Central banking in Mexico: monetary policies and financial crises, 1964-1940.

Mode of access: Internet.

Foreign central banking: the instruments of monetary policy.

Mode of access: Internet.

Central banking legislation; a collection of central bank, monetary, and banking laws.

Includes bibliographies.

Central banking and inequalities: taking off the blinders

What is the relation between monetary policy and inequalities in income and wealth? This question has received insufficient attention, especially in light of the unconventional policies introduced since the 2008 financial crisis. The article analyzes three ways in which the concern central banks show for inequalities in their official statements remains incomplete and underdeveloped. First, central banks tend to care about inequality for instrumental reasons only. When they do assign intrinsic value to containing inequalities, they shy away from trade-offs with the standard objectives of monetary policy that such a position entails. Second, central banks play down the causal impact monetary policy has on inequalities. When they do acknowledge it, they defend their actions by claiming that it is an unintended side effect, that it is temporary, and/or that any alternative policy would fare even worse. The article appeals to the doctrine of double effect to criticize these arguments. Third, even if one accepts that inequalities should be contained and that today’s monetary policies exacerbate them, is it both desirable and feasible to make containing inequalities part of the mandate of central banks? The article analyzes and rejects three attempts on the part of central banks to answer this question negatively.

Continuity and change in monetary policy and banking in Ireland 1922-43

The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the development of monetary policy and banking in southern Ireland from the attainment of independence in 1922 (gained through the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921) to the establishment of the Central Bank of Ireland in 1943. This research serves to challenge the overwhelming concentration on the findings of a small number of major works, most notably by Ronan Fanning, Maurice Moynihan and Cormac Ó’Gráda, in the existing historiography. This thesis is based on the research hypothesis that there were two key factors impacting on the development of monetary and banking institutions in Ireland in the 1922-1943 period. First, an exogenous institutional context, primarily Anglo-Irish in focus, in which the wider macroeconomic landscape directly influenced monetary policy and banking in Ireland. Second, an individualist context in which the development of relationships between key individuals dictated development patterns and institutional structures. This research highlights that key Irish policymakers, such as Joseph Brennan, evidenced a more flexible and realistic approach to banking and monetary affairs than is currently recognised. It also develops three further issues which have been overlooked in the existing historiography. First, a germ of monetary reform existed in Ireland from as early as the mid-1920s and was consistent in promoting alternative policies in the period to 1943. Second, this research challenges the view that the creation of the Currency Commission in 1927 and the establishment of the Central Bank of Ireland in 1943 were insignificant events given the continued stagnation in Irish monetary policy in the decades after 1943. Third, this thesis identifies that wider international trends did influence Irish monetary and banking affairs in the 1922-43 period. At both an institutional and more individual level the process of monetary institution building in Ireland was directly impacted by wider international experiences.

A Prudent Central Banker

This paper studies monetary policy in an economy where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around optimal inflation. In particular, positive deviations from the optimum can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative deviations in the policy maker's loss function. It is shown that under asymmetric preferences, uncertainty can induce a prudent behavior on the part of the central banker. Since the prudence motive can be large enough to override the inflation bias, optimal monetary policy could be implemented even in the absence of rules, reputation, or contractual mechanisms. For certain parameter values, a deflationary bias can arise in equilibrium.

The Inflation Bias When the Central Bank Targets, the Natural Rate of Unemployment

This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate. Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more (or less) severely than negative deviations in the central banker's loss function. The bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment. The time-series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from G7 countries. Econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related.

Media bias and central bank response. Evidence from the nominal exchange rate behavior in Colombia

Since 1991 Colombia has had a market-determined Peso - US Dollar Nominal Exchange Rate (NER), after more than 20 years of controlled and multiple exchange rates. The behavior (revaluation / devaluation) of the NER is constantly reported in news, editorials and op-eds of major newspapers of the nation with particular attention to revaluation. The uneven reporting of revaluation episodes can be explained by the existence of an interest group particulary affected by revaluation, looking to increase awareness and sympathy for help from public institutions. Using the number of news and op-eds from a major Colombian newspaper, it is shown that there is an over-reporting of revaluation episodes in contrast to devaluation ones. Secondly, using text analysis upon the content of the news, it is also shown that the words devaluation and revaluation are far apart in the distribution of words within the news; and revaluation is highly correlated with words related to: public institutions, exporters and the need of assistance. Finally it is also shown that the probability of the central bank buying US dollars to lessen revaluation effects increases with the number of news; even though the central bank allegedly intervenes in the exchange rate market only to tame volatility or accumulate international reserves.

