The constitutional doctrines of Justice Harlan.

Issued also as thesis (PH. D.) Johns Hopkins University.

Los nuevos saberes en el constitucionalismo ecuatoriano (Tema Central)

Para evitar una transformación formal y conducir un cambio constitucional sustancial se hace indispensable generar una construcción teórica en la que se sustenten los valores estructurales del constitucionalismo ecuatoriano como son el Sumak Kawsay y la justicia. Los nuevos saberes constitucionales son una motivación para transformar la práctica del derecho en el sistema de justicia ecuatoriano, porque no es suficiente el ejercicio tradicional del derecho para las exigencias del sistema constitucional actual. Es importante identificar que el cambio a lo nuevo ofrece resistencia en la práctica y exige creatividad para la transformación, circunstancia que se apega a la reparación integral que involucra el ejercicio de la justicia no como un ideal reservado para la teorización, sino que exige materialización.

The debates of the Constitutional Convention of the state of Iowa, assembled at Iowa City, Monday, January 19, 1857. Being a full and complete report of the debates and proceedings, by authority of the Convention; accompanied, for purposes of reference, by a copious index of subjects, and remarks of members thereon. W. Blair Lord, reporter.

The two volume record of the debates that occured during the thirty-nine days it took to draft the third constitution of the State of Iowa.

2007 State of Iowa Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act Formule Grand Update

This document is Iowa’s 2007 JJDP Act formula grant three year plan update. When specific items of this plan are unchanged from the previously submitted 2006 plan, we have reflected accordingly in the respective topic areas of this document. The bulk of this 2007 plan is an “update” of the program plan completed since submission of the original 2006 plan. The Division of Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning (CJJP) wrote Iowa’s three year plan update. CJJP is the state agency responsible for administering the JJDP Act in Iowa. Federal officials refer to state administering agencies as the state planning agency (SPA). The Plan was developed and approved by Iowa’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Council. That Council assists with administration of the JJDP Act, and also provides guidance and direction to the SPA, the Governor and the legislature regarding juvenile justice issues in Iowa. Federal officials refer to such state level groups as state advisory groups (SAG’s).

DMC Section: 2008 State of Iowa Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act Formula Grant Update, March 2009

This document is the DMC Section of Iowa’s 2009 federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDP Act) formula grant three year plan update. The Division of Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning (CJJP) wrote this update. CJJP is the state agency responsible for administering the JJDP Act in Iowa. Federal officials refer to state administering agencies as the state planning agency (SPA). The Plan was developed and approved by Iowa’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Council. That Council assists with administration of the JJDP Act, and also provides guidance and direction to the SPA, the Governor and the legislature regarding juvenile justice issues in Iowa. Federal officials refer to such state level groups as state advisory groups (SAG’s). The acronyms SPA and SAG are used through this report.

The house that the Court built. The retained powers case law of the European Court of Justice and the constitutional structure of the Union

