Four essays on capital regulation of banks

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2013

Auswirkungen von Eigenkapitalregulierung auf optimale Bankkreditzinsniveaus (Effect of capital regulation on optimal bank loan interest rate levels)

Die Vielfalt von möglichen wirtschaftlichen Konsequenzen von Banksolvenzproblemen trägt auch dazu bei, dass wissenschaftliche Fragen über die Eigenkapitalregulierung im Bankensektor schon seit einigen Jahren ziemlich intensiv diskutiert werden. Die Effekte von Eigenkapitalregulierung können sich auf zahlreiche Weise zeigen, zum Beispiel ist ein Effekt auf das Kreditzinsniveau auch nicht auszuschließen. Um diesen potenziellen Zusammenhang, an den die frühere Literatur noch nicht fokussierte, klarer analysieren zu können, wird in der vorliegenden Studie ein theoretisches Modell präsentiert, in der eine Verbindung zwischen einem optimalen Bankkreditzinsniveau und der Eigenkapitalregulierung existiert. Die Optimalität von Kreditzinsniveaus wird aus zwei Aspekten betrachtet: als Optimalitätskriterien werden Gewinnmaximierung und Maximierung von Solvenzwahrscheinlichkeit verglichen. Aufgrund der Ergebnisse kann darauf geschlossen werden, dass diese zwei optimale Kreditzinsniveaus nicht identisch sind und unterschiedlich von Eigenkapitalregulierung beeinflusst werden. Nach theoretischen Ergebnissen ist es möglich, dass im Falle einer Erhöhung des Eigenkapitals bei gleichbleibenden Bankeinlagen das gewinnmaximierende Optimum sich nicht ändert, während das zu der Maximierung der Solvenzwahrscheinlichkeit gehörende Optimum sich verringert.

Optimal Capital Requirements in Financial Networks with Fire Sales

I explore and analyze a problem of finding the socially optimal capital requirements for financial institutions considering two distinct channels of contagion: direct exposures among the institutions, as represented by a network and fire sales externalities, which reflect the negative price impact of massive liquidation of assets.These two channels amplify shocks from individual financial institutions to the financial system as a whole and thus increase the risk of joint defaults amongst the interconnected financial institutions; this is often referred to as systemic risk. In the model, there is a trade-off between reducing systemic risk and raising the capital requirements of the financial institutions. The policymaker considers this trade-off and determines the optimal capital requirements for individual financial institutions. I provide a method for finding and analyzing the optimal capital requirements that can be applied to arbitrary network structures and arbitrary distributions of investment returns.

In particular, I first consider a network model consisting only of direct exposures and show that the optimal capital requirements can be found by solving a stochastic linear programming problem. I then extend the analysis to financial networks with default costs and show the optimal capital requirements can be found by solving a stochastic mixed integer programming problem. The computational complexity of this problem poses a challenge, and I develop an iterative algorithm that can be efficiently executed. I show that the iterative algorithm leads to solutions that are nearly optimal by comparing it with lower bounds based on a dual approach. I also show that the iterative algorithm converges to the optimal solution.

Finally, I incorporate fire sales externalities into the model. In particular, I am able to extend the analysis of systemic risk and the optimal capital requirements with a single illiquid asset to a model with multiple illiquid assets. The model with multiple illiquid assets incorporates liquidation rules used by the banks. I provide an optimization formulation whose solution provides the equilibrium payments for a given liquidation rule.

I further show that the socially optimal capital problem using the ``socially optimal liquidation" and prioritized liquidation rules can be formulated as a convex and convex mixed integer problem, respectively. Finally, I illustrate the results of the methodology on numerical examples and

discuss some implications for capital regulation policy and stress testing.

