Tax morale and conditional cooperation

Why so many people pay their taxes, even though fines and audit probability are low, is a central question in the tax compliance literature. Positing a homo oeconomicus having a refined motivation structure sheds light on this puzzle. This paper provides empirical evidence for the relevance of conditional cooperation, using survey data from 30 West and East European countries. We find a high correlation between perceived tax evasion and tax morale. The results remain robust after exploiting endogeneity and conducting several robustness tests. We also observe a strong positive correlation between institutional quality and tax mmorale. Keywords: Tax morale; Tax compliance; Tax evasion; Pro-social behavior; Institutions

Informal sanctions and conditional cooperation: : A natural experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good.

In a natural experiment, this paper studies the impact of an informal sanctioning mechanism on individuals’ voluntary contribution to a public good. Cross-country skiers’ actual cash contributions in two ski resorts, one with and one without an informal sanctioning system, are used. I find the contributing share to be higher in the informal sanctioning system (79 percent) than in the non-sanctioning system (36 percent). Previous studies in one-shot public good situations have found an increasing conditional contribution (CC) function, i.e. the relationship between expected average contributions of other group members and the individual’s own contribution. In contrast, the present results suggest that the CC-function in the non-sanctioning system is non-increasing at high perceived levels of others’ contribution. This relationship deserves further testing in lab.

Conditional corruption

In this paper we discuss whether corruption is contagious and whether conditional cooperation matters. We use the notion of “conditional corruption” for these effects. We analyze whether the justifiability to be corrupt is influenced by the perceived activities of others. Moreover, we also explore whether – and to what extent – group dynamics or socialization and past experiences affect corruption. We present evidence using two data sets at the micro level and a large macro level international panel data set. The results indicate that the willingness to engage in corruption is influenced by the perceived activities of peers and other individuals. Moreover, the panel data set at the macro level indicates that the past level of corruption has a strong impact on the current corruption level.

Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game with Incomplete Information and Heterogeneous Population

Differently from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We present stability conditions for the case when individuals play unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection or conditional cooperation. We then consider the removal of one or two strategies. Results show that conditional cooperators are the most resilient agents against extinction and that the removal of unconditional cooperators may lead to the extinction of unconditional defectors.

Environmental and pro-social norms : evidence on littering

The paper investigates the relationship between pro-social norms and its implications for improved environmentsl outcomes. This is an area, which has been neglected in the environmental economic literature. We provide empirical evidence to demonstrate a small but significant positive impact between perceived environmental cooperation (reduced public littering) and increased voluntary environmental morale. For this purpose we use European Value Survey (EVS) data for 30 European countries. We also demonstrate that Western European countries are more sensitive to perceived environmental cooperation than the public in Eastern Europe. Interestingly, the results also demonstrate that environmental morale is strongly correlated with several socio-economic and environmental variables. Several robustness tests are conducted to check the validity of the results.

Social norms and corruption

We explore theoretically and empirically whether corruption is contagious and whether conditional cooperation matters. We argue that the decision to bribe bureaucrats depends on the frequency of corruption within a society. We provide a behavioral model to explain this conduct: engaging in corruption results in a disutility of guilt. This disutility depends negatively on the number of people engaging in corruption. The empirical section presents evidence using two international panel data data sets, one at the micro and one at the macro level. Results indicate that corruption is influenced by the perceived activities of peers. Moreover, macro level data indicates that past levels of corruption impact current corruption levels.

Volunteering, pro-environmental attitudes and norms

In the spirit of previous work in the compliance literature (e.g., tax, littering), we investigate whether environmental social norms affect volunteering in environmental organizations. Using two ‘environmental morale’ variables as indirect measures, we analyze the impact of social norms on the incidence of unpaid work in environmental organizations. In addition, we test whether violation of a specific environmental norm initiates a conditional cooperation response. We explore a large individual data set covering 32 countries from both Western and Eastern Europe, and extend the number of countries investigated to test the robustness of the relationship at the macro level. Our results indicate a strong positive relationship between the proxies for environmental social norms and volunteering in environmental organizations. The relationship persists despite our various robustness checks.

Challenging Educational Underdevelopment: The Cuban Solidarity Approach as a Mode of South-South Cooperation

The Capacity to Share is the first book to document how Cubans share their highly developed educational services with other low-income states, especially those in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. A variety of international and Cuban authors break new ground in presenting this research. They investigate the experiences of people who have studied in Cuba on scholarships from the Cuban government, the implications for their home countries, and the work of Cuban teachers and administrators to support education in other countries. The authors discuss how the Cuban "solidarity" approach prioritizes global educational cooperation for mutual support, rather than imposing conditional aid. The book offers original and unusual insights into issues of culture, education, aid, development, and change as they relate to low-income states.

Refinement of defection strategies stabilizes cooperation

Cooperation among unrelated individuals is an enduring evolutionary riddle and a number of possible solutions have been suggested. Most of these suggestions attempt to refine cooperative strategies, while little attention is given to the fact that novel defection strategies can also evolve in the population. Especially in the presence of punishment to the defectors and public knowledge of strategies employed by the players, a defecting strategy that avoids getting punished by selectively cooperating only with the punishers can get a selective benefit over non-conditional defectors. Furthermore, if punishment ensures cooperation from such discriminating defectors, defectors who punish other defectors can evolve as well. We show that such discriminating and punishing defectors can evolve in the population by natural selection in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game scenario, even if discrimination is a costly act. These refined defection strategies destabilize unconditional defectors. They themselves are, however, unstable in the population. Discriminating defectors give selective benefit to the punishers in the presence of non-punishers by cooperating with them and defecting with others. However, since these players also defect with other discriminators they suffer fitness loss in the pure population. Among the punishers, punishing cooperators always benefit in contrast to the punishing defectors, as the latter not only defect with other punishing defectors but also punish them and get punished. As a consequence of both these scenarios, punishing cooperators get stabilized in the population. We thus show ironically that refined defection strategies stabilize cooperation. Furthermore, cooperation stabilized by such defectors can work under a wide range of initial conditions and is robust to mistakes.

Conditional cash transfer programmes: the recent experience in Latin America and the Caribbean

Includes Bibliography