856 resultados para Competition In Health Insurance
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There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance. Performing simulation for di erent distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium. However, most of the surplus is retained by the firm and, as a result, most individuals prefer competitive markets notwithstanding their performance is generally poorer than monopoly.
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This paper focuses on the switching behaviour of enrolees in the Swiss basic health insurance system. Even though the new Federal Law on Social Health Insurance (LAMal) was implemented in 1996 to promote competition among health insurers in basic insurance, there is limited evidence of premium convergence within cantons. This indicates that competition has not been effective so far, and reveals some inertia among consumers who seem reluctant to switch to less expensive funds. We investigate one possible barrier to switching behaviour, namely the influence of supplementary insurance. We use survey data on health plan choice (a sample of 1943 individuals whose switching behaviours were observed between 1997 and 2000) as well as administrative data relative to all insurance companies that operated in the 26 Swiss cantons between 1996 and 2005. The decision to switch and the decision to subscribe to a supplementary contract are jointly estimated.Our findings show that holding a supplementary insurance contract substantially decreases the propensity to switch. However, there is no negative impact of supplementary insurance on switching when the individual assesses his/her health as 'very good'. Our results give empirical support to one possible mechanism through which supplementary insurance might influence switching decisions: given that subscribing to basic and supplementary contracts with two different insurers may induce some administrative costs for the subscriber, holding supplementary insurance acts as a barrier to switch if customers who consider themselves 'bad risks' also believe that insurers reject applications for supplementary insurance on these grounds. In comparison with previous research, our main contribution is to offer a possible explanation for consumer inertia. Our analysis illustrates how consumer choice for one's basic health plan interacts with the decision to subscribe to supplementary insurance.
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Background. Lack of coverage, lack of access, and failure to utilize health care services have all been linked to dismal health outcomes in the US. Such consequences have been a longstanding challenge that US minorities are faced with, in the context of a health care system believed to be lacking efficiency and equity. National population surveys in the US suggest that the number of uninsured approaches 50 millions, while some concerns and suspicions are raised by opponents to the growing number of foreign born US residents, many of whom are Hispanic. Research shows that race is a significant predictor of lack of coverage, access, and utilization, while age, gender, education, and income are also linked to these outcomes. We investigated the potential effect of immigration status or duration in the US on the association between coverage, access, use, and race. Methods. Using National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) data of 2006, we selected 22, 667 individuals of Non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and Non-Hispanic White descent, at least 18 years of age, US-born and foreign-born who reported their duration of residence in the US. Through complex sample survey logistic regression analysis, we computed odds ratios, beta coefficients, and 95% confidence intervals using models which excluded then included immigration status. Results. Although a significant predictor of the outcomes, immigration status did not change the relationship between each of the dependent variables (coverage, access, utilization), and the factor race, while adjusting for age, gender, education, and income. Our results show that Hispanics were least likely to have coverage (OR=.58; 95% CI[.49, .68]), access (OR=.62; 95% CI[.50, .76]), and to utilize services (OR=.60; 95% CI[.46, .79]) followed by Non-Hispanic Blacks, and Non-Hispanic Whites. These results were not changed by stratification, or the inclusion of interaction terms to eliminate the potential effect of relationships between independent variables. Recent immigrants (<5 years in US) were 0.12 times less likely to be insured, but also 0.26 times less likely to utilize services (p<0.001), and in addition they represented only 7.3% of the uninsured and 1.9% of the US population in 2006. Furthermore, 12% of the Non-Hispanic White population in the US was not covered, and 65% of the uninsured individuals were US-Born Citizens. Other predictors of lack of coverage, access and use were age below 45, male gender, education at high school or below, and income of less than $20,000. Conclusion. This investigation shows that the high percentage of uninsured was not directly caused by Hispanics, and immigration status alone could not explain racial differences in coverage, access, and utilization. An immigration reform may not be the solution to the healthcare crisis, and more specifically, will not stop the increase in the number of uninsured in the US, nor reduce the cost of health care. As a better alternative, universal health insu rance coverage should be considered, when aiming to eliminate racial disparities, and to solve the health care crisis. ^ Keywords. health insurance, coverage, access, utilization, race, immigration, disparities.^
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In the 1990s, competition among public health insurance funds (‘sickness funds’) was introduced in Germany. As one means of competition, free choice of initial health funds and subsequent switching between them was made available to all insured. Since then, the number of funds has decreased substantially, and funds have had to engage in competitive strategies to remain in the market. In this paper, we want to analyse the funds' advertising activities in the face of the changed competitive environment. This has not been possible to date due to a lack of data. We use two new datasets to get a first insight into the potential effects of competition on funds' advertising strategies; one of the volume and cost of advertisements and one of their contents. Our results suggest that competition has been associated with an increase in the amount of advertising. As to the adverts themselves, we find that there was a decrease in the share of advertisements of a ‘general’ content in favour of advertisements of a more ‘fund-specific’ content. The data therefore indicate that once the market was open to switching of funds by the insured, funds' advertising efforts changed to differentiating their own perceived strengths from those of competitor funds. These observations allow us to draw some tentative conclusions about the relevance of (attempts of) risk selection by health funds via advertisements and about the general success of the pro-competitive legislation.
