Differences and commonalities between connectionism and symbolicism

The differences between connectionism and symbolicism in artificial intelligence (AI) are illustrated on several aspects in details firstly; then after conceptually decision factors of connectionism are proposed, the commonalities between connectionism and symbolicism are tested to make sure, by some quite typical logic mathematics operation examples such as "parity"; At last, neuron structures are expanded by modifying neuron weights and thresholds in artificial neural networks through adopting high dimensional space geometry cognition, which give more overall development space, and embodied further both commonalities.

Connectionism as metaphor: Towards an integrated, unified conception of self-system and individual difference

Comments on an article by Kashima et al. (see record 2007-10111-001). In their target article Kashima and colleagues try to show how a connectionist model conceptualization of the self is best suited to capture the self's temporal and socio-culturally contextualized nature. They propose a new model and to support this model, the authors conduct computer simulations of psychological phenomena whose importance for the self has long been clear, even if not formally modeled, such as imitation, and learning of sequence and narrative. As explicated when we advocated connectionist models as a metaphor for self in Mischel and Morf (2003), we fully endorse the utility of such a metaphor, as these models have some of the processing characteristics necessary for capturing key aspects and functions of a dynamic cognitive-affective self-system. As elaborated in that chapter, we see as their principal strength that connectionist models can take account of multiple simultaneous processes without invoking a single central control. All outputs reflect a distributed pattern of activation across a large number of simple processing units, the nature of which depends on (and changes with) the connection weights between the links and the satisfaction of mutual constraints across these links (Rummelhart & McClelland, 1986). This allows a simple account for why certain input features will at times predominate, while others take over on other occasions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved)

Out of their minds: legal theory in neural networks

This paper examines the use of connectionism (neural networks) in modelling legal reasoning. I discuss how the implementations of neural networks have failed to account for legal theoretical perspectives on adjudication. I criticise the use of neural networks in law, not because connectionism is inherently unsuitable in law, but rather because it has been done so poorly to date. The paper reviews a number of legal theories which provide a grounding for the use of neural networks in law. It then examines some implementations undertaken in law and criticises their legal theoretical naïvete. It then presents a lessons from the implementations which researchers must bear in mind if they wish to build neural networks which are justified by legal theories.

Cognitive neuroimaging: Cognitive science out of the armchair

Cognitive scientists were not quick to embrace the functional neuroimaging technologies that emerged during the late 20th century. In this new century, cognitive scientists continue to question, not unreasonably, the relevance of functional neuroimaging investigations that fail to address questions of interest to cognitive science. However, some ultra-cognitive scientists assert that these experiments can never be of relevance to the study of cognition. Their reasoning reflects an adherence to a functionalist philosophy that arbitrarily and purposefully distinguishes mental information-processing systems from brain or brain-like operations. This article addresses whether data from properly conducted functional neuroimaging studies can inform and subsequently constrain the assumptions of theoretical cognitive models. The article commences with a focus upon the functionalist philosophy espoused by the ultra-cognitive scientists, contrasting it with the materialist philosophy that motivates both cognitive neuroimaging investigations and connectionist modelling of cognitive systems. Connectionism and cognitive neuroimaging share many features, including an emphasis on unified cognitive and neural models of systems that combine localist and distributed representations. The utility of designing cognitive neuroimaging studies to test (primarily) connectionist models of cognitive phenomena is illustrated using data from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigations of language production and episodic memory.

Dynamic knowledge representation in connectionist systems

One of the most pervading concepts underlying computational models of information processing in the brain is linear input integration of rate coded uni-variate information by neurons. After a suitable learning process this results in neuronal structures that statically represent knowledge as a vector of real valued synaptic weights. Although this general framework has contributed to the many successes of connectionism, in this paper we argue that for all but the most basic of cognitive processes, a more complex, multi-variate dynamic neural coding mechanism is required - knowledge should not be spacially bound to a particular neuron or group of neurons. We conclude the paper with discussion of a simple experiment that illustrates dynamic knowledge representation in a spiking neuron connectionist system.

Redes neurais e representação mental: um ensaio sobre harmonia e racionalidade

Investigaremos, a partir da perspectiva da Ciência Cognitiva, a noção de representação mental, no domínio da percepção visual humana. Ênfase é dada ao paradigma Conexionista, ou de Redes Neurais, de acordo com o qual tais representações mentais são descritas como estruturas emergentes da interação entre sistemas de processamento de informação que se auto-organizam - tais como o cérebro - e a luz estruturada no meio ambiente. Sugerimos que essa noção de representação mental indica uma solução para uma antiga polêmica, entre Representacionalistas e Eliminativistas, acerca da existência de representações mentais no sistema perceptual humano.

Robots, intencionalidade e inteligência artificial

O artigo aborda problemas filosóficos relativos à natureza da intencionalidade e da representação mental. A primeira parte apresenta um breve histórico dos problemas, percorrendo rapidamente alguns episódios da filosofia clássica e da filosofia contemporânea. A segunda parte examina o Chinese Room Argument (Argumento do Quarto do Chinês) formulado por J. Searle. A terceira parte desenvolve alguns argumentos visando mostrar a inadequação do modelo funcionalista de mente na construção de robots. A conclusão (quarta parte) aponta algumas alternativas ao modelo funcionalista tradicional, como, por exemplo, o conexionismo.

As contribuições da ciência cognitiva à composição musical

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Teaching Cognitive Modeling Using PDP++

PDP++ is a freely available, open source software package designed to support the development, simulation, and analysis of research-grade connectionist models of cognitive processes. It supports most popular parallel distributed processing paradigms and artificial neural network architectures, and it also provides an implementation of the LEABRA computational cognitive neuroscience framework. Models are typically constructed and examined using the PDP++ graphical user interface, but the system may also be extended through the incorporation of user-written C++ code. This article briefly reviews the features of PDP++, focusing on its utility for teaching cognitive modeling concepts and skills to university undergraduate and graduate students. An informal evaluation of the software as a pedagogical tool is provided, based on the author’s classroom experiences at three research universities and several conference-hosted tutorials.

Generalization by symbolic abstraction in cascaded recurrent networks

Generalization performance in recurrent neural networks is enhanced by cascading several networks. By discretizing abstractions induced in one network, other networks can operate on a coarse symbolic level with increased performance on sparse and structural prediction tasks. The level of systematicity exhibited by the cascade of recurrent networks is assessed on the basis of three language domains. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Cognitive neuroimaging: Cognitive science out of the armchair

Cognitive scientists were not quick to embrace the functional neuroimaging technologies that emerged during the late 20th century. In this new century, cognitive scientists continue to question, not unreasonably, the relevance of functional neuroimaging investigations that fail to address questions of interest to cognitive science. However, some ultra-cognitive scientists assert that these experiments can never be of relevance to the Study of cognition. Their reasoning reflects an adherence to a functionalist philosophy that arbitrarily and purposefully distinguishes mental information-processing systems from brain or brain-like operations. This article addresses whether data from properly conducted functional neuroimaging studies can inform and Subsequently constrain the assumptions of theoretical cognitive models. The article commences with a focus upon the functionalist philosophy espoused by the ultra-cognitive scientists, contrasting it with the materialist philosophy that motivates both cognitive neuromiaging investigations and connectionist modelling of cognitive systems. Connectionism and cognitive neuroimaging share many features, including an emphasis on unified cognitive and neural models of systems that combine localist and distributed representations. The utility of designing cognitive neuroimaging studies to test (primarily) connectionist models of cognitive phenomena is illustrated using data from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigations of language production and episodic memory. (C) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.