What is Consciousness? Towards a Preliminary Definition

There is little or no general agreement about what researchers should focus on when studying consciousness. The most active scientific studies often use the methods of Cognitive Neuroscience and focus mainly on vision. Other aspects and contents of consciousness, namely thoughts and emotions, are much less studied, possibly leading to a biased view of what consciousness is and how it works. In this essay we describe what we call a referential nucleus, implicit in much of consciousness research. In this context, 'consciousness' refers to (partially) reportable content experienced by living individuals. We then discuss the philosophical concept of a phenomenal world and another contemporary view that conscious experience involves, besides integration of information in the brain, participation in action-perception cycles in a natural, social and cultural environment. These views imply a need to reconceptualize 'qualia' as the conscious aspect of subjective experiences, thus stating properties of consciousness that pose serious challenges to an exclusive approach via Cognitive Neuroscience, because experimental settings oversimplify conscious experiences, narrowing them to fragments correlated with measured brain activity and behaviour In conclusion we argue that a science of consciousness requires a broad interdisciplinary range of research, including qualitative methods from the Human Sciences.

Robust discrimination between EEG responses to categories of environmental sounds in early coma.

Humans can recognize categories of environmental sounds, including vocalizations produced by humans and animals and the sounds of man-made objects. Most neuroimaging investigations of environmental sound discrimination have studied subjects while consciously perceiving and often explicitly recognizing the stimuli. Consequently, it remains unclear to what extent auditory object processing occurs independently of task demands and consciousness. Studies in animal models have shown that environmental sound discrimination at a neural level persists even in anesthetized preparations, whereas data from anesthetized humans has thus far provided null results. Here, we studied comatose patients as a model of environmental sound discrimination capacities during unconsciousness. We included 19 comatose patients treated with therapeutic hypothermia (TH) during the first 2 days of coma, while recording nineteen-channel electroencephalography (EEG). At the level of each individual patient, we applied a decoding algorithm to quantify the differential EEG responses to human vs. animal vocalizations as well as to sounds of living vocalizations vs. man-made objects. Discrimination between vocalization types was accurate in 11 patients and discrimination between sounds from living and man-made sources in 10 patients. At the group level, the results were significant only for the comparison between vocalization types. These results lay the groundwork for disentangling truly preferential activations in response to auditory categories, and the contribution of awareness to auditory category discrimination.

Functional Sub-Types

The paper argues that a functional reduction of ordinary psychology to neuropsychology is possible by means of constructing fine-grained functional, mental sub-types that are coextensive with neuropsychological types. We establish this claim by means of considering as examples the cases of the disconnection syndrome and schizophrenia. We point out that the result is a conservative reduction, vindicating the scientific quality of the mental types of ordinary psychology by systematically linking them with neuroscience. That procedure of conservative reduction by means of functional sub-types is in principle repeatable down to molecular neuroscience.

Neural mechanisms underlying conscious and unconscious vision. Evidence from event-related potentials and transcranial magnetic stimulation

