Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers

We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a better manager's control but makes manager's decisions hard to react when market conditions change. It tends to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in low-competitive environments. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt the Code when managers are not too heterogeneous while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, the shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce to hire the best managers, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.

Non-competitive markets

Among all the paradigms in economic theory, the theoretical predictions of oligopoly were the first to be examined in the laboratory. In this chapter, instead of surveying all the experiments with few sellers, we adopt a narrower definition of the term “oligopoly”, and focus on the experiments that were directly inspired by the basic oligopolistic models of Cournot, Bertrand, Hotelling, Stackelberg, and some extensions. Most of the experiments we consider in this chapter have been run in the last three decades. This literature can be considered as a new wave of experimental works aiming at representing basic oligopolistic markets and testing their properties. The chapter is divided into independent sections referring to different parts of the oligopolistic theory, including both monopoly as well as a number of extensions of the basic models, which have been chosen with the aim of providing a representative list of the relevant experimental findings.

Non-Linear Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive Markets

This thesis is dedicated to the analysis of non-linear pricing in oligopoly. Non-linear pricing is a fairly predominant practice in most real markets, mostly characterized by some amount of competition. The sophistication of pricing practices has increased in the latest decades due to the technological advances that have allowed companies to gather more and more data on consumers preferences. The first essay of the thesis highlights the main characteristics of oligopolistic non-linear pricing. Non-linear pricing is a special case of price discrimination. The theory of price discrimination has to be modified in presence of oligopoly: in particular, a crucial role is played by the competitive externality that implies that product differentiation is closely related to the possibility of discriminating. The essay reviews the theory of competitive non-linear pricing by starting from its foundations, mechanism design under common agency. The different approaches to model non-linear pricing are then reviewed. In particular, the difference between price and quantity competition is highlighted. Finally, the close link between non-linear pricing and the recent developments in the theory of vertical differentiation is explored. The second essay shows how the effects of non-linear pricing are determined by the relationship between the demand and the technological structure of the market. The chapter focuses on a model in which firms supply a homogeneous product in two different sizes. Information about consumers' reservation prices is incomplete and the production technology is characterized by size economies. The model provides insights on the size of the products that one finds in the market. Four equilibrium regions are identified depending on the relative intensity of size economies with respect to consumers' evaluation of the good. Regions for which the product is supplied in a single unit or in several different sizes or in only a very large one. Both the private and social desirability of non-linear pricing varies across different equilibrium regions. The third essay considers the broadband internet market. Non discriminatory issues seem the core of the recent debate on the opportunity or not of regulating the internet. One of the main questions posed is whether the telecom companies, owning the networks constituting the internet, should be allowed to offer quality-contingent contracts to content providers. The aim of this essay is to analyze the issue through a stylized two-sided market model of the web that highlights the effects of such a discrimination over quality, prices and participation to the internet of providers and final users. An overall welfare comparison is proposed, concluding that the final effects of regulation crucially depend on both the technology and preferences of agents.

Supply chain innovation for competing in highly competitive markets:challenges and solutions

Rapid changes in technological development are forcing businesses to continuously innovate to improve their competitiveness, which is particularly evident in logistics and supply chain management (SCM), where innovation impacts both the strategic and operational levels. Supply Chain Innovation for Competing in Highly Dynamic Markets: Challenges and Solutions investigates the role of innovation in the management of supply chains of today. This book focuses on supply chain integration from both strategic and operational perspectives and the impact of information technology-related innovation in supply chain and logistics service industries. It also analyzes how environmental innovation affects logistical decisions throughout the supply chain and the strategies employed in managing logistics-related environmental impacts. Finally, the book explores theoretical and practical implications of innovation in the management of supply systems.

Promoting competitive markets:the role of public procurement

The study presented here examines how public procurement agencies address establishing and maintaining competitive markets; a topic still in its academic infancy. Cases are used to address impediments and improve understanding of strategic priorities in managing for competitive markets. Public policy academics have observed many competing policies in the wider public sector. Specifically, this paper identifies a need for research on supplier incentives at a market level, on the post contract management of suppliers and as an important sub-set, key supplier relationship management, along with professional development.

On the fundamentals of research and development (R&D) spillovers in competitive markets

Rivals may voluntarily share Research and Development (R&D) results even in the absence of any binding agreements or collusion. In a model where rival firms engage in non-cooperative independent R&D process, we used optimization and game theory analysis to study the equilibrium strategy of the firms. Our work showed that, while minimal spillover is always equilibrium, there may be another equilibrium where firms may reciprocally choose high, sometimes perfect, spillover rates. The incentive for sharing R&D output is based on firms' expectations of learning from their rivals' R&D progress in the future. This leads to strategic complementarities between the firms' choices of spillover rates and thus policy implication follows. ^ Public research agencies can contribute more to social welfare by providing research as public goods. In a non-cooperative public-private research relationship where parallel R&D is conducted, by making its R&D results accessible, the public research agency can stimulate private spillovers, even if there exists rivalry among the private firms who can benefit from such spillovers. ^

Multi-agent Simulation of Bilateral Contracting in Competitive Electricity Markets

Traditional vertically integrated power utilities around the world have evolved from monopoly structures to open markets that promote competition among suppliers and provide consumers with a choice of services. Market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. Electricity can be traded in both organized markets or using forward bilateral contracts. This article focuses on bilateral contracts and describes some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral trading in competitive markets. Special attention is devoted to the negotiation process, demand response in bilateral contracting, and risk management. The article also presents a case study on forward bilateral contracting: a retailer agent and a customer agent negotiate a 24h-rate tariff. © 2014 IEEE.