Determinants and effects of central bank independence reforms

This thesis consists of four empirically oriented papers on central bank independence (CBI) reforms.    Paper [1] is an investigation of why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to control the economy. A new data-set, including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during 1980-2005, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country had been characterized by high variability in inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries.    Paper [2], using a difference-in-difference approach, studies whether CBI reform matters for inflation performance. The analysis is based on a dataset including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during the period of 1980-2005. CBI reform is found to have contributed to bringing down inflation in high-inflation countries, but it seems unrelated to inflation performance in low-inflation countries.    Paper [3] investigates whether CBI-reforms are important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability, using a random-effects random-coefficients model to account for heterogeneity in the effects of CBI-reforms on inflation. CBI-reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average by 3.31 percent, but the effect is only present when countries with historically high inflation rates are included in the sample. Countries with more modest inflation rates have achieved low inflation without institutional reforms that grant central banks more independence, thus undermining the time-inconsistency theory case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI-reforms have contributed to lower inflation variability    Paper [4] studies the relationship between CBI and a suggested trade-off between price variability and output variability using data on CBI-levels, and data the on implementation dates of CBI-reforms. The results question the existence of such a trade-off, but indicate that there may still be potential gains in stabilization policy from CBI-reforms.

Banco central do Brasil: em busca de um modelo face as mudanças no sistema financeiro e levando-se em conta a experiência internacional

Trata da análise do caso brasileiro, buscando-se com base no desenvolvimento teórico acerca do assunto, bem como da experiência de outros países, analisaras principais mudanças pertinentes ao tema Bancos Centrais e sua forma de atuação. Especial atenção foi dispensada a temas como a polêmica Central Banking X Free-Banking, aos Modelos de Supervisão Bancária, e a Regulamentação do art. 192 da Constituição Federal que trata do sistema financeiro e da organização, funções e forma de atuação do Banco central do Brasil

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contacting approach to central banking in the context of a simple common agency model. The recent literature on optimal contracts suggests that the political principal of the central bank can design the appropriate incentive schemes that remedy for time-inconsistency problems in monetary policy. The effectiveness of such contracts, however, requires a central banker that attaches a positive weight to the incentive scheme. As a result, delegating monetary policy under such circumstances gives rise to the possibility that the central banker may respond to incentive schemes offered by other potential principals. We introduce common agency considerations in the design of optimal central banker contracts. We introduce two principals - society (government) and an interest group, whose objectives conflict with society's and we examine under what circumstances the government-offered or the interest-group-offered contract dominates. Our results largely depend on the type of bias that the interest group contract incorporates. In particular, when the interest group contract incorporates an inflationary bias the outcome depends on the principals' relative concern of the incentive schemes' costs. When the interest group contract incorporates an expansionary bias, however, it always dominates the government contract. A corollary of our results is that central banker contracts aiming to remove the expansionary bias of policymakers should be written explicitly in terms of the perceived bias.

A atuação organizada do setor bancário e a regulamentação das tarifas bancárias

Analisa a questão do pressuposto da necessidade de regulação do sistema bancário e o lobby, como parte legítima do processo decisório político. Estas variáveis são fundamentais para a compreensão do estudo da atuação dos grupos de interesse envolvidos no processo de aprovação, pelo Conselho Monetário Nacional, da Resolução 3.518, de 06/12/07, que trata da tarifa bancária. A análise da regulamentação do setor bancário procura evidenciar os fatores que influenciam a escolha, por parte do órgão regulador, do grau de controle a ser exercido sobre as instituições financeiras, podendo ser enfatizado o caráter prudencial, fiscalizador ou liberal das normas bancárias, conforme política posta em prática pelo Banco Central. A abordagem acerca do lobbying evidencia a legitimidade de sua prática junto aos órgãos públicos, como também a possibilidade de sua regulamentação no Brasil. Em seguida, é analisado o comportamento da tarifa bancária antes, durante e depois da publicação da Resolução em questão, assim como as audiências públicas que a antecederam, a fim de investigar seus possíveis resultados, pois a partir deles, como também por intermédio das entrevistas concedidas, pode-se depreender a atuação dos grupos de influência na consecução de seus interesses.