Vision affords us with the ability to consciously see, and use this information in our behavior. While research has produced a detailed account of the function of the visual system, the neural processes that underlie conscious vision are still debated. One of the aims of the present thesis was to examine the time-course of the neuroelectrical processes that correlate with conscious vision. The second aim was to study the neural basis of unconscious vision, that is, situations where a stimulus that is not consciously perceived nevertheless influences behavior. According to current prevalent models of conscious vision, the activation of visual cortical areas is not, as such, sufficient for consciousness to emerge, although it might be sufficient for unconscious vision. Conscious vision is assumed to require reciprocal communication between cortical areas, but views differ substantially on the extent of this recurrent communication. Visual consciousness has been proposed to emerge from recurrent neural interactions within the visual system, while other models claim that more widespread cortical activation is needed for consciousness. Studies I-III compared models of conscious vision by studying event-related potentials (ERP). ERPs represent the brain’s average electrical response to stimulation. The results support the model that associates conscious vision with activity localized in the ventral visual cortex. The timing of this activity corresponds to an intermediate stage in visual processing. Earlier stages of visual processing may influence what becomes conscious, although these processes do not directly enable visual consciousness. Late processing stages, when more widespread cortical areas are activated, reflect the access to and manipulation of contents of consciousness. Studies IV and V concentrated on unconscious vision. By using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) we show that when early visual cortical processing is disturbed so that subjects fail to consciously perceive visual stimuli, they may nevertheless guess (above chance-level) the location where the visual stimuli were presented. However, the results also suggest that in a similar situation, early visual cortex is necessary for both conscious and unconscious perception of chromatic information (i.e. color). Chromatic information that remains unconscious may influence behavioral responses when activity in visual cortex is not disturbed by TMS. Our results support the view that early stimulus-driven (feedforward) activation may be sufficient for unconscious processing. In conclusion, the results of this thesis support the view that conscious vision is enabled by a series of processing stages. The processes that most closely correlate with conscious vision take place in the ventral visual cortex ~200 ms after stimulus presentation, although preceding time-periods and contributions from other cortical areas such as the parietal cortex are also indispensable. Unconscious vision relies on intact early visual activation, although the location of visual stimulus may be unconsciously resolved even when activity in the early visual cortex is interfered with.

Los estados modificados de conciencia y su uso en la psicología contemporánea

La conciencia, sus diversos estados y las propiedades específicas de estado han sido materia de indagación en prácticamente todas las culturas. Como producto de ello, se han generado multiplicidad de perspectivas sobre el valor de estos estados de conciencia y sobre los modos adecuados de producirlos y utilizarlos. A éstos últimos se les conoce como prácticas de transformación o tecnologías de la conciencia. En el presente trabajo, luego de presentar las posturas contemporáneas básicas utilizadas para el estudio de la conciencia, se revisan las concepciones que sobre ella surgen desde la psicología transpersonal y en el budismo mahayana. Le sigue la presentación del concepto de estados y estados alterados de conciencia en la psicoterapia. Tras discutir la noción de prácticas de transformación de la conciencia se concluye con una presentación más detallada de la meditación y la oración como ejemplos de tecnologías de conciencia utilizadas como medio de sanación y de crecimiento personal.

The Effects of Anesthetic Induced Loss of Consciousness on Quantitative Electroen Cephalogram, and Bispectral and Spectral Entropy Indices. Studies on Healthy Male

Changes in the electroencephalography (EEG) signal have been used to study the effects of anesthetic agents on the brain function. Several commercial EEG based anesthesia depth monitors have been developed to measure the level of the hypnotic component of anesthesia. Specific anesthetic related changes can be seen in the EEG, but still it remains difficult to determine whether the subject is consciousness or not during anesthesia. EEG reactivity to external stimuli may be seen in unconsciousness subjects, in anesthesia or even in coma. Changes in regional cerebral blood flow, which can be measured with positron emission tomography (PET), can be used as a surrogate for changes in neuronal activity. The aim of this study was to investigate the effects of dexmedetomidine, propofol, sevoflurane and xenon on the EEG and the behavior of two commercial anesthesia depth monitors, Bispectral Index (BIS) and Entropy. Slowly escalating drug concentrations were used with dexmedetomidine, propofol and sevoflurane. EEG reactivity at clinically determined similar level of consciousness was studied and the performance of BIS and Entropy in differentiating consciousness form unconsciousness was evaluated. Changes in brain activity during emergence from dexmedetomidine and propofol induced unconsciousness were studied using PET imaging. Additionally, the effects of normobaric hyperoxia, induced during denitrogenation prior to xenon anesthesia induction, on the EEG were studied. Dexmedetomidine and propofol caused increases in the low frequency, high amplitude (delta 0.5-4 Hz and theta 4.1-8 Hz) EEG activity during stepwise increased drug concentrations from the awake state to unconsciousness. With sevoflurane, an increase in delta activity was also seen, and an increase in alpha- slow beta (8.1-15 Hz) band power was seen in both propofol and sevoflurane. EEG reactivity to a verbal command in the unconsciousness state was best retained with propofol, and almost disappeared with sevoflurane. The ability of BIS and Entropy to differentiate consciousness from unconsciousness was poor. At the emergence from dexmedetomidine and propofol induced unconsciousness, activation was detected in deep brain structures, but not within the cortex. In xenon anesthesia, EEG band powers increased in delta, theta and alpha (8-12Hz) frequencies. In steady state xenon anesthesia, BIS and Entropy indices were low and these monitors seemed to work well in xenon anesthesia. Normobaric hyperoxia alone did not cause changes in the EEG. All of these results are based on studies in healthy volunteers and their application to clinical practice should be considered carefully.

