929 resultados para CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
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Abstract . Rights jiirisprudence in Canada dates back as far as Confederation in 1867. Between this date and 1982, the organizing principle of Confederation - federalism - has kept this jurisprudence solely within the supremacy of Parliament, subject to its confines and division of powers. After 1982, however, a new constitutional organizing principle was introduced, when Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau introduced the patriation initiative, touted as the "people's package". Individual rights and freedoms were now guaranteed by the Constitution. Citizens of Canada now had a direct link to the Constitution via the Charter and there were now two significantly different organizing principles within the constitutional order widch created an unstable coexistence. This instability has led to a clash between judicially enforced Charter rights and federalism. The Charter has since had both a nationalizing and centralizing effect on Canadian federalism. This thesis explores the relationship between rights and federalism in Canada fix)m Confederation to present day by comparing the jurisprudence of pre and post Charter Canada. An analysis of Supreme Court's (and its predecessor's, the JCPC) decisions shows the profound effect the Charter has had on Canadian federalism. The result has been an undermining of federalism in Canada, with Parliamentary Supremacy replaced by Constitutional supremacy, and ultimately. Judicial Supremacy. Moreover, rights discourse has largely replaced federalism discourse. Canadians have become very attached to their Charter, and are unwilling to allow any changes to the constitution that may affect their rights as political elites discovered the hard way after the collapse of the Meech and Charlottetown Accords. If federalism is to remain a relevant and viable organizing principle in the Constitution, then governments, especially at the provincial level, must find new and iimovative ways to assert their importance within the federation.
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Este artículo analiza la supremacía de la Constitución, en el escenario boliviano, frente al resto de las normas que integran el ordenamiento jurídico. Se estudia de manera particular a los tratados internacionales –en particular aquellos que forman parte del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos– en relación al debate sobre su jerarquía en el ordenamiento jurídico boliviano y, en particular, frente a la Constitución. Finalmente, se precisa la jerarquía que le corresponde a las normas propias de los pueblos indígenas, originarios y campesinos en el ordenamiento jurídico boliviano.
Resumo:
Este trabalho se propõe a analisar a posse dos bens públicos, sob a perspectiva do neoconstitucionalismo, com destaque para o princípio da função social da propriedade. A tese deste estudo se pautou na afirmativa de que a partir do surgimento da concessão de uso especial para fins de moradia, instituída pela Medida Provisória 2.220 para regulamentar o artigo 183, § 1º da Constituição Federal de 1988, a função social da propriedade, antes sobrelevada nos litígios envolvendo a posse dos bens públicos, passou a ser discutida no âmbito dos tribunais. Para a comprovação da referida tese, analisou-se a jurisprudência do Superior Tribunal de Justiça, dos Tribunais Regionais Federais das cinco regiões do país e dos Tribunais de Justiça do Estado do Rio de Janeiro e do Rio Grande do Sul. Feita esta análise, foi possível comprovar a tese defendida. Com o intuito de garantir a máxima eficácia ao princípio da função social da propriedade, defendeu-se a não delimitação temporal imposta pela MP 2.220, tendo por base quatro argumentos de índole constitucional, sendo eles, a observância da força normativa da Constituição, a aplicação dos tratados internacionais de Direitos Humanos, o respeito ao princípio da igualdade e, por fim, o princípio da supremacia da Constituição.