Euroopan unionin perustamissopimusten katsotaan muodostavan EU:n valtiosäännön, jonka rajat ovat kuitenkin perustamissopimusten määräysten väljän muotoilun sekä Euroopan unionin tuomioistuimen tulkintakäytännön valossa epätarkat. Etenkin kysymys unionin ja sen jäsenvaltioiden välisestä toimivallanjaosta on EU-oikeudellisen tutkimuksen klassikoita. Tarkastelen pro gradu -tutkielmassani unionin valtiosääntörakennetta ja unionioikeuden kokonaisvaikutusta jäsenvaltioiden toimivaltojen käyttöön erityisesti EU-tuomioistuimen ratkaisukäytännössään kehittämän niin kutsutun retained powers -doktriinin valossa. Kyseisen opin mukaan EU-oikeus asettaa vaatimuksia jäsenvaltioiden toimivaltojen käytölle myös niillä aloilla, joilla sääntelytoimivalta on jäänyt jäsenvaltioille eikä sitä ole jaettu unionin kanssa. Aiheen teoreettisen tarkastelun pohjalta analysoin Euroopaun unionin tuomioistuimen ratkaisukäytäntöä erityisesti yhtä säilytetyn toimivallan alaa, koulutusta, koskevissa tapauksissa pyrkien havaitsemaan typologioita tuomioistuimen ratkaisutoiminnassa. Tutkimus noudattaa EU-valtiosääntöoikeuden metodologiaa. Keskeisenä lähdemateriaalina on siten käytetty unionituomioistuimen ratkaisukäytäntöä, joka heijastaa perustamissopimuksia tarkemmin unionin valtiosääntörakennetta. Oikeuskäytännön analyysi ja tulkinta on suoritettu peilaten sitä vasten unionin kehitystä markkinaorientoituneesta organisaatiosta yleismaailmalliseksi poliittiseksi unioniksi. Tutkielmani loppupäätelmä on, että jäsenvaltiot ovat tietyissä rajoissa hyväksyneet unionituomioistuimen kehittämän doktriinin, ja unionituomioistuin on siten saanut aikaan tosiasiallisen muutoksen EU:n valtiosääntörakenteessa. Retained powers -doktriini on omiaan syventämään eurooppalaista integraatiota ja nostaa kysymyksiä toimivallanjaon merkityksestä unionioikeudessa, perustamissopimusten kyvystä heijastaa unionin valtiosääntörakennetta sekä unionituomioistuimen toiminnan poliittisesta luonteesta.

Talking with the “pouvoir constituant” in times of constitutional reform: The European Court of Justice on Private Applicants’ Access to Justice. Research Paper in Law 3/2003

[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”

An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Re-writing the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht. IHS Political Science Series No. 136, February 2014

At a time of crisis – a true state of emergency – both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the German Federal Constitutional Court have failed the rule of law in Europe. Worse still, in their evaluation of the ersatz crisis law, which has been developed in response to financial and sovereign debt crises, both courts have undermined constitutionality throughout Europe. Each jurisdiction has been implicated within the techocratisation of democratic process. Each Court has contributed to an incremental process of the undermining of the political subjectivity of European Citizens. The results are depressing for lawyers who are still attached to notions of constitutionality. Yet, we must also ask whether the Courts could have acted otherwise. Given the original flaws in the construction of Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the politically pre-emptive constraints imposed by global financial markets, each Court might thus be argued to have been forced to suspend immediate legality in a longer term effort to secure the character of the legal jurisdiction as a whole. Crisis can and does defeat the law. Nevertheless, what continues to disturb is the failure of law in Europe to open up any perspective for a return to normal constitutionality post crisis, as well as its apparent inability to give proper and honest consideration to the hardship now being experienced by millions of Europeans within crisis. This contribution accordingly seeks to reimagine each Judgment in a language of legal honesty. Above all, this contribution seeks to suggest a new form of post-national constitutional language; a language which takes as its primary function, proper protection of democratic process against the ever encroaching powers of a post-national executive power. This contribution forms a part of an on-going effort to identify a new basis for the legitimacy of European Law, conducted jointly and severally with Christian Joerges, University of Bremen and Hertie School of Government, Berlin. Differences do remain in our theoretical positions; hence this individual essay. Nevertheless, the congruence between pluralist and conflict of law approaches to the topic are also readily apparent. See, for example, Everson & Joerges (2013).

Constitutional reason of state : the survival of the constitutional order /

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Journal of the Constitutional convention of the commonwealth of Virginia to amend the Constitution of Virginia for voting by certain members of the armed forces. Held in the old hall of the House of delegates in the state Capitol at Richmond April 30, May 1, 2, 22, 1945 [and]

J. Sinclair Brown, president of the convention

Constitutional and statutory provisions of the state of Oregon relating to railroads, common carriers by rail and public utilities /

Running title: Railroad and public utility laws of Oregon.