835 resultados para Combined public-key scheme
Resumo:
The major purpose of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) is to provide safety-related message access for motorists to react or make a life-critical decision for road safety enhancement. Accessing safety-related information through the use of VANET communications, therefore, must be protected, as motorists may make critical decisions in response to emergency situations in VANETs. If introducing security services into VANETs causes considerable transmission latency or processing delays, this would defeat the purpose of using VANETs to improve road safety. Current research in secure messaging for VANETs appears to focus on employing certificate-based Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC) to support security. The security overhead of such a scheme, however, creates a transmission delay and introduces a time-consuming verification process to VANET communications. This paper proposes an efficient public key management system for VANETs: the Public Key Registry (PKR) system. Not only does this paper demonstrate that the proposed PKR system can maintain security, but it also asserts that it can improve overall performance and scalability at a lower cost, compared to the certificate-based PKC scheme. It is believed that the proposed PKR system will create a new dimension to the key management and verification services for VANETs.
Resumo:
The primary goal of the Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) is to provide real-time safety-related messages to motorists to enhance road safety. Accessing and disseminating safety-related information through the use of wireless communications technology in VANETs should be secured, as motorists may make critical decisions in dealing with an emergency situation based on the received information. If security concerns are not addressed in developing VANET systems, an adversary can tamper with, or suppress, the unprotected message to mislead motorists to cause traffic accidents and hazards. Current research on secure messaging in VANETs focuses on employing the certificate-based Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) scheme to support message encryption and digital signing. The security overhead of such a scheme, however, creates a transmission delay and introduces a time-consuming verification process to VANET communications. This thesis has proposed a novel public key verification and management approach for VANETs; namely, the Public Key Registry (PKR) regime. Compared to the VANET PKI scheme, this new approach can satisfy necessary security requirements with improved performance and scalability, and at a lower cost by reducing the security overheads of message transmission and eliminating digital certificate deployment and maintenance issues. The proposed PKR regime consists of the required infrastructure components, rules for public key management and verification, and a set of interactions and associated behaviours to meet these rule requirements. This is achieved through a system design as a logic process model with functional specifications. The PKR regime can be used as development guidelines for conforming implementations. An analysis and evaluation of the proposed PKR regime includes security features assessment, analysis of the security overhead of message transmission, transmission latency, processing latency, and scalability of the proposed PKR regime. Compared to certificate-based PKI approaches, the proposed PKR regime can maintain the necessary security requirements, significantly reduce the security overhead by approximately 70%, and improve the performance by 98%. Meanwhile, the result of the scalability evaluation shows that the latency of employing the proposed PKR regime stays much lower at approximately 15 milliseconds, whether operating in a huge or small environment. It is therefore believed that this research will create a new dimension to the provision of secure messaging services in VANETs.
Resumo:
Current research in secure messaging for Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) appears to focus on employing a digital certificate-based Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC) to support security. The security overhead of such a scheme, however, creates a transmission delay and introduces a time-consuming verification process to VANET communications. This paper proposes a non-certificate-based public key management for VANETs. A comprehensive evaluation of performance and scalability of the proposed public key management regime is presented, which is compared to a certificate-based PKC by employing a number of quantified analyses and simulations. Not only does this paper demonstrate that the proposal can maintain security, but it also asserts that it can improve overall performance and scalability at a lower cost, compared to the certificate-based PKC. It is believed that the proposed scheme will add a new dimension to the key management and verification services for VANETs.
Resumo:
An encryption scheme is non-malleable if giving an encryption of a message to an adversary does not increase its chances of producing an encryption of a related message (under a given public key). Fischlin introduced a stronger notion, known as complete non-malleability, which requires attackers to have negligible advantage, even if they are allowed to transform the public key under which the related message is encrypted. Ventre and Visconti later proposed a comparison-based definition of this security notion, which is more in line with the well-studied definitions proposed by Bellare et al. The authors also provide additional feasibility results by proposing two constructions of completely non-malleable schemes, one in the common reference string model using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and another using interactive encryption schemes. Therefore, the only previously known completely non-malleable (and non-interactive) scheme in the standard model, is quite inefficient as it relies on generic NIZK approach. They left the existence of efficient schemes in the common reference string model as an open problem. Recently, two efficient public-key encryption schemes have been proposed by Libert and Yung, and Barbosa and Farshim, both of them are based on pairing identity-based encryption. At ACISP 2011, Sepahi et al. proposed a method to achieve completely non-malleable encryption in the public-key setting using lattices but there is no security proof for the proposed scheme. In this paper we review the mentioned scheme and provide its security proof in the standard model. Our study shows that Sepahi’s scheme will remain secure even for post-quantum world since there are currently no known quantum algorithms for solving lattice problems that perform significantly better than the best known classical (i.e., non-quantum) algorithms.
