Cartel deterrence and settlements: the Brazilian experience

Settlements are an important part of a program of cartel deterrence, particularly when the likelihood of conviction and the litigation costs are higher. This type of negotiated procedure to reach finality is in essence complementary to the fully adversarial procedures associated to the trial by the administrative or judicial courts, and to other investigative instruments, such as the leniency agreement. The Brazilian experience provides some insights about the different models of direct settlement in cartel cases and the complex interaction among settlements, leniency agreements, and trial outcome. First, there is leeway for the complementary models of settlements, the first oriented mainly to increasing the likelihood of detection, and the second oriented to saving social costs of litigation. Second, the concern with the preservation of the demand for leniency agreements led the competition authority to restrict the use of settlements, which are effectively designed for the defendants that are likely guilty and give higher value to finality. The recent experience illustrates that the current settlement policy has not caused any adverse effect on leniency agreements, while reducing litigation costs and granting finality in some cases.

The Anatomy of an International Cartel: Cyanide 1897-1927

The development of a new product or a new process, if adopted by the market, may generate a number of economic processes including secondary innovations to promote the exploitation of the new discovery. Such technological advances may also promote new industrial ventures which may exist over many decades, enhancing economic development. The history of the adoption of the cyanide process for the extraction of gold from its ores exemplifies such developments. One outcome was the formation of an international cyanide cartel.

America's nuclear deterrence in the age of terrorism

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and the leakage of the Nuclear Posture Report (NPR) spur a complete review of the nuclear doctrine under Pres George W. Bush's administration. Kampmark discusses the contrariness of NPR in relation to America's deterrence of nuclear weapons and the possible proliferation of tactical offensive weapons as compared to strategic nuclear weapons.

How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?

We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.

Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge

In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains). To do this we undertake a systematic comparison of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with three other penalty regimes: fixed penalties; penalties based on revenue, and penalties based on profits. Our analysis is the first to compare these regimes in terms of their impact on both (i) the prices charged by those cartels that do form; and (ii) the number of stable cartels that form (deterrence). We show that the class of penalties based on profits is identical to the class of fixed penalties in all welfare-relevant respects. For the other three types of penalty we show that, for those cartels that do form, penalties based on the overcharge produce lower prices than those based on profit) while penalties based on revenue produce the highest prices. Further, in conjunction with the above result, our analysis of cartel stability (and thus deterrence), shows that penalties based on the overcharge out-perform those based on profits, which in turn out-perform those based on revenue in terms of their impact on each of the following welfare criteria: (a) average overcharge; (b) average consumer surplus; (c) average total welfare.

Vertical Product Differentiation, Entry-Deterrence Strategies, and Entry Qualities, September 2005

We analyze the entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market in which an entrant and an incumbent compete in prices. Here the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on “limit qualities.” With a sequential choice of quality, a quality-dependent marginal production cost, and a fixed entry cost, we relate the entry-quality decision and the entry-deterrence strategies to the level of entry cost and the degree of consumer heterogeneity. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well as an incumbent’s aggressive entry-deterrence strategies of increasing its quality level toward potential entry. Welfare evaluation confirms that social welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred.

Role of Methyl Salicylate on Oviposition Deterrence in Arabidopsis thaliana.

Plants attacked by herbivores have evolved different strategies that fend off their enemies. Insect eggs deposited on leaves have been shown to inhibit further oviposition through visual or chemical cues. In some plant species, the volatile methyl salicylate (MeSA) repels gravid insects but whether it plays the same role in the model species Arabidopsis thaliana is currently unknown. Here we showed that Pieris brassicae butterflies laid fewer eggs on Arabidopsis plants that were next to a MeSA dispenser or on plants with constitutively high MeSA emission than on control plants. Surprisingly, the MeSA biosynthesis mutant bsmt1-1 treated with egg extract was still repellent to butterflies when compared to untreated bsmt1-1. Moreover, the expression of BSMT1 was not enhanced by egg extract treatment but was induced by herbivory. Altogether, these results provide evidence that the deterring activity of eggs on gravid butterflies is independent of MeSA emission in Arabidopsis, and that MeSA might rather serve as a deterrent in plants challenged by feeding larvae.

El surgimiento del cartel publicitario : análisis comparativo de la obra publicitaria de Jules Chéret y Ramón Casas

En aquest treball s’analitzarà el surgiment del cartell publicitari a través d’un recorregut històric del cartell, s’observaràn les teories actuals del cartell i compararem la obra publicitaria dels cartellistes pioners a França i España, Jules Chéret i Ramón Casas respectivament.