Comparative Statics of Asset Prices: the effect of other assets' risk

Currently, financial economics is unable to predict changes in asset prices with respect to changes in the underlying risk factors, even when an asset's dividend is independent of a given factor. This paper takes steps towards addressing this issue by highlighting a crucial component of wealth effects on asset prices hitherto ignored by the literature. Changes in wealth do not only alter an agents risk aversion, but also her perceived 'riskiness' of a security. The latter enhances significantly the extent to which market- clearing leads to endogenously-generated correlation across asset prices, over and above that induced by correlation between payoffs, giving the appearance of 'contagion.'

Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics

We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties (unavailable-type-invariance, individual-rationality, weak non-wastefulness, or truncation-invariance). In the house allocation problem, where at most one copy of each object is available, deferred-acceptance (DA)-mechanisms allocate objects based on exogenously fixed objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm. For house allocation we show that DA-mechanisms are characterized by our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity or (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity. Once we allow for multiple identical copies of objects, on the one hand the first characterization breaks down and there are unstable mechanisms satisfying our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. On the other hand, our basic properties and (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity characterize (the most general) class of DA-mechanisms based on objects' fixed choice functions that are acceptant, monotonic, substitutable, and consistent. These choice functions are used by objects to reject agents in the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm. Therefore, in the general model resource-monotonicity is the «stronger» comparative statics requirement because it characterizes (together with our basic requirements and strategy-proofness) choice-based DA-mechanisms whereas population-monotonicity (together with our basic properties and strategy-proofness) does not.

Consistent comparative statics for the food industries

Consistent conjectures are derived in an oligopoly model with homogeneous products and identical firms. The exercise uncovers two important findings. Absent entry, the monopolistic conjecture, is the unique consistent conjecture. With endogenous entry, no consistent conjecture exists. These results provide foundations for deriving consistentc omparatives taticsf or the food industries

Production under uncertainty and choice under uncertainty in the emergence of generalized expected utility theory

This paper presents a personal view of the interaction between the analysis of choice under uncertainty and the analysis of production under uncertainty. Interest in the foundations of the theory of choice under uncertainty was stimulated by applications of expected utility theory such as the Sandmo model of production under uncertainty. This interest led to the development of generalized models including rank-dependent expected utility theory. In turn, the development of generalized expected utility models raised the question of whether such models could be used in the analysis of applied problems such as those involving production under uncertainty. Finally, the revival of the state-contingent approach led to the recognition of a fundamental duality between choice problems and production problems.

The hidden value behind capital structure decisions

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Economic analysis in health care regulation : three essays

