The animal kingdom : arranged in conformity with its organization /

v. 10 (Pisces)

The animal kingdom arranged in conformity with its organization / by the Baron Cuvier ; the Crustacea, Arachnides and Insecta, by P.A. Latreille ; translated from the French, with notes and additions, by H. M'Murtrie ; in four volumes, with plates.

v 3 (1831)

The animal kingdom arranged in conformity with its organization / by the Baron Cuvier ; the Crustacea, Arachnides and Insecta, by P.A. Latreille ; translated from the French, with notes and additions, by H. M'Murtrie ; in four volumes, with plates.

v 2 (1831)

The animal kingdom arranged in conformity with its organization / by the Baron Cuvier ; the Crustacea, Arachnides and Insecta, by P.A. Latreille ; translated from the French, with notes and additions, by H. M'Murtrie ; in four volumes, with plates.

v 1 (1831)

Consumption Decisions When People Value Conformity

In this paper we assume that for some commodities individuals may wish to adjust their levels of consumption from their normal Marshallian levels so as to match the consumption levels of a group of other individuals, in order to signal that they conform to the consumption norms of that group. Unlike Veblen’s concept of conspicuous consumption this can mean that some individuals may reduce their consumption of the relevant commodities. We model this as a three-stage game in which individuals first decide whether or not they wish to adhere to a norm, then decide which norm they wish to adhere to, and finally decide their actual consumption. We present a number of examples of the resulting equilibria, and then discuss the potential policy implications of this model.

Dummy run and conformity indices in the ongoing EORTC low-grade glioma trial 22033-26033: First evaluation of quality of radiotherapy planning.

PURPOSE: Early assessment of radiotherapy (RT) quality in the ongoing EORTC trial comparing primary temozolomide versus RT in low-grade gliomas. MATERIALS AND METHODS: RT plans provided for dummy cases were evaluated and compared against expert plans. We analysed: (1) tumour and organs-at-risk delineation, (2) geometric and dosimetric characteristics, (3) planning parameters, compliance with dose prescription and Dmax for OAR (4) indices: RTOG conformity index (CI), coverage factor (CF), tissue protection factor (PF); conformity number (CN = PF x CF); dose homogeneity in PTV (U). RESULTS: Forty-one RT plans were evaluated. Only two (5%) centres were requested to repeat CTV-PTV delineations. Three (7%) plans had a significant under-dosage and dose homogeneity in one deviated > 10%. Dose distribution was good with mean values of 1.5, 1, 0.68, and 0.68 (ideal values = 1) for CI, CF, PF, and CN, respectively. CI and CN strongly correlated with PF and they correlated with PTV. Planning with more beams seems to increase PTV(Dmin), improving CF. U correlated with PTV(Dmax). CONCLUSION: Preliminary results of the dummy run procedure indicate that most centres conformed to protocol requirements. To quantify plan quality we recommend systematic calculation of U and either CI or CN, both of which measure the amount of irradiated normal brain tissue.

Conformity, upstream reciprocity and social diversity: secondary mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation

Cooperation is ubiquitous in nature: genes cooperate in genomes, cells in muti- cellular organims, and individuals in societies. In humans, division of labor and trade are key elements of most known societies, where social life is regulated by- moral systems specifying rights and duties often enforced by third party punish¬ment. Over the last decades, several primary mechanisms, such as kin selection, direct and indirect reciprocity, have been advanced to explain the evolution of cooperation from a naturalistic approach. In this thesis, I focus on the study of three secondary mechanisms which, although insufficient to allow for the evo¬lution of cooperation, have been hypothesized to further promote it when they are linked to proper primary mechanisms: conformity (the tendency to imitate common behaviors), upstream reciprocity (the tendency to help somebody once help has been received from somebody else) and social diversity (heterogeneous social contexts). I make use of mathematical and computational models in the formal framework of evolutionary game theory in order to investigate the theoret¬ical conditions under which conformity, upstream reciprocity and social diversity are able to raise the levels of cooperation attained in evolving populations. - La coopération est ubiquitaire dans la nature: les gènes coopèrent dans les génomes, les cellules dans les organismes muticellulaires, et les organismes dans les sociétés. Chez les humains, la division du travail et le commerce sont des éléments centraux de la plupart des sociétés connues, où la vie sociale est régie par des systèmes moraux établissant des droits et des devoirs, souvent renforcés par la punition. Au cours des dernières décennies, plusieurs mécanismes pri¬maires, tels que la sélection de parentèle et les réciprocités directe et indirecte, ont été avancés pour expliquer l'évolution de la coopération d'un point de vue nat¬uraliste. Dans cette thèse, nous nous concentrons sur l'étude de trois mécanismes secondaires qui, bien qu'insuffisants pour permettre l'évolution de la coopération, sont capables de la promouvoir davantage s'ils sont liés aux mécanismes primaires appropriés: la conformité (tendance à imiter des comportements en commun), la 'réciprocité en amont' (tendance à aider quelqu'un après avoir reçu l'aide de quelqu'un d'autre) et la diversité sociale (contextes sociaux hétérogènes). Nous faisons usage de modèles mathématiques et informatiques dans le cadre formel de la théorie des jeux évolutionnaires afin d'examiner les conditions théoriques dans lesquelles la conformité, la 'réciprocité en amont' et la diversité sociale sont capables d'élever le niveau de coopération des populations en évolution.