Software developer policies : economics and s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010

This article considers the impact of developer policies that hinder or restrict cross platform application development. We suggest that policies that hinder or restrict cross platform development have the potential to erode competition within the market for smartphones. The article also considers the relevance of dominance measures in software markets, arguing that conventional economic approaches may not be applicable. Furthermore, while most monitoring activities tend to focus primarily on protection of consumers, the article points out that modern electronic/information technology markets are multi-sided and there is a need for monitoring of practices designed to attract and retain the favour of developers. While the article is written in the context and application of the applicable Australian legislation, this being s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), our findings are equally relevant to other jurisdictions.

Joint ventures and the Competition and Consumer Act

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the way in which joint venture agreements can fall within the competition provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, and the circumstances in which authorisation may be available for joint venture collaborations.

Standardised packaging and new enlarged graphic health warnings for tobacco products in Australia--legislative requirements and implementation of the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 and the Competition and Consumer (Tobacco) Information Standard, 2011

This paper describes the development, content and implementation of two pieces of Australian tobacco control legislation: one to standardise the packaging of tobacco products and the other to introduce new, enlarged graphic health warnings. It describes the process of legislative drafting, public consultation and parliamentary consideration. It summarises exactly how tobacco products have been required to look since late 2012. Finally, it describes implementation, most particularly, the extent to which packs compliant with the legislation became available to consumers over time.

‘Lemon Laws’: an inquiry into consumer protections and remedies for buyers of new motor vehicles

1. Under the Terms of Reference for the Committee’s Inquiry, ‘lemons’ are defined as ‘new motor vehicles with numerous, severe defects that re-occur despite multiple repair attempts or where defects have caused a new motor vehicle to be out of service for a prolonged period of time’. Consumers are currently protected in relation to lemon purchases by the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) located in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA). The ACL applies as a law of Queensland pursuant to the Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld). The voluntary recall and consumer guarantees law took effect on 1 January 2011. 2. In 2006, the Government of Victoria made a commitment to introduce a lemon law into the provisions of the then Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic). The public consultation process on the proposal to introduce a lemon law for motor vehicle purchases in Victoria was conducted by Ms Janice Munt MP, with the assistance of Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV). CAV released an Issues Paper to canvas with industry and the community options for the development and introduction of a motor vehicle lemon law.(Consumer Affairs Victoria, Introducing Victorian motor vehicle lemon laws, Issues Paper, (September, 2007). 3. A CAV report prepared by Janice Munt MP was released in July, 2008 (Consumer Affairs Victoria, Motor Cars: A report on the motor vehicle lemon law consultations (July 2008) (Victorian Lemon Law Report). However, the Victorian proposal was overtaken by events leading to the adoption of a uniform consumer protection law in all Australian jurisdictions, the ACL. 4. The structure of this submission is to consider first the three different bases upon which consumers can obtain relief for economic loss arising from defects in motor vehicles. The second part of the submission considers the difficulties encountered by consumers in litigating motor vehicle disputes in the courts and tribunals. The third part of the submission examines the approach taken in other jurisdictions to resolving motor vehicle disputes. The final part of the submission considers a number of possible reforms that could be made to the existing law and its enforcement to reduce consumer detriment arising from the purchase of ‘lemon’ motor vehicles. 5. There are three principal bases upon which a consumer can obtain redress for defects in new motor vehicles under the ACL. The first is where the manufacturer admits liability and initiates the voluntary recall procedure provided for in s 128 of the ACL. Under this basis the manufacturer generally repairs or replaces the part subject to the recall free of charge. The second basis is where the manufacturer or dealer denies liability and the consumer is initiates proceedings in the court or tribunal seeking a statutory remedy under the ACL, the nature of which will depend on whether the failure to comply with the consumer guarantee was major or not. The third basis upon which a consumer can obtain redress is pursuant to public enforcement by the ACCC. Each basis will be considered in this part. What all three bases have in common is the need to conduct an investigation to identify the nature of the defect and how it arose.