Resumo:
A number of laws in Canada which uphold rights are referred to as quasi-constitutional by the courts in recognition of their special importance. Quasi-constitutional statutes are enacted through the regular legislative process, although they are being interpreted and applied in a fashion which has become remarkably similar to constitutional law, and are therefore having an important affect over other legislation. Quasi-constitutionality has surprisingly received limited scholarly attention, and very few serious attempts at explaining its significance have been made. This dissertation undertakes a comprehensive study of quasi-constitutionality which considers its theoretical basis, its interpretation and legal significance, as well as its similarities to comparable forms of law in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. Part I examines the theoretical basis of quasi-constitutionality and its relationship to the Constitution. As a statutory and common law form of fundamental law, quasi-constitutionality is shown to signify an association with the Canadian Constitution and the foundational principles that underpin it. Part II proceeds to consider the special rules of interpretation applied to quasi-constitutional legislation, the basis of this interpretative approach, and the connection between the interpretation of similar provisions in quasi-constitutional legislation and the Constitution. As a statutory form of fundamental law, quasi-constitutional legislation is given a broad, liberal and purposive interpretation which significantly expands the rights which they protect. The theoretical basis of this approach is found in both the fundamental nature of the rights upheld by quasi-constitutional legislation as well as legislative intent. Part III explores how quasi-constitutional statutes affect the interpretation of regular legislation and how they are used for the purposes of judicial review. Quasi-constitutional legislation has a significant influence over regular statutes in the interpretative exercise, which in some instances results in conflicting statutes being declared inoperable. The basis of this form of judicial review is demonstrated to be rooted in statutory interpretation, and as such it provides an interesting model of rights protection and judicial review that is not conflated to constitutional and judicial supremacy.
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Australian Constitutional referendums have been part of the Australian political system since federation. Up to the year 1999 (the time of the last referendum in Australia), constitutional change in Australia does not have a good history of acceptance. Since 1901, there have been 44 proposed constitutional changes with eight gaining the required acceptance according to section 128 of the Australian Constitution. In the modern era since 1967, there have been 20 proposals over seven referendum votes for a total of four changes. Over this same period, there have been 13 federal general elections which have realised change in government just five times. This research examines the electoral behaviour of Australian voters from 1967 to 1999 for each referendum. Party identification has long been a key indicator in general election voting. This research considers whether the dominant theory of voter behaviour in general elections (the Michigan Model) provides a plausible explanation for voting in Australian referendums. In order to explain electoral behaviour in each referendum, this research has utilised available data from the Australian Electoral Commission, the 1996 Australian Bureau of Statistics Census data, and the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study. This data has provided the necessary variables required to measure the impact of the Michigan Model of voter behaviour. Measurements have been conducted using bivariate and multivariate analyses. Each referendum provides an overview of the events at the time of the referendum as well as the =yes‘ and =no‘ cases at the time each referendum was initiated. Results from this research provide support for the Michigan Model of voter behaviour in Australian referendum voting. This research concludes that party identification, as a key variable of the Michigan Model, shows that voters continue to take their cues for voting from the political party they identify with in Australian referendums. However, the outcome of Australian referendums clearly shows that partisanship is only one of a number of contributory factors in constitutional referendums.
Resumo:
The legal power to declare war has traditionally been a part of a prerogative to be exercised solely on advice that passed from the King to the Governor-General no later than 1942. In 2003, the Governor- General was not involved in the decision by the Prime Minister and Cabinet to commit Australian troops to the invasion of Iraq. The authors explore the alternative legal means by which Australia can go to war - means the government in fact used in 2003 - and the constitutional basis of those means. While the prerogative power can be regulated and/or devolved by legislation, and just possibly by practice, there does not seem to be a sound legal basis to assert that the power has been devolved to any other person. It appears that in 2003 the Defence Minister used his legal powers under the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) (as amended in 1975) to give instructions to the service head(s). A powerful argument could be made that the relevant sections of the Defence Act were not intended to be used for the decision to go to war, and that such instructions are for peacetime or in bello decisions. If so, the power to make war remains within the prerogative to be exercised on advice. Interviews with the then Governor-General indicate that Prime Minister Howard had planned to take the matter to the Federal Executive Council 'for noting', but did not do so after the Governor-General sought the views of the then Attorney-General about relevant issues of international law. The exchange raises many issues, but those of interest concern the kinds of questions the Governor-General could and should ask about proposed international action and whether they in any way mirror the assurances that are uncontroversially required for domestic action. In 2003, the Governor-General's scrutiny was the only independent scrutiny available because the legality of the decision to go to war was not a matter that could be determined in the High Court, and the federal government had taken action in March 2002 that effectively prevented the matter coming before the International Court of Justice
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The central argument of this work is that “democratic constitutional legitimacy”[2] probably does not currently exist in the politics of any country internationally. This inherent problem in constitutionalism is an endemic governance problem most citizenries should be dealing with, only that we are not in a large extent doing so and haven’t been historically. This position was ascertained using a form of Beck and Grande’s (2010) cosmopolitan methodology in my doctoral thesis (which we shall return to). It is argued that every constitution is in need of considerable rethinking so as to bring its statutes in line with the interests of the plurality of individuals it oversees. Finally, this work attempts to show that research in this area of democratic constitutional legitimacy is lacking in the literature as only a few scholars presently engage the issue (namely Simone Chambers).
