What place discourse, what role rigorous argumentation? Against the standard image of Hadot's conception of philosophy as a way of life

After an introduction situating the piece in light of debates surrounding Hadot et al's work on the history of philosophy, Part I of what follows lays out, as briefly as possible, the 'standard view' of Hadot promoted by the texts that have been translated hitherto, and which has attracted Cooper, Nussbaum et al’s criticisms about misrepresenting--or dismissing-the place of rational argument in philosophy 'comme manière de vivre'. In Part II, will we see how several of Hadot’s as-yet-untranslated pieces, led by 'La Philosophie Antique: Une Éthique ou une Pratique?', indicate his own much more qualified perspectives about the place of discourse in ancient philosophy conceived as a way of life. To argue that philosophy included the paranoetic prescription of imaginative, mnemic, and even somatic exercises to rehape subjects' beliefs, habits, and desires is not to deny that these exercises were justified rationally, or based in rigorous theoretical accounts of the human being and its place in the cosmos.

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

A Reading of the conception of man in Hans Jonas’ works: Between Nature and Responsibility. An Environmental Ethics Approach

Hans Jonas is considered one of the principal leaders of the ecological doctrine that fights against the hegemony of technical power upon society. We will study the conception of man in Jonas’ ideology through the lens of nature and of responsibility. He brandishes the specter of disaster (“heuristics of fear”) as a guard against technological excesses. He appeals to a prospective, universal and categorical responsibility to protect nature and to save future generations. Jonas considers responsibility as a method of anticipating the threat to that which is vulnerable, ephemeral, and perishable. Thus, the responsibility that Jonas decrees implies an ethics of conservation. Jonas’ writings aim to procure a new dimension of acting, which necessitates an ethics of foresight and responsibility.

Applied philosophy of language

This chapter explores the extent to which philosophy of language can be considered an applied discipline. I consider, first, ways in which sub-sections of philosophy of language may be considered as applied in terms of their subject matter and/or the kinds of questions being addressed (e.g. philosophy of language which deals with derogatory or inflammatory uses of language, or the role of philosophy of language within feminist philosophy). Then, in the second part of the chapter, I turn to consider a more general (and perhaps more controversial) conception of philosophy of language as applied, which arises from the methodology adopted and the relationship of the discipline to empirical data.

The mechanistic conception of life; biological essays,

Reprinted from various sources.

Chaucer and the Disconsolations of Philosophy: Boethius, Agency, and Literary Form in Late Medieval Literature

This study argues that Chaucer's poetry belongs to a far-reaching conversation about the forms of consolation (philosophical, theological, and poetic) that are available to human persons. Chaucer's entry point to this conversation was Boethius's Consolation of Philosophy, a sixth-century dialogue that tried to show how the Stoic ideals of autonomy and self-possession are not simply normative for human beings but remain within the grasp of every individual. Drawing on biblical commentary, consolation literature, and political theory, this study contends that Chaucer's interrogation of the moral and intellectual ideals of the Consolation took the form of philosophical disconsolations: scenes of profound poetic rupture in which a character, sometimes even Chaucer himself, turns to philosophy for solace and yet fails to be consoled. Indeed, philosophy itself becomes a source of despair. In staging these disconsolations, I contend that Chaucer asks his readers to consider the moral dimensions of the aspirations internal to ancient philosophy and the assumptions about the self that must be true if its insights are to console and instruct. For Chaucer, the self must be seen as a gift that flowers through reciprocity (both human and divine) and not as an object to be disciplined and regulated.

Chapter one focuses on the Consolation of Philosophy. I argue that recent attempts to characterize Chaucer's relationship to this text as skeptical fail to engage the Consolation on its own terms. The allegory of Lady Philosophy's revelation to a disconsolate Boethius enables philosophy to become both an agent and an object of inquiry. I argue that Boethius's initial skepticism about the pretentions of philosophy is in part what Philosophy's therapies are meant to respond to. The pressures that Chaucer's poetry exerts on the ideals of autonomy and self-possession sharpen one of the major absences of the Consolation: viz., the unanswered question of whether Philosophy's therapies have actually consoled Boethius. Chapter two considers one of the Consolation's fascinating and paradoxical afterlives: Robert Holcot's Postilla super librum sapientiae (1340-43). I argue that Holcot's Stoic conception of wisdom, a conception he explicitly links with Boethius's Consolation, relies on a model of agency that is strikingly similar to the powers of self-knowledge that Philosophy argues Boethius to posses. Chapter three examines Chaucer's fullest exploration of the Boethian model of selfhood and his ultimate rejection of it in Troilus and Criseyde. The poem, which Chaucer called his "tragedy," belonged to a genre of classical writing he knew of only from Philosophy's brief mention of it in the Consolation. Chaucer appropriates the genre to explore and recover mourning as a meaningful act. In Chapter four, I turn to Dante and the House of Fame to consider Chaucer's self-reflections about his ambitions as a poet and the demands of truth-telling.

Chasing butterflies: The Conception of the Soul in Plutarch’s Works

When first approaching a topic such as the concept of material or natural soul in Greek literature, the researcher might be puzzled. While in diverse contemporary cultures, numerous theriomorphic figures (bears, ravens, mice, wasps, bees, dragonflies, and dung-beetles) serve to represent the human soul in its transmigration from life to death, this is not the case in Greek culture. At least, this is what one may conclude from the monograph written by the Dutch scholar J. Bremmer, The early Greek Concept of the Soul: "importunely, there are no other indications of a possible connection between the butterfly and the soul of the living and the dead" (1987: 64). Given Plutarch’s great interest in the soul, which can be seen in a variety of texts referring to its generation, form, internal dichotomy, material substance, origin and destination, etc., the question arises as to whether Plutarch also includes such a representation of the soul when departing from the dead body. Does the corpus plutarcheum preserve and transmit such conception of the human soul? And if it does, are we dealing with survival of ancestral beliefs or motifs or is it a simple metaphor by means of which ancients intended to express the departing of the life-breath? In the following pages I will focus on three texts that allegedly include the butterfly-motif to represent the human soul, to wit, Table Talks 636C, Consolation to his Wife 611F, and the fragment 177 Sandbach.

TOWARD A POLITICAL CONCEPTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS: RECONCILING SOVEREIGNTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MINORITY CLAIMS

The question that I will explore in this research dissertation is whether one can defend the rights of homeland minorities as a progressive extension of the existing norms of human rights. This question calls for several deeper inquiries about the nature, the function and the underlying justifications for both human rights and minority rights. In particular, this research project will examine the following issues: on what normative grounds the available norms of human rights and minority rights are justified; if there is any methodic way to use the normative logic of human rights to support substantial forms of minority claims, such as the right to self-determination; whether human rights can take the form of group rights; and finally, whether there is any non-sectarian basis for justifying the minority norms, which can be acceptable from both liberal and non-liberal perspectives. This research project has some implications for both theories of minority rights and human rights. On the one hand, the research employs the topic of minority rights to shed light on deficiencies of the existing political theories of human rights. On the other hand, it uses the political theory to shed light on how existing theories of minority rights could be improved and amended. The inquiry will ultimately clarify how to judge the merit of the claim that minority rights are or should be a part of human rights norms.