regroupement Droit et Changements. La Loi sur les Indiens institutionnalise toujours de nombreuses facettes de ce qu’est être « Indien » pour beaucoup d’individus au Canada et un changement de perspective doit être opéré. Cet essai puise dans la pensée du philosophe Theodor Adorno pour réfléchir aux tentatives de reconnaissance juridique par le Canada des individus et sociétés autochtones en vertu de l’article 35 de la Constitution. L’auteur présente la théorie de la dialectique négative d’Adorno de 1966 sur le rapport à l’altérité, à partir de l’analyse de la professeure Drucilla Cornell, afin d’identifier ce que sa pensée prescrit pour établir des rapports non-oppressants entre Autochtones et non-Autochtones et leurs gouvernements aujourd’hui. La dialectique négative est particulièrement appropriée à la tentative de reconnaissance juridique de l’existence des sociétés autochtones par le Canada, du fait de leur statut marginalisé et de leurs revendications à la spécificité. Après avoir établi un tel cadre, l’auteur souligne que des précédentes tentatives de reconnaissances se sont soldées par des échecs en raison des désaccords au niveau des valeurs impliquées et des concepts utilisés auxquels elles ont donné lieu. Le processus de signature des traités numérotés de 1871-1921 est employé comme illustration en raison de son résultat souvent décrit aujourd’hui comme coercitif et injuste en dépit du discours de négociation sur un pied d’égalité l’ayant accompagné. Les critiques contemporaines de la politique en vigueur de mise en œuvre de l’autonomie gouvernementale autochtone par des accords négociés sont également présentées, afin d’illustrer que des désaccords quant à la manière dont l’État canadien entend reconnaître les peuples autochtones persistent à ce jour. L’auteur ajoute que, du point de vue de la dialectique négative, de tels désaccords doivent nécessairement être résolus pour que des rapports moins oppressifs puissent être établis. L’auteur conclut que la dialectique négative impose à la fois de se considérer soi-même (« je est un autre ») et de considérer l’autre comme au-delà des limites de sa propre pensée. La Cour suprême a déjà reconnu que la seule perspective de la common law n’est pas suffisante pour parvenir à une réconciliation des souverainetés des Autochtones et de la Couronne en vertu de la Constitution. Le concept de common law de fiduciaire présente un véhicule juridique intéressant pour une reconfiguration plus profonde par le gouvernement canadien de son rapport avec les peuples autochtones, priorisant processus plutôt que résultats et relations plutôt que certitude. Il doit toutefois être gardé à l’esprit que la reconnaissance de ces peuples par l’État canadien par le prisme de la pensée d’Adorno présente non seulement le défi d’inclure de nouvelles perspectives, mais également de remettre en cause les prémisses fondamentales à partir desquelles on considère la communauté canadienne en général.

Whatever works: proportionality as a constitutional doctrine

In The Global Model of Constitutional Rights Kai Möller claims that the proportionality test is underlain by an expansive moral right to autonomy. This putative right protects everything that advances one’s self-conception. It may of course be limited when balanced against other considerations such as the rights of others. But it always creates a duty on the state to justify the limitation. Möller further contends that the practice of proportionality can best be understood as protecting the right to autonomy. This review article summarizes the main tenets of Möller’s theory and criticizes them on two counts. First, it disputes the existence of a general right to autonomy; such a right places an unacceptably heavy burden on others. Second, it argues that we do not need to invoke a right to autonomy to explain and justify the main features of the practice of proportionality. Like other constitutional doctrines, proportionality is defensible, if it is grounded in pragmatic –mainly epistemic and institutional- considerations about how to increase overall rights compliance. These considerations are independent of any substantive theory of rights.