ABSTRACT - It is the purpose of the present thesis to emphasize, through a series of examples, the need and value of appropriate pre-analysis of the impact of health care regulation. Specifically, the thesis presents three papers on the theme of regulation in different aspects of health care provision and financing. The first two consist of economic analyses of the impact of health care regulation and the third comprises the creation of an instrument for supporting economic analysis of health care regulation, namely in the field of evaluation of health care programs. The first paper develops a model of health plan competition and pricing in order to understand the dynamics of health plan entry and exit in the presence of switching costs and alternative health premium payment systems. We build an explicit model of death spirals, in which profitmaximizing competing health plans find it optimal to adopt a pattern of increasing relative prices culminating in health plan exit. We find the steady-state numerical solution for the price sequence and the plan’s optimal length of life through simulation and do some comparative statics. This allows us to show that using risk adjusted premiums and imposing price floors are effective at reducing death spirals and switching costs, while having employees pay a fixed share of the premium enhances death spirals and increases switching costs. Price regulation of pharmaceuticals is one of the cost control measures adopted by the Portuguese government, as in many European countries. When such regulation decreases the products’ real price over time, it may create an incentive for product turnover. Using panel data for the period of 1997 through 2003 on drug packages sold in Portuguese pharmacies, the second paper addresses the question of whether price control policies create an incentive for product withdrawal. Our work builds the product survival literature by accounting for unobservable product characteristics and heterogeneity among consumers when constructing quality, price control and competition indexes. These indexes are then used as covariates in a Cox proportional hazard model. We find that, indeed, price control measures increase the probability of exit, and that such effect is not verified in OTC market where no such price regulation measures exist. We also find quality to have a significant positive impact on product survival. In the third paper, we develop a microsimulation discrete events model (MSDEM) for costeffectiveness analysis of Human Immunodeficiency Virus treatment, simulating individual paths from antiretroviral therapy (ART) initiation to death. Four driving forces determine the course of events: CD4+ cell count, viral load resistance and adherence. A novel feature of the model with respect to the previous MSDEMs is that distributions of time to event depend on individuals’ characteristics and past history. Time to event was modeled using parametric survival analysis. Events modeled include: viral suppression, regimen switch due virological failure, regimen switch due to other reasons, resistance development, hospitalization, AIDS events, and death. Disease progression is structured according to therapy lines and the model is parameterized with cohort Portuguese observational data. An application of the model is presented comparing the cost-effectiveness ART initiation with two nucleoside analogue reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTI) plus one non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor(NNRTI) to two NRTI plus boosted protease inhibitor (PI/r) in HIV- 1 infected individuals. We find 2NRTI+NNRTI to be a dominant strategy. Results predicted by the model reproduce those of the data used for parameterization and are in line with those published in the literature.

Forest management in an urbanizing landscape

This paper aims at building a theoretical framework to examine the impact of development pressure on private owner’s forest management practices, namely, on regeneration and conversion cut dates. As the rent for developed land is rising over time, our model creates the possibility of switching from forestry to residential use at some point in the future, thus departing from the Faustmann’s traditional setup. Comparative statics results with respect to stumpage prices, regeneration costs and urban growth parameters are provided. The results obtained depend on the impact on the opportunity cost of holding the stand and the impact on the opportunity cost of holding the land, generalizing Faustmann’s unambiguous results.

Testing the TASP: An Experimental Investigation of Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP” (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a fourth strategy, Dumb. Nash equilibrium places a weight of 1/2 on Dumb in both games, but the TASP places no weight on Dumb when the equilibrium is unstable. We also vary the level of monetary payoffs with higher payoffs predicted to increase instability. We find that the high payoff unstable treatment differs from the others. Frequency of Dumb is lower and play is further from Nash than in the other treatments. That is, we find support for the comparative statics prediction of learning theory, although the frequency of Dumb is substantially greater than zero in the unstable treatments.

The effects of entry in thin markets

We consider entry of additional firms into the market for a single commodity in which both sellers and buyers are permitted to interact strategically. We show that the market is quasi-competitive, in that the inclusion of an additional seller lowers the price and increases the volume of trade, as expected. However, whilst buyers benefit from this change under reasonable conditions on preferences, we cannot conclude that sellers are always made worse off in the face of more intense competition, contrary to the conventional wisdom. We characterize the conditions under which entry by new sellers may raise the equilibrium profit of existing sellers, which will depend in an intuitive way on the elasticity of a strategic analog of demand and the market share of existing sellers, and encompass completely standard economic environments.

The Effects of Experience on Preference Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics for Public and Quasi-Public Environmental Goods

This paper develop and estimates a model of demand estimation for environmental public goods which allows for consumers to learn about their preferences through consumption experiences. We develop a theoretical model of Bayesian updating, perform comparative statics over the model, and show how the theoretical model can be consistently incorporated into a reduced form econometric model. We then estimate the model using data collected for two environmental goods. We find that the predictions of the theoretical exercise that additional experience makes consumers more certain over their preferences in both mean and variance are supported in each case.

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets

Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopoliesrequire the unrealistic assumption that firms observe the precision ofinformation chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. Thispaper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game. Relativeto the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policyimplications based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes ortoo low subsidies for research activities. For the case of heterogeneousduopoly it is shown that comparative statics results partly depend on theobservability assumption.