Intellectual Property and Joint Ventures

Following upon the success of the 2nd edition published in 2005, this new edition not only updates its predecessor but also adds considerable new material in consequences of changes in the law generally and commercial approaches to financing joint ventures in particular. Of special note are the following: Financing of Joint Ventures has been completely re-written with considerable additions to take account of the new legislative regimes such as the Personal Property Securities, the impact of climate change legislation, specifically carbon pricing with additional material on structuring generally and particularly in relation to large joint ventures with governments through Public Private Partnerships. A new Chapter called Resources Joint Ventures undertakes a thorough analysis of a typical resources joint venture and is heavily cross referenced into the chapter on Default which has also been updated. International Joint Ventures now includes additional material on structuring and dispute resolution. Joint Ventures and the Competition and Consumer Act has been substantially re-written to take account of 2009 legislative amendments on cartel conduct, and the impact of changes wrought by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. All other chapters and material has been updated to accommodate other legislative changes and new case law over the seven years since the last edition.

The Australian Consumer Law

Reform of Australia’s inconsistent Commonwealth, State and Territory consumer laws is now a reality. The 1 January 2011 commencement of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL), within the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, is the culmination of a long process of consultation. Unifying and rationalising the plethora of laws, this new Act sees the disappearance of the “Trade Practices Act” and the amendment of a raft of State and Territory legislation; the new national regime informed by them operates in their stead. This is indisputably the most comprehensive change in the history of the Trade Practices Act 1974. This book aims to assist practitioners, academics and students understand the Australian Consumer Law regime and its impact. It summarises the history and constitutional basis of the ACL, explaining how the ACL will be implemented, amended and enforced. In addition it explores how the various general and specific protections interrelate, and the scope of their overlap, and considers the content of the ACL, and the principal changes from the provisions of the Trade Practices Act.

A toothless chihuahua? : the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, neoliberalism and supermarket power in Australia

During the Senate Inquiry into 'milk price wars' in 2011, Senator Nick Xenophon accused the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) of being 'less effective than a toothless Chihuahua'. This follows the ACCC's lack of action regarding the reported abuse of market power of Australia's supermarket duopoly, where an extensive inquiry into the competitiveness of retail prices in 2008 found grocery retailing to be 'workably competitive' despite numerous claims to the contrary. How can farmers' submissions to the inquiry that cite market abuse be reconciled with the ACCC's finding that all is well in the food supply chain? Following an in-depth examination of 53 farmer submissions to the inquiry, we conclude that the findings of the ACCC are commensurate with the neoliberal economisation of the political sphere, where commercial entities 'legitimately' govern beyond their corporate boundaries, often using disciplinary measures that were once exclusive to governments. We argue that such clear structural inequalities between farmers and major corporations is reason to re-regulate markets and reinsert a stronger role for government to 'level the playing field'.

Competition Law in Australia [6th ed.]

Competition Law in Australia, 6th edition provides a comprehensive discussion of the provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) dealing with the regulation of competition and markets in Australia. This book covers disparate topics, such as restrictions in horizontal and vertical agreements, horizontal mergers and acquisitions, misuse of market power, and access to services necessary to compete in upstream or downstream markets. However, the unifying theme of this text is that it is not possible to use a formalistic approach in applying the CCA. The decisions of the courts, and the competition authorities responsible for implementing and enforcing the CCA, underline the need to undertake a detailed substantive economic analysis of the effect of the agreement or conduct at issue on competition, efficiency and consumer welfare.

Competition policy review : draft recommendations on competition laws

On 4 December 2013, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Small Business announced a “root and branch” review of Australia’s competition policy. The Minister for Small Business released the final Terms of Reference for the competition policy review on 27 March 2014, following consultation with the States and Territories, and announced the Review Panel headed by Professor Ian Harper. Under the terms of reference the Competition Policy Review Committee (the Harper Committee) is required to focus on three broad areas: •examining what can be done to create more competition in service areas such as health, education and intellectual property; •considering whether the structure and powers of the competition institutions (the ACCC , the NCC, the Tribunal and the AER) remain appropriate; and •examining the effectiveness of the competition provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) and laying down a broad framework through which the law can be streamlined and reformed over time.

Regulating unilateral supermarket misconduct as customer/acquirer of goods and services

Supermarkets in Australia may have substantial market power as buyers in wholesale markets for grocery products. They may also have substantial bargaining power in negotiating contracts with their suppliers of grocery products. The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) regulates misconduct by supermarkets as customer/acquirers in three ways. First, s 46(1) of the CCA prohibits the ‘taking advantage’ of buyer power for the purpose of damaging a competitor, preventing entry or deterring or preventing competitive conduct. Secondly, s 21 of the ACL prohibits unconscionable conduct in business–to–business transactions. Thirdly, Pt IVB of the CCA provides for the promulgation of mandatory and voluntary industry codes of conduct. Since 1 July 2015 the conduct of supermarkets as customer/acquirers has been regulated by the Food and Grocery Industry Code of Conduct. This article examines these three different approaches. It considers them against the background of the misconduct at issue in ACCC v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd which the ACCC chose to litigate as an unconscionable conduct case, rather than a misuse of market power case. The article also considers the strengths and weaknesses of each of the three approaches and concludes that while the three approaches address different problems there is scope for overlap and all three should be retained for compete coverage.

