Deriving optimal competition in infrastructure procurement

Typically only a limited number of consortiums are able to competitively bid for Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Consequently, this may lead to oligopoly pricing constraints and ineffective competition, thus engendering ex ante market failure. In addressing this issue, this paper aims to determine the optimal number of bidders required to ensure a healthy level of competition is available to procure major infrastructure projects. The theories of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm; Game Theory and Auction Theory and Transaction Cost Economics are reviewed and discussed and used to produce an optimal level of competition for major infrastructure procurement, that prevents market failure ex ante (lack of competition) and market failure ex post (due to asymmetric lock-in).

An evaluation of viability of public private partnerships in social infrastructure procurement projects in Queensland, Australia

Public private partnerships (PPP) have been widely used as a method for public infrastructure project delivery not only locally and internationally, however the adoption of PPPs in social infrastructure procurement has still been very limited. The objective of this paper is to investigate the potential of implementation of current PPP framework in social affordable housing projects in South East Queensland. Data were collected from 22 interviewees with rich experiences in the industry. The findings of this study show that affordable housing investment have been considered by the industry practitioners as a risky business in comparison to other private rental housing investment. The main determents of the adoption of PPPs in social infrastructure project are the tenant-related factors, such as the inability of paying rent and the inability of caring the property. The study also suggests the importance of seeking strategic partnership with community-based organisation that has experiences in managing similar tenants’ profiles. Current PPP guideline is also viewed as inappropriate for the affordable housing projects, but the principle of VFM framework and risk allocation in PPPs still be applied to the affordable housing projects. This study helps to understand the viability of PPP in social housing procurement projects, and point out the importance of developing guideline for multi-stakeholder partnership and the expansion of the current VFM and PPPs guidelines.

Sustainable road infrastructure procurement in Australia

According to Tan et al. (2011), the establishment of a clear sustainability policy in the construction industry is paramount, if only as a statement of the commitment of the top management to protecting the environment and enhancing social responsibility. The resulting policies should then translate into proactive strategies and action plans that improve the sustainability performance of contractors and provide a competitive advantage by integrating “long-run profitability” with sustainable development efforts. The strategies should also take into account climatic protection issues through greenhouse gas emissions (GHGe) monitoring and reduction initiatives (Stocker & Luptacik, 2009)...

Sustainable infrastructure procurement in Australia : standard vs. project practices

The Australian Government and most Australian road authorities have set ambitious greenhouse gas emission (GHGe) reduction targets for the near future, many of which have translated into action plans. However, previous research has shown that the various Australian state road authorities are at different stages of implementing ‘green’ initiatives in construction planning and development, with considerable gaps in their monitoring, tendering, and contracting. This study illustrates the differences between procurement standards and project specific practices that aim to reduce GHGe from road construction projects in three of the largest Australian road construction clients, with a focus on the tools used, contract type and incentives for better performance.

Empirical Analysis of Competition in Procurement Auctions

A vast amount of public services and goods are contracted through procurement auctions. Therefore it is very important to design these auctions in an optimal way. Typically, we are interested in two different objectives. The first objective is efficiency. Efficiency means that the contract is awarded to the bidder that values it the most, which in the procurement setting means the bidder that has the lowest cost of providing a service with a given quality. The second objective is to maximize public revenue. Maximizing public revenue means minimizing the costs of procurement. Both of these goals are important from the welfare point of view. In this thesis, I analyze field data from procurement auctions and show how empirical analysis can be used to help design the auctions to maximize public revenue. In particular, I concentrate on how competition, which means the number of bidders, should be taken into account in the design of auctions. In the first chapter, the main policy question is whether the auctioneer should spend resources to induce more competition. The information paradigm is essential in analyzing the effects of competition. We talk of a private values information paradigm when the bidders know their valuations exactly. In a common value information paradigm, the information about the value of the object is dispersed among the bidders. With private values more competition always increases the public revenue but with common values the effect of competition is uncertain. I study the effects of competition in the City of Helsinki bus transit market by conducting tests for common values. I also extend an existing test by allowing bidder asymmetry. The information paradigm seems to be that of common values. The bus companies that have garages close to the contracted routes are influenced more by the common value elements than those whose garages are further away. Therefore, attracting more bidders does not necessarily lower procurement costs, and thus the City should not implement costly policies to induce more competition. In the second chapter, I ask how the auctioneer can increase its revenue by changing contract characteristics like contract sizes and durations. I find that the City of Helsinki should shorten the contract duration in the bus transit auctions because that would decrease the importance of common value components and cheaply increase entry which now would have a more beneficial impact on the public revenue. Typically, cartels decrease the public revenue in a significant way. In the third chapter, I propose a new statistical method for detecting collusion and compare it with an existing test. I argue that my test is robust to unobserved heterogeneity unlike the existing test. I apply both methods to procurement auctions that contract snow removal in schools of Helsinki. According to these tests, the bidding behavior of two of the bidders seems consistent with a contract allocation scheme.

