Relative Uncertainty and Additively Representable Set Rankings

This paper proposes a definition of relative uncertainty aversion for decision models under complete uncertainty. It is shown that, for a large class of decision rules characterized by a set of plausible axioms, the new criterion yields a complete ranking of those rules with respect to the relative degree of uncertainty aversion they represent. In addition, we address a combinatorial question that arises in this context, and we examine conditions for the additive representability of our rules.

Ranking Sets of Objects

We provide a survey of the literature on ranking sets of objects. The interpretations of those set rankings include those employed in the theory of choice under complete uncertainty, rankings of opportunity sets, set rankings that appear in matching theory, and the structure of assembly preferences. The survey is prepared for the Handbook of Utility Theory, vol. 2, edited by Salvador Barberà, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidl, to be published by Kluwer Academic Publishers. The chapter number is provisional.

Cooperative choice and its framing effect under threshold uncertainty in a provision point mechanism

This paper explores how threshold uncertainty affects cooperative behaviors in the provision of public goods and the prevention of public bads. The following facts motivate our study. First, environmental (resource) problems are either framed as public bads prevention or public goods provision. Second, the occurrence of these problems is characterized by thresholds that are interchangeably represented as "nonconvexity," "bifurcation," "bi-stability," or "catastrophes." Third, the threshold location is mostly unknown. We employ a provision point mechanism with threshold uncertainty and analyze the responses of cooperative behaviors to uncertainty and to the framing for each type of social preferences categorized by a value orientation test. We find that aggregate framing effects are negligible, although the response to the frame is the opposite depending on the type of social preferences. "Cooperative" subjects become more cooperative in negative frames than in positive frames, whereas "individualistic" subjects are less cooperative in negative frames than in positive ones. This finding implies that the insignificance of aggregate framing effects arises from behavioral asymmetry. We also find that the percentage of cooperative choices non-monotonically varies with the degree of threshold uncertainty, irrespective of framing and value orientation. Specifically, the degree of cooperation is highest at intermediate levels of threshold uncertainty and decreases as the uncertainty becomes sufficiently large.

Revealed Preference and Choice under Uncertainty

We employ the theory of rational choice to examine whether observable choices from feasible sets of prospects can be generated by the optimization of some underlying decision criterion under uncertainty. Rather than focusing on a specific theory of choice, our objective is to formulate a general approach that is designed to cover the various decision criteria that have been proposed in the literature. We use a mild dominance property to define a class of suitable choice criteria. In addition to rationalizability per se, we characterize transitive and Suzumura consistent rationalizability in the presence of dominance.

Promising Practices: Ensuring Choice Under the Ticket to Work Program - The Indiana PABSS Approach

The Ticket to Work program offered disabled and blind social security beneficiaries the promise of greater choice when selecting a vocational rehabilitation provider. With the issuance of Transmittal #17, much of the opportunity to choose a provider was removed. The Protection and Advocacy agency in Indiana took steps to protect the rights of disabled and blind beneficiaries to choose providers in the face of this significant policy change. Learn what was done to protect the rights and ability of beneficiaries to seek and choose vocational rehabilitation providers.

Guessing under source uncertainty with side information

We study the problem of guessing the realization of a finite alphabet source, when some side information is provided, in a setting where the only knowledge the guesser has about the source and the correlated side information is that the joint source is one among a family. We define a notion of redundancy, identify a quantity that measures this redundancy, and study its properties. We then identify good guessing strategies that minimize the supremum redundancy (over the family). The minimum value measures the richness of the uncertainty class.

GNSS Signal Detection Under Noise Uncertainty

High sensitivity detection techniques are required for indoor navigation using Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers, and typically, a combination of coherent and non- coherent integration is used as the test statistic for detection. The coherent integration exploits the deterministic part of the signal and is limited due to the residual frequency error, navigation data bits and user dynamics, which are not known apriori. So, non- coherent integration, which involves squaring of the coherent integration output, is used to improve the detection sensitivity. Due to this squaring, it is robust against the artifacts introduced due to data bits and/or frequency error. However, it is susceptible to uncertainty in the noise variance, and this can lead to fundamental sensitivity limits in detecting weak signals. In this work, the performance of the conventional non-coherent integration-based GNSS signal detection is studied in the presence of noise uncertainty. It is shown that the performance of the current state of the art GNSS receivers is close to the theoretical SNR limit for reliable detection at moderate levels of noise uncertainty. Alternate robust post-coherent detectors are also analyzed, and are shown to alleviate the noise uncertainty problem. Monte-Carlo simulations are used to confirm the theoretical predictions.

A simulation-based algorithm for optimal pricing policy under demand uncertainty

We propose a simulation-based algorithm for computing the optimal pricing policy for a product under uncertain demand dynamics. We consider a parameterized stochastic differential equation (SDE) model for the uncertain demand dynamics of the product over the planning horizon. In particular, we consider a dynamic model that is an extension of the Bass model. The performance of our algorithm is compared to that of a myopic pricing policy and is shown to give better results. Two significant advantages with our algorithm are as follows: (a) it does not require information on the system model parameters if the SDE system state is known via either a simulation device or real data, and (b) as it works efficiently even for high-dimensional parameters, it uses the efficient smoothed functional gradient estimator.

Choice under Risk : Theory and Applications

Es útil para estudiantes de postgrado (Master y Doctorado) en cursos de Economía o de Microeconomía en los que se analicen problemas de Decisión en condiciones de Riesgo o Incertidumbre. El documento comienza explicando la Teoría de la Utilidad Esperada. A continuación se estudian la aversión al riesgo, los coeficientes de aversión absoluta y relativa al riesgo, la relación “más averso que” entre agentes económicos y los efectos riqueza sobre las decisiones en algunas relaciones de preferencia utilizadas frecuentemente en el análisis económico. La sección 4 se centra en la comparación entre alternativas arriesgadas en términos de rendimiento y riesgo, considerando la dominancia estocástica de primer y segundo orden y algunas extensiones posteriores de esas relaciones de orden. El documento concluye con doce ejercicios resueltos en los que se aplican los conceptos y resultados expuestos en las secciones anteriores a problemas de decisión en varios contextos

Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: the Newsboy Problem Revisited.

In this article we study the effect of uncertainty on an entrepreneur who must choose the capacity of his business before knowing the demand for his product. The unit profit of operation is known with certainty but there is no flexibility in our one-period framework. We show how the introduction of global uncertainty reduces the investment of the risk neutral entrepreneur and, even more, that the risk averse one. We also show how marginal increases in risk reduce the optimal capacity of both the risk neutral and the risk averse entrepreneur, without any restriction on the concave utility function and with limited restrictions on the definition of a mean preserving spread. These general results are explained by the fact that the newsboy has a piecewise-linear, and concave, monetary payoff witha kink endogenously determined at the level of optimal capacity. Our results are compared with those in the two literatures on price uncertainty and demand uncertainty, and particularly, with the recent contributions of Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1991, 1995).