Can genetic algorithms explain experimental anomalies? An application to common property resources

It is common to find in experimental data persistent oscillations in the aggregate outcomes and high levels of heterogeneity in individual behavior. Furthermore, it is not unusual to find significant deviations from aggregate Nash equilibrium predictions. In this paper, we employ an evolutionary model with boundedly rational agents to explain these findings. We use data from common property resource experiments (Casari and Plott, 2003). Instead of positing individual-specific utility functions, we model decision makers as selfish and identical. Agent interaction is simulated using an individual learning genetic algorithm, where agents have constraints in their working memory, a limited ability to maximize, and experiment with new strategies. We show that the model replicates most of the patterns that can be found in common property resource experiments.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

Private Storage of Common Property

This paper examines a characteristic of common property problems unmodeled in the published literature: Extracted common reserves are aften stored privately rather than immediately. We examine the positive and normative effects of such storage.

On the Effects of Mergers on Equilibrium Outcomes in a Common Property Renewable Asset Oligopoly

This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We study the impact of the merger on the equilibrium production strategies, on the steady states, and on the profitability of the merger for its members. We show that there exists an interval of the asset's stock such that any merger is profitable if the stock at the time the merger is formed falls within that interval. That includes mergers that are known to be unprofitable in the corresponding static equilibrium framework.

Community based ecotourism as a panacea for protected areas: the use of common property theory in its analysis and development

Tourism is the worlds largest employer, accounting for 10% of jobs worldwide (WTO, 1999). There are over 30,000 protected areas around the world, covering about 10% of the land surface(IUCN, 2002). Protected area management is moving towards a more integrated form of management, which recognises the social and economic needs of the worlds finest areas and seeks to provide long term income streams and support social cohesion through active but sustainable use of resources. Ecotourism - 'responsible travel to natural areas that conserves the environment and improves the well- being of local people' (The Ecotourism Society, 1991) - is often cited as a panacea for incorporating the principles of sustainable development in protected area management. However, few examples exist worldwide to substantiate this claim. In reality, ecotourism struggles to provide social and economic empowerment locally and fails to secure proper protection of the local and global environment. Current analysis of ecotourism provides a useful checklist of interconnected principles for more successful initiatives, but no overall framework of analysis or theory. This paper argues that applying common property theory to the application of ecotourism can help to establish more rigorous, multi-layered analysis that identifies the institutional demands of community based ecotourism (CBE). The paper draws on existing literature on ecotourism and several new case studies from developed and developing countries around the world. It focuses on the governance of CBE initiatives, particularly the interaction between local stakeholders and government and the role that third party non-governmental organisations can play in brokering appropriate institutional arrangements. The paper concludes by offering future research directions."

Fenced in: Common property struggles in the management of communal rangelands in central Eastern Cape Province, South Africa

This paper takes as its starting point the assertion that current rangeland management in the central Eastern Cape Province (former Ciskei) of South Africa, is characterised primarily by an ‘open access’ approach. Empirical material drawn from three case-study communities in the region is used to examine the main barriers to management of rangeland as a ‘commons’. The general inability to define and enforce rights to particular grazing resourses in the face of competing claims from ‘outsiders’, as well as inadequate local institutions responsible for rangeland management are highlighted as being of key importance. These are often exacerbated by lack of available grazing land, diffuse user groups and local political and ethnic divisions. Many of these problems have a strong legacy in historical apartheid policies such as forced resettlement and betterment planning. On this basis it is argued that policy should focus on facilitating the emergence of effective, local institutions for rangeland management. Given the limited grazing available to many communities in the region, a critical aspect of this will be finding ways to legitimise current patterns of extensive resource use, which traverse existing ‘community’ boundaries. However, this runs counter to recent legislation, which strongly links community management with legal ownership of land within strict boundaries often defined through fencing. Finding ways to overcome this apparent disjuncture between theory and policy will be vital for the effective management of common pool grazing resources in the region.

Why do individuals behave differently in commons dilemmas?: The case of alpine farmers using common property pastures in Grindelwald, Switzerland

The sustainable use of common-pool resources depends on users’ behaviour with regards to appropriation and provision. Most knowledge about behaviour in such situations comes from experimental research. As experiments take place in confined environments, motivational drivers and actions in the field might differ. This paper analyses farmers’ use of common property pastures in Grindelwald, Switzerland. Binary logistic regression is applied to survey data to explore the effect of farmers’ attributes on livestock endowment, appropriation and provision behaviour. Furthermore, Q methodology is used to assess the impact of broader contextual variables on the sustainability of common property pastures. It is shown that the strongest associations exist between (a) socio-economic attributes and change in livestock endowment; (b) norms and appropriation behaviour; and (c) area and pay-off and provision behaviour. Relevant contextual variables are the economic value of the resource units, off-farm income opportunities, and the subsidy structure. We conclude that with increasing farm size farmers reduce the use and maintenance of common property. Additionally, we postulate that readiness to maintain a resource increases with appropriation activities and the net returns generated from appropriation.

Alpine Common Property Institutions under Change: Conditions for Successful and Unsuccessful Collective Action by Alpine Farmers in the Canton of Grisons, Switzerland

The protection and sustainable management of alpine summer pastures has been stated as a goal in Swiss national law since 1996, and direct payments from the state for summer pasturing have been tied to sustainability criteria since 2000. This reflects the increasing value of the alpine cultural landscape as a public good. However, provision of this public good remains in the hands of local farmers and their local common pool resource (CPR) institutions for managing alpine pastures. These institutions are increasingly struggling to maintain their institutional arrangements, particularly regarding the work needed to maintain the pastures. This paper examines two cases of local CPR institutions for managing alpine pastures in the Swiss Canton of Grisons that manifest different institutional developments in light of changing conditions. The differences in how these institutions reacted to change and the impacts this has had on the provision of the CPR are explained by focusing on relative prices, bargaining power, and ideology as drivers of institutional change that are often neglected within common property research. Key words: summer pasture management, institutional change, bargaining power, ideology

Threatened common property resource system and factors for resilience: lessons drawn from serege-commons in Muhur, Ethiopia

This ethnographic case study of serege-commons, communal pasture and forest in Muhur, Ethiopia, demonstrates the socially complex nature of the common property resource (CPR) system, including the factors behind its resilience and sustained operation. It reveals the multifaceted and interacting local processes that maintain the commons in the face of political economic processes that challenge common property management. The study shows how CPR use, crop cultivation, alternative livelihood strategies, out-migration, collective herding practices, management practices, and alternative sources of compliance interact, and these interacting processes reinforce each other and maintain a resilient CPR system. This study argues that there is not one single cause for sustainable CPR regimes. Instead, the resilience and sustained operation of the CPR system are due to a mix of interdependent elements and inter-reinforcing linkages related to CPR operations, and their interactions within complex social-ecological systems.