The neural processes generating visual phenomenal consciousness: ERP and neuronavigated brain stimulation studies

One of the greatest conundrums to the contemporary science is the relation between consciousness and brain activity, and one of the specifi c questions is how neural activity can generate vivid subjective experiences. Studies focusing on visual consciousness have become essential in solving the empirical questions of consciousness. Th e main aim of this thesis is to clarify the relation between visual consciousness and the neural and electrophysiological processes of the brain. By applying electroencephalography and functional magnetic resonance image-guided transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we investigated the links between conscious perception and attention, the temporal evolution of visual consciousness during stimulus processing, the causal roles of primary visual cortex (V1), visual area 2 (V2) and lateral occipital cortex (LO) in the generation of visual consciousness and also the methodological issues concerning the accuracy of targeting TMS to V1. Th e results showed that the fi rst eff ects of visual consciousness on electrophysiological responses (about 140 ms aft er the stimulus-onset) appeared earlier than the eff ects of selective attention, and also in the unattended condition, suggesting that visual consciousness and selective attention are two independent phenomena which have distinct underlying neural mechanisms. In addition, while it is well known that V1 is necessary for visual awareness, the results of the present thesis suggest that also the abutting visual area V2 is a prerequisite for conscious perception. In our studies, the activation in V2 was necessary for the conscious perception of change in contrast for a shorter period of time than in the case of more detailed conscious perception. We also found that TMS in LO suppressed the conscious perception of object shape when TMS was delivered in two distinct time windows, the latter corresponding with the timing of the ERPs related to the conscious perception of coherent object shape. Th e result supports the view that LO is crucial in conscious perception of object coherency and is likely to be directly involved in the generation of visual consciousness. Furthermore, we found that visual sensations, or phosphenes, elicited by the TMS of V1 were brighter than identically induced phosphenes arising from V2. Th ese fi ndings demonstrate that V1 contributes more to the generation of the sensation of brightness than does V2. Th e results also suggest that top-down activation from V2 to V1 is probably associated with phosphene generation. The results of the methodological study imply that when a commonly used landmark (2 cm above the inion) is used in targeting TMS to V1, the TMS-induced electric fi eld is likely to be highest in dorsal V2. When V1 was targeted according to the individual retinotopic data, the electric fi eld was highest in V1 only in half of the participants. Th is result suggests that if the objective is to study the role of V1 with TMS methodology, at least functional maps of V1 and V2 should be applied with computational model of the TMS-induced electric fi eld in V1 and V2. Finally, the results of this thesis imply that diff erent features of attention contribute diff erently to visual consciousness, and thus, the theoretical model which is built up of the relationship between visual consciousness and attention should acknowledge these diff erences. Future studies should also explore the possibility that visual consciousness consists of several processing stages, each of which have their distinct underlying neural mechanisms.

Life at its best : a series of studies in the vital doctrines of consciousness, ideal, and effort /

Mode of access: Internet.

On double consciousness : experimental psychological studies /

Mode of access: Internet.