Competition for procurement shares

We propose a new procurement procedure that allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are the following: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows variations in the extent to which affirmative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even while accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a standard auction format.

The effect of procurement on competition and flexibility : determining the suitability of public-private partnerships in major infrastructure projects

A procurement decision-making model is developed based on a novel integration of leading-edge microeconomic theory and empirically tested in major road and health projects. The model provides a more reliable approach to identifying projects suited to Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPs) and it is expected that the model will enable government to deliver improved value-for-money from their portfolio of PPP projects.

Reforming the procurement of construction and financing of Australian infrastructure : advancing capacity, competition and investment

Funded by an Australian Research Council (ARC) Linkage grant over four years (2009–13), the Major Infrastructure Procurement project sought to find more effective and efficient ways of procuring and delivering the nation’s social and economic infrastructure by investigating constraints relating to construction capacity, competition, and finance in new public sector major infrastructure.1 The research team comprised researchers in construction economics and finance from Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Griffith University (GU), The University of Hong Kong (UHK), and The University of Newcastle (UoN). Project partners included state government departments and agencies responsible for infrastructure procurement and delivery from all Australian mainland states, and private sector companies and peak bodies in the infrastructure sector (see “Introduction” for complete list). There are a number of major outcomes from this research project. The first of these is a scientifically developed decisionmaking model for procurement of infrastructure that deploys a novel and state-of-the-art integration of dominant microeconomic theory (including theories developed by two Nobel Prize winners). The model has been established through empirical testing and substantial experiential evidence as a valid and reliable guide to configuring procurement of new major and mega infrastructure projects in pursuance of superior Valuefor- Money (VfM). The model specifically addresses issues of project size, bundling of contracts, and exchange relationships. In so doing, the model determines the suitability of adopting a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) mode.

Delivering value for money in the procurement of public sector major infrastructure : a new first-order decision making model

The significant challenge faced by government in demonstrating value for money in the delivery of major infrastructure resolves around estimating costs and benefits of alternative modes of procurement. Faced with this challenge, one approach is to focus on a dominant performance outcome visible on the opening day of the asset, as the means to select the procurement approach. In this case, value for money becomes a largely nominal concept and determined by selected procurement mode delivering, or not delivering, the selected performance outcome, and notwithstanding possible under delivery on other desirable performance outcomes, as well as possibly incurring excessive transaction costs. This paper proposes a mind-set change in this particular practice, to an approach in which the analysis commences with the conditions pertaining to the project and proceeds to deploy transaction cost and production cost theory to indicate a procurement approach that can claim superior value for money relative to other competing procurement modes. This approach to delivering value for money in relative terms is developed in a first-order procurement decision making model outlined in this paper. The model developed could be complementary to the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) in terms of cross validation and the model more readily lends itself to public dissemination. As a possible alternative to the PSC, the model could save time and money in preparation of project details to lesser extent than that required in the reference project and may send a stronger signal to the market that may encourage more innovation and competition.

Towards testing a new first-order decision making model for the procurement of public sector major infrastructure

Given global demand for new infrastructure, governments face substantial challenges in funding new infrastructure and simultaneously delivering Value for Money (VfM). As background to this challenge, a brief review is given of current practice in the selection of major public sector infrastructure in Australia, along with a review of the related literature concerning the Multi-Attribute Utility Approach (MAUA) and the effect of MAUA on the role of risk management in procurement selection. To contribute towards addressing the key weaknesses of MAUA, a new first-order procurement decision making model is mentioned. A brief summary is also given of the research method and hypothesis used to test and develop the new procurement model and which uses competition as the dependent variable and as a proxy for VfM. The hypothesis is given as follows: When the actual procurement mode matches the theoretical/predicted procurement mode (informed by the new procurement model), then actual competition is expected to match optimum competition (based on actual prevailing capacity vis-à-vis the theoretical/predicted procurement mode) and subject to efficient tendering. The aim of this paper is to report on progress towards testing this hypothesis in terms of an analysis of two of the four data components in the hypothesis. That is, actual procurement and actual competition across 87 road and health major public sector projects in Australia. In conclusion, it is noted that the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has seen a significant increase in competition in public sector major road and health infrastructure and if any imperfections in procurement and/or tendering are discernible, then this would create the opportunity, through the deployment of economic principles embedded in the new procurement model and/or adjustments in tendering, to maintain some of this higher level post-GFC competition throughout the next business cycle/upturn in demand including private sector demand. Finally, the paper previews the next steps in the research with regard to collection and analysis of data concerning theoretical/predicted procurement and optimum competition.