Retail competition and consumer choice:contextualising the “food deserts” debate

The “food deserts” debate can be enriched by setting the particular circumstances of food deserts – areas of very limited consumer choice – within a wider context of changing retail provision in other areas. This paper’s combined focus on retail competition and consumer choice shifts the emphasis from changing patterns of retail provision towards a more qualitative understanding of how “choice” is actually experienced by consumers at the local level “on the ground”. This argument has critical implications for current policy debates where the emphasis on monopolies and mergers at the national level needs to be brought together with the planning and regulation of retail provision at the local, neighbourhood level.

Joint Ventures Law in Australia (3rd ed.)

Following on from the 2nd edition published in 2005, this new edition updates its predecessor and adds considerable new material as a result of changes in the law generally and commercial approaches to financing joint ventures in particular. Of special note, Financing of Joint Ventures has been completely re-written with considerable additions to take account of the new legislative regimes such as the Personal Property Securities. The impact of climate change legislation has been covered, specifically carbon pricing with additional material on structuring generally and particularly in relation to large joint ventures with governments through Public Private Partnerships. A new Chapter has been added called Resources Joint Ventures and undertakes a thorough analysis of a typical resources joint venture and is heavily cross referenced into the chapter on Default which has also been updated. In addition, International Joint Ventures now includes additional material on structuring and dispute resolution and Joint Ventures and the Competition and Consumer Act has been substantially re-written to take account of 2009 legislative amendments on cartel conduct, and the impact of changes wrought by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. All other chapters and material has been updated to accommodate other legislative changes and new case law over the seven years since the last edition.

Agents as intermediaries : when do they compete with their suppliers?

In cases involving allegations of price fixing under the former s 45A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), it was necessary to prove that at least two parties to the arrangement or understanding at issue were “in competition with each other”. The same requirement is contained in the cartel provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) that replaced s 45A. The so-called “competition condition” is set out in s 44ZZRD (4) of the CCA. Where a supplier enters into vertical supply arrangements with agents or brokers, problems can arise if the supplier also has a downstream presence. At that functional level there may be a horizontal and therefore competitive dimension, and the competition condition may be satisfied. In such circumstances, great care will need to be taken in any discussions between the supplier and its downstream agents or distributors about the prices, discounts, allowances, rebates or credits that the agent or distributor may charge. Whether agents or brokers competed with their suppliers in vertical supply arrangements arose for consideration in two decisions handed down by the Federal Court in Brisbane...

When should private property rights give way to the public interest?

Since Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177 it has been recognised that corporations with substantial market power are subject to special responsibilities and restraints that corporations without market power are not. In NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 219 CLR 90 McHugh A-CJ, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ in their joint reasons stated (at [76]), that s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) can operate not only to prevent firms with substantial market power from doing prohibited things, but also compel them positively to do things they do not want to do. Their Honours also stated (at [126]) that the proposition that a private property owner who declines to permit competitors to use the property is immune from s 46 is “intrinsically unsound”. However, the circumstances in which a firm with substantial power must accommodate competitors, and private property rights give way to the public interest are uncertain. The purpose of this Note is to consider recent developments in two areas of the CCA where the law requires private property rights to give way to the public interest. The first part of the Note considers two recent cases which clarify the circumstances in which s 46 of the CCA can be used to compel a firm with substantial market power to accommodate a competitor and allow the competitor to make use of private property rights in the public interest. Secondly, on 12 February 2014 the Minister for Small Business, the Hon Bruce Billson,released the Productivity Commission’s Final Report, on the National Access Regime in Pt IIIA of the CCA (National Access Regime, Inquiry Report No 66, Canberra). Pt IIIA provides for the processes by which third parties may obtain access to infrastructure owned by others in the public interest. The Report recommends that Pt IIIA be retained but makes a number of suggestions for its reform, some of which will be briefly considered.