Multi-agent simulation of bilateral contracting in competitive electricity markets

Traditional vertically integrated power utilities around the world have evolved from monopoly structures to open markets that promote competition among suppliers and provide consumers with a choice of services. Market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. Electricity can be traded in both organized markets or using forward bilateral contracts. This article focuses on bilateral contracts and describes some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral trading in competitive markets. Special attention is devoted to the negotiation process, demand response in bilateral contracting, and risk management. The article also presents a case study on forward bilateral contracting: a retailer agent and a customer agent negotiate a 24h-rate tariff. © 2014 IEEE.

Multi-agent Simulation of Bilateral Contracting in Competitive Electricity Markets

Traditional vertically integrated power utilities around the world have evolved from monopoly structures to open markets that promote competition among suppliers and provide consumers with a choice of services. Market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. Electricity can be traded in both organized markets or using forward bilateral contracts. This article focuses on bilateral contracts and describes some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral trading in competitive markets. Special attention is devoted to the negotiation process, demand response in bilateral contracting, and risk management. The article also presents a case study on forward bilateral contracting: a retailer agent and a customer agent negotiate a 24h-rate tariff.

Harmful competition in the insurance markets

There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance. Performing simulation for di erent distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium. However, most of the surplus is retained by the firm and, as a result, most individuals prefer competitive markets notwithstanding their performance is generally poorer than monopoly.

Data, Competition, and Consumer Privacy in Digital Markets

In digital markets personal information is pervasively collected by firms. In the first chapter I study data ownership and product customization when there is exclusive access to non rival but excludable data about consumer preferences. I show that an incumbent firm does not have an incentive to sell an exclusively held dataset with a rival firm, but instead it has an incentive to trade a customizing technology with the other firm. In the second chapter I investigate the effects of consumer information on the intensity of competition. In a two dimensional model of product differentiation, firms use information on preferences to practice price discrimination. I contrast a full privacy and a no privacy benchmark with a regime in which firms are able to target consumers only partially. When data is partially informative, firms are always better-off with price discrimination and an exclusive access to user data is not necessarily a competition policy concern. From a consumer protection perspective, the policy recommendation is that the regulator should promote either no privacy or full privacy. In the third chapter I introduce a data broker that observes either only one or both dimensions of consumer information and sells this data to competing firms for price discrimination purposes. When the seller exogenously holds a partially informative dataset, an exclusive allocation arises. Instead, when the dataset held is fully informative, the data broker trades information non exclusively but each competitor acquires consumer data on a different dimension. When data collection is made endogenous, non exclusivity is robust if collection costs are not too high. The competition policy suggestion is that exclusivity should not be banned per se, but it is data differentiation in equilibrium that rises market power in competitive markets. Upstream competition is sufficient to ensure that both firms get access to consumer information.

Can globalisation result in less efficient and more vulnerable industries?

Growing economic globalisation (a means of market extension) may increase the economic vulnerability of firms in modern industries, especially those in which firms experience substantial economies of scale. The possibility is explored that globalisation activates competitive pressures that forces firms into a situation where their leverage (fixed costs relative to variable costs, or overhead cost relative to operating costs or capital intensity) rises substantially. Consequently, they become increasingly vulnerable to a sudden adverse change in economic conditions, such as a collapse in the demand for their industry’s product. This is explored for monopolistically competitive markets and also for oligopolistic markets of the type considered and modelled by Sweezy using kinked demand curves. In addition, globalisation is hypothesised to induce firms to become more uniformly efficient. While this has static efficiency advantages, this lack of heterogeneity in productive efficiency of firms can make for economic inefficiency in the adjustment of the industry to altered economic conditions. It is shown that lack of variation in the economic efficiency of firms can impede the speed of market adjustment to new equilibria and may destabilise market equilibria.

Least-Cost Planning and electricity industry reform in Australia

Least-Cost Planning played a key role in the development of the energy efficiency and renewable energy industries in the USA, It has not been widely used elsewhere, largely due to differences in other nations' regulatory environments and the emergence of competitive markets as the dominant paradigm for electricity planning, Least-Cost Planning, however may over valuable insights for creating regulatory framework for competitive electricity markers. This paper examines some lessons which may be extracted from an analysis of the Least-Cost Planning experience in the USA and suggests how these lessons might prove beneficial in guiding Australia's electricity industry reform, This analysis demonstrates how market-based reforms may be flawed if they ignore the history of previous reform processes.

Using demand response to deal with unexpected low wind power generation in the context of smart grid

Demand response is assumed an essential resource to fully achieve the smart grids operating benefits, namely in the context of competitive markets. Some advantages of Demand Response (DR) programs and of smart grids can only be achieved through the implementation of Real Time Pricing (RTP). The integration of the expected increasing amounts of distributed energy resources, as well as new players, requires new approaches for the changing operation of power systems. The methodology proposed aims the minimization of the operation costs in a smart grid operated by a virtual power player. It is especially useful when actual and day ahead wind forecast differ significantly. When facing lower wind power generation than expected, RTP is used in order to minimize the impacts of such wind availability change. The proposed model application is here illustrated using the scenario of a special wind availability reduction day in the Portuguese power system (8th February 2012).