938 resultados para Collective Property Rights
Resumo:
In order to reduce the rate of human-induced biodiversity loss of wild species, it has become increasingly important to stem this loss on private and tribal lands and to find effective policies to do this. Some writers believe that granting landholders commercial property rights in wildlife might be effective in dealing with this matter and result in the sustainable use of wildlife. This paper explores this view using economic theory. In doing so, it takes into account the total economic valuation concept. While granting of commercial property rights is found to be effective for conserving some species, it is predicted to be a complete failure as a means of conserving other species. In addition, particular attention is given to the economics of the utilisation and conservation of non-captive fugitive (or mobile) wildlife. The economic theory involved is contrasted and compared with that for the exploitation of open-access resources.
Resumo:
This paper shows that introducing weak property rights in the standard real business cycle (RBC) model can help to explain economic fluctuations. This is motivated by the empirical observation that changes in institutions in emerging markets are related to the evolution of the main macroeconomic variables. In particular, in Mexico, the movements in productivity in the data are associated with changes in institutions, so that we can explain productivity shocks to a large extent as shocks to the quality of institutions. We find that the model with shocks to the degree of protection of property rights only - without technology shocks - can match the second moments in the data for Mexico well. In particular, the fit is better than that of the standard neoclassical model with full protection of property rights regarding the auto-correlations and cross-correlations in the data, especially those related to labor. Viewing productivity shocks as shocks to institutions is also consistent with the stylized fact of falling productivity and non-decreasing labor hours in Mexico over 1980-1994, which is a feature that the neoclassical model cannot match.
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This paper operates at the interface of the literature on the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on host countries, and the literature on the determinants of institutional quality. We argue that FDI contributes to economic development by improving institutional quality in the host country and we attempt to test this proposition using a large panel data set of 70 developing countries during the period 1981 and 2005, and we show that FDI inflows have a positive and highly significant impact on property rights. The result appears to be very robust and is and not affected by model specification, different control variables, or a particular estimation technique. As far as we are aware this is the first paper to empirically test the FDI – property rights linkage.
Resumo:
Institutions, and more speci cally private property rights, have come to be seen as a major determinant of long-run economic development. We evaluate the case for property rights as an explanatory factor of the Industrial Revolution and derive some lessons for the analysis of developing countries today. We pay particular attention to the role of property rights in the accumulation of physical capital and the production of new ideas. The evidence that we review from the economic history literature does not support the institutional thesis.
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This paper studies how the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects investments in biological innovations when the value of an innovation is stochastically reduced to zero because of the evolution of pest resistance. We frame the problem as a research and development (R&D) investment game in a duopoly model of sequential innovation. We characterize the incentives to invest in R&D under two competing IPR regimes, which differ in their treatment of the follow-on innovations that become necessary because of pest adaptation. Depending on the magnitude of the R&D cost, ex ante firms might prefer an intellectual property regime with or without a “research exemption” provision. The study of the welfare function that also accounts for benefit spillovers to consumers—which is possible analytically under some parametric conditions, and numerically otherwise—shows that the ranking of the two IPR regimes depends critically on the extent of the R&D cost.
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I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.
Resumo:
Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rightsdisregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide torightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers interms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstatethe role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, theessential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and,second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable ofmaking truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactionson the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting bothelements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of bothproperty and corporate contracting.
Resumo:
In Switzerland, the land management regime is characterized by a liberal attitude towards the institution of property rights, which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Under the present Swiss constitutional arrangement, authorities (municipalities) are required to take into account landowners' interests when implementing their spatial planning policy. In other words, the institution of property rights cannot be restricted easily in order to implement zoning plans and planning projects. This situation causes many problems. One of them is the gap between the way land is really used by the landowners and the way land should be used based on zoning plans. In fact, zoning plans only describe how landowners should use their property. There is no sufficient provision for handling cases where the use is not in accordance with zoning plans. In particular, landowners may not be expropriated for a non-conforming use of the land. This situation often leads to the opening of new building areas in greenfields and urban sprawl, which is in contradiction with the goals set into the Federal Law on Spatial Planning. In order to identify legal strategies of intervention to solve the problem, our paper is structured into three main parts. Firstly, we make a short description of the Swiss land management regime. Then, we focus on an innovative land management approach designed to implement zoning plans in accordance with property rights. Finally, we present a case study that shows the usefulness of the presented land management approach in practice. We develop three main results. Firstly, the land management approach brings a mechanism to involve landowners in planning projects. Coordination principle between spatial planning goals and landowners' interests is the cornerstone of all the process. Secondly, the land use is improved both in terms of space and time. Finally, the institution of property rights is not challenged, since there is no expropriation and the market stays free.
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This paper analyzes the role of formalization of land property rights in the war against illicit crops in Colombia. We argue that as a consequence of the increase of state presence and visibility during the period of 2000 and 2009, municipalities with a higher level of formalization of their land property rights saw a greater reduction in the area allocated to illicit crops. We hypothesize that this is due to the increased cost of growing illicit crops on formal land compared to informal, and due to the possibility of obtaining more benets in the newly in- stalled institutional environment when land is formalized. We exploit the variation in the level of formalization of land property rights in a set of municipalities that had their rst cadastral census collected in the period of 1994-2000; this selection procedure guarantees reliable data and an unbiased source of variation. Using fixed effects estimators, we found a signicant negative relationship between the level of formalization of land property rights and the number of hectares allocated to coca crops per municipality. These results remain robust through a number of sensitivity analyses. Our ndings contribute to the growing body of evidence on the positive effects of formal land property rights, and e ective policies in the war on drugs in Colombia.
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This study critically analyzes the historical role and influence of multinational drug cotpOrations and multinational corporations in general; the u.s. government and the Canadian state in negotiating the global recognition ofIntellectual Property Rights (IPR) under GATT/NAFTA. This process began in 1969 when the Liberal government, in response to high prices for brand-name drugs amended the Patent Act to introduce compulsory licensing by reducing monopoly protection from 20 to seven years. Although the financial position ofthe multinational drug industry was not affected, it campaigned vigorously to change the 1969 legislation. In 1987, the Patent Act was amended to extend protection to 10 years as a condition for free trade talks with the u.s. Nonetheless, the drug industry was not satisfied and accused Canada of providing a bad example to other nations. Therefore, it continued to campaign for global recognition ofIPR laws under GATT. Following the conclusion of the GATTI Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS) in 1991, the multinational drug industry and the American government, to the surprise of many, were still not satisfied and sought to implement harsher conditions under NAFTA. The Progressive Conservative government readily agreed without any objections or consideration for the social consequences. As a result, Bill C-91 was introduced. It abandoned compulsory licenses and was made retroactive from December 21, 1991. It is the contention of this thesis that the economic survival of multinational corporations on a global scale depends on the role and functions of the modem state. Similarly, the existence of the state depends on the ideological-political and socioeconomic assistance it gives to multinational corporations on a national and international scale. This dialectical relation of the state and multinational corporations is explored in our theoretical and historical analysis of their role in public policy.