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Significant reform of the laws regulating charities is under way in Australia. The reforms cover almost every facet of the relationship between charities and government and the process has brought to the surface different assumptions about the role of charities in society, their entitlement to fiscal and other privileges and the scope and nature of regulation that can or should be imposed on the charities. This paper explores these broader issues in the context of the Aid/Watch case, involving an organisation used by citizens to challenge the State. Such organisations occupy contested space as to what does and does not constitute a charity. Accordingly the case provides a useful perspective from which to consider the broader issues in the relationship between government and charity. This paper seeks to build on the contribution made by other academics, by exploring the constitutional significance of political purposes and drawing from philosophy to provide context and meaning to potentially significant aspects of the judgment that might be missed when it is analysed only in terms of legal precedent through the narrow lens of the existing four heads of charity. Revenue implications for taxation of charities and political parties are also considered and it is suggested that in practice, if not in theory, the fence between them has come down.
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In recent years a growing number of states have chosen to recognise environmental issues in their national constitutions. Some have added declarations about the value of the environment, some have sought to restrict or regulate government’s ability to take action which would potentially harm the environment, while others have proclaimed that citizens possess a right to an environment of a particular quality. A survey of these constitutional provisions reveals that the majority of reform in this area has come from developing states, including a number of states which have been designated as among the least developed countries in the world. The increasing focus on constitutional environmental rights appears to represent a shift in the attitude of developing and emerging economies, which could in turn be influential in setting the tone of the environmental rights debate more broadly, with potential to shape the future development of international law in the area. This chapter examines constitutional environmental rights in an attempt to determine whether consistent state practice can in fact be identified in this area which might form the basis of an emerging norm. It will also analyse some of the potential contributing factors to the proliferation of a constitutional right to a good environment among developing states, and the implications for the development of customary international law.
Resumo:
Submission recommended addition of a new 'self-enacting' preamble and enacting words to the Commownealth Constitution, and replacement of the 'race power' by a series of more specific powers relating to the recognition of native title and laws of the indigenous people.
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"This book systematically explores and clarifies the complexities of Austrealian Constitutional law and provides valuable critical analysis suitable for students, academics and government departments." -- book cover "Constitutional Law examines the foundational principles and concepts of this area of law. Written by practicing lawyers and lecturers in the subject, this book aims to provide an accessible yet comprehensive introductory text for Australian students. In eight parts this book systematically explores and clarifies the complexities of Australian Constitutional law and provides valuable critical analysis suitable for students, academics and government departments. An excellent resource for law students, Constitutional Law provides visual summaries in the form of flow charts, and each chapter includes key concepts and end-of-chapter discussion questions, further reading and useful websites and links. It also introduces students to key examinable areas, legal style essays, problems and assessment." -- publisher website
Resumo:
Archimedes is reported as famously saying: 'Give me a place to stand and I will move the earth.' He was referring to the power of levers. His point was that a person of ordinary capacity with a place to stand, a fulcrum and a level could change the path of planets. This principle of physics is a metaphor for how the common law has moved over the last millennium. Courts have found a stable foundation on which to stand, such as the constitutional bedrock or well-grounded precedent, and, using cases as fulcrums and legal principles as levers, the have moved the law. Australia is at a critical juncture in the development of the law of charities. The High Court of Australia has held that political purposes can be charitable in certain circumstances. The Parliament of Australia has not only enshrined this in a statutory definition of charity but has done so with a preamble to the legislation which affirms the basis for this development in residing in the 'unique nature and diversity of charities and the distinctive and important role that they play in Australia'.