Resumo:
An increasing number of countries are faced with an aging population increasingly needing healthcare services. For any e-health information system, the need for increased trust by such clients with potentially little knowledge of any security scheme involved is paramount. In addition notable scalability of any system has become a critical aspect of system design, development and ongoing management. Meanwhile cryptographic systems provide the security provisions needed for confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. Cryptographic key management, however, must be secure, yet efficient and effective in developing an attitude of trust in system users. Digital certificate-based Public Key Infrastructure has long been the technology of choice or availability for information security/assurance; however, there appears to be a notable lack of successful implementations and deployments globally. Moreover, recent issues with associated Certificate Authority security have damaged trust in these schemes. This paper proposes the adoption of a centralised public key registry structure, a non-certificate based scheme, for large scale e-health information systems. The proposed structure removes complex certificate management, revocation and a complex certificate validation structure while maintaining overall system security. Moreover, the registry concept may be easier for both healthcare professionals and patients to understand and trust.
Resumo:
A parallel authentication and public-key encryption is introduced and exemplified on joint encryption and signing which compares favorably with sequential Encrypt-then-Sign (ɛtS) or Sign-then-Encrypt (Stɛ) schemes as far as both efficiency and security are concerned. A security model for signcryption, and thus joint encryption and signing, has been recently defined which considers possible attacks and security goals. Such a scheme is considered secure if the encryption part guarantees indistinguishability and the signature part prevents existential forgeries, for outsider but also insider adversaries. We propose two schemes of parallel signcryption, which are efficient alternative to Commit-then-Sign-and- Encrypt (Ct&G3&S). They are both provably secure in the random oracle model. The first one, called generic parallel encrypt and sign, is secure if the encryption scheme is semantically secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks and the signature scheme prevents existential forgeries against random-message attacks. The second scheme, called optimal parallel encrypt. and sign, applies random oracles similar to the OAEP technique in order to achieve security using encryption and signature components with very weak security requirements — encryption is expected to be one-way under chosen-plaintext attacks while signature needs to be secure against universal forgeries under random-plaintext attack, that is actually the case for both the plain-RSA encryption and signature under the usual RSA assumption. Both proposals are generic in the sense that any suitable encryption and signature schemes (i.e. which simply achieve required security) can be used. Furthermore they allow both parallel encryption and signing, as well as parallel decryption and verification. Properties of parallel encrypt and sign schemes are considered and a new security standard for parallel signcryption is proposed.
Resumo:
We propose a public key cryptosystem based on block upper triangular matrices. This system is a variant of the Discrete Logarithm Problem with elements in a finite group, capable of increasing the difficulty of the problem while maintaining the key size. We also propose a key exchange protocol that guarantees that both parties share a secret element of this group and a digital signature scheme that provides data authenticity and integrity.
Resumo:
We describe the design and implementation of a public-key platform, secFleck, based on a commodity Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip that extends the capability of a standard node. Unlike previous software public-key implementations this approach provides E- Commerce grade security; is computationally fast, energy efficient; and has low financial cost — all essential attributes for secure large-scale sen- sor networks. We describe the secFleck message security services such as confidentiality, authenticity and integrity, and present performance re- sults including computation time, energy consumption and cost. This is followed by examples, built on secFleck, of symmetric key management, secure RPC and secure software update.
Resumo:
Communication security for wireless sensor networks (WSN) is a challenge due to the limited computation and energy resources available at nodes. We describe the design and implementation of a public-key (PK) platform based on a standard Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip that extends the capability of a standard node. The result facilitates message security services such as confidentiality, authenticity and integrity. We present results including computation time, energy consumption and cost.