969 resultados para Competition Law
Resumo:
Vietnam's present draft of the proposed new Law on Competition is currently in its ninth version. Although there is a need to enact legislation as quickly as possible, Vietnam cannot rush the drafting process. Under its Bilateral Trade Agreement with the USA, Vietnam has committed to improve the quality of its laws and consistency of its legislative framework. Since the Law on Competition will be fundamental in establishing the legal framework for a more coherent and effective competition regime, and will have profound influences on Vietnam's objective of becoming a socialist-oriented market economy, its provisions must be well constructed and well considered, and this takes time. This article shows how the proposed Law is being crafted as compared to older drafts which sheds light on changes in policy during the drafting process. Where possible, the Draft is also compared with the laws in other jurisdictions for any assistance they might lend. In this author's opinion not all the changes are positive but any defects in the draft are not intractable and can be remedied prior to promulgation.
Resumo:
Since 1986 Vietnam has been engaged in the transition from a centrally-controlled economy to a socialist-oriented market economy (the 'doi moi' renovation). The process for global economic integration has been slow given the magnitude of necessary reforms. Consequently technology entrepreneurs often discount Vietnam as a possible commercialization base which means that it is not realising its economic potential as a hub of technology transfer in the Asia-Pacific region. Three significant factors in the current uncertainty are Vietnam's laws on competition, intellectual property and technology transfer. Another problem is the lack of literature on these laws. This article first discusses the conceptual relationship between competition, intellectual property and technology transfer. Hopefully the article will provide some guidance for the technology entrepreneur considering foreign direct investment (FDI) in Vietnam. The bottom line is that these laws still need further reform to bolster entrepreneurial confidence.
Resumo:
This article examines the problem of patent ambush in standard setting, where patent owners are sometimes able to capture industry standards in order to secure monopoly power and windfall profits. Because standardisation generally introduces high switching costs, patent ambush can impose significant costs on downstream manufacturers and consumers and drastically reduce the efficiency gains of standardisation.This article considers how Australian competition law is likely to apply to patent ambush both in the development of a standard (through misrepresenting the existence of an essential patent) and after a standard is implemented (through refusing to license an essential patented technology either at all or on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms). This article suggests that non-disclosure of patent interests is unlikely to restrained by Part IV of the Trade Practices Act (TPA), and refusals to license are only likely to be restrained if the refusal involves leveraging or exclusive dealing. By contrast, Standard Setting Organisations (SSOs) which seek to limit this behaviour through private ordering may face considerable scrutiny under the new cartel provisions of the TPA. This article concludes that SSOs may be best advised to implement administrative measures to prevent patent hold-up, such as reviewing which patents are essential for the implementation of a standard, asking patent holders to make their licence conditions public to promote transparency, and establishing forums where patent licensees can complain about licence terms that they consider to be unreasonable or discriminatory. Additionally, the ACCC may play a role in authorising SSO policies that could otherwise breach the new cartel provisions, but which have the practical effect of promoting competition in the standards setting environment.
Resumo:
Competition Law in Australia, 6th edition provides a comprehensive discussion of the provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) dealing with the regulation of competition and markets in Australia. This book covers disparate topics, such as restrictions in horizontal and vertical agreements, horizontal mergers and acquisitions, misuse of market power, and access to services necessary to compete in upstream or downstream markets. However, the unifying theme of this text is that it is not possible to use a formalistic approach in applying the CCA. The decisions of the courts, and the competition authorities responsible for implementing and enforcing the CCA, underline the need to undertake a detailed substantive economic analysis of the effect of the agreement or conduct at issue on competition, efficiency and consumer welfare.
Resumo:
Free software is viewed as a revolutionary and subversive practice, and in particular has dealt a strong blow to the traditional conception of intellectual property law (although in its current form could be considered a 'hack' of IP rights). However, other (capitalist) areas of law have been swift to embrace free software, or at least incorporate it into its own tenets. One area in particular is that of competition (antitrust) law, which itself has long been in theoretical conflict with intellectual property, due to the restriction on competition inherent in the grant of ‘monopoly’ rights by copyrights, patents and trademarks. This contribution will examine how competition law has approached free software by examining instances in which courts have had to deal with such initiatives, for instance in the Oracle Sun Systems merger, and the implications that these decisions have on free software initiatives. The presence or absence of corporate involvement in initiatives will be an important factor in this investigation, with it being posited that true instances of ‘commons-based peer production’ can still subvert the capitalist system, including perplexing its laws beyond intellectual property.
Resumo:
The European desire to ensure that bearers of EU rights are adequately compensated for any infringement of these rights, particularly in cases where the harm is widely diffused, and perhaps not even noticed by those affected by it, collides with another desire: to avoid the perceived excesses of an American-style system of class actions. The excesses of these American class actions are in European discourse presented as a sort of bogeyman, which is a source of irrational fear, often presented by parental or other authority figures. But when looked at critically, the bogeyman disappears. In this paper, I examine the European (and UK) proposals for collective action. I compare them to the American regime. The flaws and purported excesses of the American regime, I argue, are exaggerated. A close, objective examination of the American regime shows this. I conclude that it is not the mythical bogeyman of a US class action that is the barrier to effective collective redress; rather, the barriers to effective, wide-ranging group actions lie within European legal culture and traditions, particularly those mandating individual control over litigation.
Resumo:
While transnational antitrust enforcement is becoming only more common, the access to foreign-based evidence remains a considerable practical challenge. This article appraises considerations and concerns surrounding confidentiality, and looks into ways of their possible accommodation. It further identifies and critically evaluates the existing mechanisms allowing for inter-agency confidential information/ evidence sharing in competition law enforcement. The article outlines the shortcomings of the current framework and points to novel unilateral approaches. In the latter regard the focus is devoted to Australia, where the competition agency is empowered to share confidential information with foreign counterparts, also without any underlying bilateral agreement and on a non-reciprocal basis. This solution shows that a pragmatic and workable approach to inter-agency evidence sharing can be achieved.