Ciclos económicos, capital bancario y nuevas opciones de política económica

El objetivo de este trabajo es utilizar algunos hechos estilizados de la "Gran recesión", específicamente la drástica caída en el nivel de capitalización bancario, para analizar la relación entre los ciclos financieros y los ciclos reales, así como la efectividad de la política monetaria no convencional y las políticas macroprudenciales. Para esto, en el primer capítulo se desarrolla una microfundamentación de la banca a partir de un modelo de Costly State Verification, que es incluido posteriomente en distintas especificaciones de modelos DSGE. Los resultados muestran que: (i) los ciclos financieros y los ciclos económicos pueden relacionarse a partir del deterioro del capital bancario; (ii) Las políticas macroprudenciales y no convencionales son efectivas para moderar los ciclos económicos, pero son costosas en términos de recursos e inflación.

Banco BPI and the reimbursement of contingent convertible subordinated bonds (CoCos)

This case study focuses on the BPI’s recapitalization plan, its causes and the reasons for the early reimbursement of CoCos in June 2014. The need for a capital intervention and the subsequent subscription agreement with the Portuguese Government of €1 500 million Core Tier 1 instruments were the result of a temporary capital buffer for sovereign debt exposures imposed by the European Banking Authority. The capital increase, the positive earnings in 2012 and 2013, the improvements in the sovereign debt crisis, the implementation of Basel III, in addition to the public exchange offer and the conversion of deferred tax assets into tax credits are the main factors for concluding the entire recapitalization operation three years before the deadline.

Regulating financial conglomerates

We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combinea bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate s risk-taking incentivesdepend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn isdetermined by the conglomerate s liability strucure. We examine optimal capitalrequirements for standalone institutions, for integrated financial conglomerates,and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies.For a given risk profile, integrated conglomerates have a lower probability offailure than either their standalone or decentralised equivalent. However, whenrisk profiles are endogenously selected conglomeration may extend the reachof the deposit insurance safety net and hence provide incentives for increasedrisk-taking. As a result, integrated conglomerates may optimally attract highercapital requirements. In contrast, decentralised conglomerates are able to holdassets in the socially most efficient place. Their optimal capital requirementsencourage this. Hence, the practice of regulatory arbitrage , or of transferingassets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare-increasing. We discuss thepolicy implications of our finding in the context not only of the present debateon the regulation of financial conglomerates but also in the light of existingUS bank holding company regulation.

Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism

This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetarypolicy in a general equilibrium model of securities marketsand banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetarypolicy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing theaggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.

Dodd Frank act and the Brazilian capital market: extraterritorial effects of regulation to the over-the-counter derivatives market

This paper aims to describe the chief alterations proposed by the Dodd Frank Act to the American over-the-counter derivatives market and, at the same time, understand the extraterritorial reach of this law compared to the regulatory framework of the Brazilian derivative market. In order to do so, I will study the extraterritorial effects of the law, particularly in reference to the international nature of Title II of the Dodd Frank, which deals with the over-the-counter derivatives, in order to evaluate its reach to foreign markets, especially the Brazilian market.

Beyond ‘best practices': the international regulation of capital markets

It is widely acknowledged that there is considerable international pressure for international ‘best practices’ to be adopted via national legislation. This would occur either by means of model laws or through the passing of country specific legislation that closely replicates foreign legal formats, administrative rules, and or regulation. These attempts to spread the implementation of ‘best practices’ have gained importance in the international debate due to the liberalization of international capital flows. The oversight, country reports, and technical assistance carried out by international organizations along with the growing internationalization of investors have also contributed to this growing pressure. In this respect, due to the constant evolution of transactions and the end objective of making sure that capital markets are developed with just rules, structures, and methods, this article looks to analyze the adoption of standardized models of capital market regulation. Furthermore it looks to examine the motivation and interest of states and other ‘stakeholders’ at the international level.

Liquidity black holes: why modern financial regulation in developed countries is making short-term capital flows to developing countries even more volatile

Includes bibliography

Derivatives, the shape of international capital flows and the virtues of prudential regulation

Includes bibliography

Evaluating the impact of securities regulation on venture capital markets /

"Planning Office, National Bureau of Standards."