A new first-order decision-making model for the procurement of public sector infrastructure: Procedures and Testing

Given global demand for new infrastructure, governments face substantial challenges in funding new infrastructure and delivering Value for Money (VfM). As part of the background to this challenge, a critique is given of current practice in the selection of the approach to procure major public sector infrastructure in Australia and which is akin to the Multi-Attribute Utility Approach (MAUA). To contribute towards addressing the key weaknesses of MAUA, a new first-order procurement decision-making model is presented. The model addresses the make-or-buy decision (risk allocation); the bundling decision (property rights incentives), as well as the exchange relationship decision (relational to arms-length exchange) in its novel approach to articulating a procurement strategy designed to yield superior VfM across the whole life of the asset. The aim of this paper is report on the development of this decisionmaking model in terms of the procedural tasks to be followed and the method being used to test the model. The planned approach to testing the model uses a sample of 87 Australian major infrastructure projects in the sum of AUD32 billion and deploys a key proxy for VfM comprising expressions of interest, as an indicator of competition.

A theoretical framework for reducing tendering costs in the procurement of infrastructure projects

Purpose of this paper One way in which the tendering process can be further improved is by reviewing and clarifying the high costs that participants face during the course of the tendering phase. The study aims to provide project teams working in construction tender preparation a clear picture of what to expect when tendering for infrastructure projects. Design/methodology/approach Firstly, a review of current literature on tendering in infrastructure projects is conducted to identify the associated costs affecting traditional and PPP procurements as well as the potential measures contributing to tendering cost-reduction. A theoretical framework and its corresponding research hypotheses, which are based on the literature reviewed, are then proposed. An industry-wide questionnaire survey is currently under design to solicit industry practitioners’ views on tendering costs and the associated tendering cost-reduction measures. The data collected in the survey will subject to statistical analysis to test the proposed research hypotheses, which will be reported in a forthcoming paper. Findings and value The direct and indirect costs in public-private procurement have been identified and have been categorised into internal and external costs arising from working on tender submissions. A theoretical framework, mainly composed of five mechanisms of cost reduction, has been proposed and will be tested in a forthcoming industry-wide questionnaire survey. Originality/value of paper The findings are expected to lead to a transparent tendering process in infrastructure procurement, in which there is increased engagement from the private sector as well as an increase in competitive tendering.

Generic-branded drug competition and the price for pharmaceuticals in procurement auctions

This paper studies the effects of generic drug’s entry on bidding behavior of drug suppliers in procurement auctions for pharmaceuticals, and the consequences on procurer’s price paid for drugs. Using an unique data set on procurement auctions for off-patent drugs organized by Brazilian public bodies, we surprisingly find no statistically difference between bids and prices paid for generic and branded drugs. On the other hand, some branded drug suppliers leave auctions in which there exists a supplier of generics, whereas the remaining ones lower their bidding price. These findings explain why we find that the presence of any supplier of generic drugs in a procurement auction reduces the price paid for pharmaceuticals by 7 percent. To overcome potential estimation bias due to generic’s entry endogeneity, we exploit variation in the number of days between drug’s patent expiration date and the tendering session. The two-stage estimations document the same pattern as the generalized least square estimations find. This evidence indicates that generic competition affects branded supplier’s behavior in public procurement auctions differently from other markets.

A comparative review of quantitative VFM methodology for PPP infrastructure project in Indonesia and Australia

The Government of Indonesia (GoI) increasingly relies on the private sector financing to build and operate infrastructures through public private partnership (PPP) schemes. However, PPP does not automatically provide the solution for the financing scheme due to value for money (VFM) issues. The procurement authority must show whether a PPP proposal is the optimal solution that provides best VFM outcome. The paper presents a literature review of comparing quantitative VFM methodology for PPP infrastructure project procurement in Indonesia and Australia. Public Sector Comparator (PSC) is used to assess the potential project VFM quantitatively in Australia. In Indonesia, the PSC has not been applied, where the PPP procurement authority tends to utilize a common project evaluation method that ignores the issues of risk. Unlike the conventional price bid evaluation, the PSC enables a financial comparison including costs/gains and risks. Since the construction of PSC is primarily on risk management approach, it can facilitate risk negotiation processes between the involved parties. The study indicates that the quantitative VFM methodology of PSC is potentially applicable in Indonesia for water supply sector. Various supporting regulations are available that emphasize the importance of VFM and risk management in infrastructure investment. However, the study also reveals a number of challenges that need to be anticipated, such as the need of a more comprehensive PPP policy at both central and local government level, a more specific legal instrument for bidding evaluation method and the issue of institutional capacity development in PPP Units at the local level.