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This report was prepared independently by Mr McLoughlin with the insurers support, for consideration by the Minister for Health and the insurers. All parties were very conscious of the importance of respecting competition law when dealing with issues such as prices and costs. The Phase 1 report contains 32 recommendations under 9 headings as follows: Most of the recommendations in the Phase 1 report could be implemented on an administrative basis, while a small number, if adopted, would require legislation. Some of the key recommendations to drive down costs are can be summarised as follows: Controlling costs in private health insurance Care settings and use of resources Age structure of the market Clinical audit and utilisation management Industry approach to private psychiatry Fraud, waste and abuse Chronic disease management Claims processing Admission and discharge procedures and processes. Most of the recommendations in the Phase 1 report could be implemented on an administrative basis, while a small number, if adopted, would require legislation.
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5.11.2014 This report was prepared independently by Mr McLoughlin with the support of the health insurers, and the Health Insurance Authority, for consideration by the Minister for Health and the insurers. All parties were very conscious of the importance of respecting competition law when dealing with issues such as prices and costs. The work of the Group has been conducted in two phases, with the first phase report published on 26 December 2013. The Phase 1 report sets out the context, establishment, membership and terms of reference for both phases of the Groups work. The report also outlines the legislative provisions for private health insurance in Ireland, the objectives of both phases of the review and the approach and methodology followed. Phase 2 of the process focused on the compilation and analysis by the Health Insurance Authority (HIA) of claims data to assess the cost drivers for health insurance, the effects of medical technology and innovations on costs, and claims processing issues.The report and submissions from relevant stakeholders which were examined and considered under the Phase 2 Review can be downloaded below. Download the Review of Measures to Reduce Costs in the Private Health Insurance Market 2014 - Independent Report to the Minister for Health and Health Insurance Council here. Submissions received HSE Submission to Pat McLoughlin, Chair of Review Group IHAI submission 11 April 2014 IHCA submission to Chair 1 May 2014 Insurance Ireland submission Society of Actuaries in Ireland submission St. Patricks Mental Health Services submission April 2014 St John of Gods Submission    ÂÂ
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Las regulaciones como primaje comunitario, paquetes estandarizados y afiliación abierta, orientadas a reducir el impacto de las fallas en los mercados de seguros, tienen un efecto limitado puesto que abren espacio a la selección sesgada. A partir de 1993, el sistema de seguridad social en salud en Colombia fue reformado hacia un enfoque de mercado con la expectativa de mejorar el desempeño de los monopolios preexistentes exponiéndolos a la competencia de nuevos entrantes. La hipótesis que se maneja en el trabajo es que las fallas de mercado pueden llevar a selección sesgada favoreciendo a los nuevos entrantes. Se analizaron dos encuestas de hogares utilizando el estado de salud auto reportado y la presencia de enfermedad crónica como indicadores prospectivos del riesgo de los afiliados. Se encuentra que hay selección sesgada, llevando a selección adversa entre los aseguradores preexistentes, y a selección favorable entre los nuevos entrantes. Este patrón se observa en 1997 y se incrementa en el 2003. Aunque las entidades preexistentes son entidades públicas, y su tamaño disminuyó sustancialmente entre estos años, se analizan sus implicaciones fiscales en términos de financiación adicional por parte del gobierno.
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Frailty prevalence in older adults has been reported but is largely unknown in middle-aged adults. We determined the prevalence of frailty indicators among middle-aged and older adults from a general Swiss population characterized by universal health insurance coverage and assessed the determinants of frailty with a special focus on socioeconomic status. Participants aged 50 and more from the population-based 2006-2010 Bus Santé study were included (N = 2,930). Four frailty indicators (weakness, shrinking, exhaustion, and low activity) were measured according to standard definitions. Multivariate logistic regressions were used to determine associations. Overall, 63.5%, 28.7%, and 7.8% participants presented no frailty indicators, one frailty indicator, and two or more frailty indicators, respectively. Among middle-aged participants (50-65 years), 75.1%, 22.2%, and 2.7% presented 0, 1, and 2 or more frailty indicators. The number of frailty indicators was positively associated with age, hypertension, and current smoking and negatively associated with male gender, body mass index, waist-to-hip ratio, and serum total cholesterol level. Lower income level but not education was associated with higher number of frailty indicators. Frailty indicators are frequently encountered in both older and middle-aged adults from the Swiss general population. Despite universal health insurance coverage, household income is independently associated with frailty.
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The purpose of this Supplementary Report is to advise on how the budgetary measures impact on the conclusions in relation to tax credits and stamp duty included in the Authority’s November 2011 Report. in doing so, we will assess the direct impacts and we will discuss some scenarios. However, the Authority’s advice in this area relies on projections of the health insurance market and, in light of the above, there is considerable uncertainty surrounding any projections of how claims inflation or the market size may develop, even in the short and medium terms. Supplementary Report of the HIA to the Minister for Health, in accordance with Section 7E(1)(b) of the Health Insurance Acts, 1994-2009 (Redacted Version) Click here to download PDF 3.2mb
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The Authority has been asked by the Minister for Health to prepare a Report under Section 7E (1) (b) of the Health Insurance Acts 1994-2009 (“the Health Insurance Acts”). For the purposes of the legislation, the relevant period is 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011. The basis of the Report is specified in the legislation  Click here to download PDF 7.3mb Click here to download the supplementary document PDF 3.2mb
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Independent Report to the Minister for Health and Health Insurance Council Click here to download PDF 179KB Â
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Provision for risk equalisation was first made in the Health Insurance Act, 1994, section 12 of which empowered the Minister to prescribe a scheme for risk equalisation. A Risk Equalsiation Scheme was introduced in 2003. In December 2005, the Minister decided, on the Authorityâ?Ts recommendation, which referred to risks now materialising, to commence risk equalisation payments under the Scheme as from 1 January 2006, but in the event the relevant legislation was overturned by the Courts in 2008. Download document here