Las garantías de los derechos en las constituciones de Bolivia y Ecuador (Tema Central)

Las recientemente promulgadas constituciones ecuatoriana y boliviana imponen nuevos paradigmas en lo que concierne a la interpretación y aplicación de los derechos fundamentales, y como no podía ser de otra manera, lo hacen igualmente con respecto a las garantías que los tutelan. Este artículo analiza las tensiones que se generan en la denominada aplicación directa de la Constitución y sus significaciones en el plano operativo (obligaciones para jueces y demás autoridades y funcionarios públicos), realiza un estudio de las garantías jurisdiccionales en Ecuador en comparación con las previstas en Bolivia, y advierte de los peligros que implica una interpretación errada de la naturaleza de estas acciones.

Análise crítica da distribuição dinâmica do ônus da prova

Nos últimos anos, a partir do surgimento da ideia de Estado Democrático de Direito, a moderna doutrina processualista passou a entender o processo não só como meio destinado à pacificação social, passando a encará-lo como mecanismo destinado a fazer valer garantias e direitos constitucionais e a alcançar a pacificação justa dos litígios. A partir deste novo contexto, verificou-se a limitação de alguns institutos processuais vigentes, que embora pudessem auxiliar na obtenção do escopo de pacificação, deixavam de resguardar ou de implementar, em alguns momentos, determinadas garantias constitucionais, o que prejudicava o fim último de acesso à ordem jurídica justa. Uma das limitações verificadas a partir da perspectiva publicista de processo corresponde à regra estática de distribuição dos encargos probatórios conforme a natureza dos fatos alegados, uma vez que esta deixava de observar eventual impossibilidade da parte em cumprir com seu encargo. Ante tal limitação, foi desenvolvida uma teoria destinada a reequilibrar a relação processual, assegurando a implementação das garantias constitucionais, quando a regra estática de distribuição dos encargos probatórios não se mostrava suficiente a assegurar o acesso à ordem jurídica justa. Denominada de distribuição dinâmica do ônus da prova (ou teoria das cargas probatórias dinâmicas) a teoria foi pensada a fim de, em tais situações e conforme as peculiaridades do caso concreto, determinar a redistribuição do encargo probatório a fim de que este recaia sobre as partes em melhores condições. Contudo, há grande divergência doutrinária sobre a viabilidade prática da distribuição dinâmica do ônus da prova, sendo apontados diversos problemas que podem decorrer de sua aplicação. O presente trabalho pretende contribuir com a análise do tema, a partir de um estudo sobre as razões que impuseram a criação do instituto, bem como as contribuições que sua implementação traz ao processo civil, encarado sobre a ótica de processo constitucional, e os riscos que podem decorrer de sua aplicação, de forma a verificar se existe viabilidade em sua aplicação e eventuais formas de se afastar os problemas apontados pelos críticos à teoria.

The Convention Manual of procedure, forms and rules for the regulation of business in the seventh New York State Constitutional Convention, 1915 : A manual for the use of the Delegates /

Title on spine: Delegates' manual.

Getting Constitutional Theory into Proportion: A Matter of Interpretation?

Gibbs, N., Getting Constitutional Theory into Proportion: A Matter of Interpretation?, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 27 (1), 175-191. RAE2008

Police accountability in Ireland: an analysis of the problems posed by the legal, constitutional and political dimensions and how they might be addressed

The concept of police accountability is not susceptible to a universal or concise definition. In the context of this thesis it is treated as embracing two fundamental components. First, it entails an arrangement whereby an individual, a minority and the whole community have the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the formulation of the principles and policies governing police operations. Second, it presupposes that those who have suffered as victims of unacceptable police behaviour should have an effective remedy. These ingredients, however, cannot operate in a vacuum. They must find an accommodation with the equally vital requirement that the burden of accountability should not be so demanding that the delivery of an effective police service is fatally impaired. While much of the current debate on police accountability in Britain and the USA revolves around the issue of where the balance should be struck in this accommodation, Ireland lacks the very foundation for such a debate as it suffers from a serious deficit in research and writing on police generally. This thesis aims to fill that gap by laying the foundations for an informed debate on police accountability and related aspects of police in Ireland. Broadly speaking the thesis contains three major interrelated components. The first is concerned with the concept of police in Ireland and the legal, constitutional and political context in which it operates. This reveals that although the Garda Siochana is established as a national force the legal prescriptions concerning its role and governance are very vague. Although a similar legislative format in Britain, and elsewhere, have been interpreted as conferring operational autonomy on the police it has not stopped successive Irish governments from exercising close control over the police. The second component analyses the structure and operation of the traditional police accountability mechanisms in Ireland; namely the law and the democratic process. It concludes that some basic aspects of the peculiar legal, constitutional and political structures of policing seriously undermine their capacity to deliver effective police accountability. In the case of the law, for example, the status of, and the broad discretion vested in, each individual member of the force ensure that the traditional legal actions cannot always provide redress where individuals or collective groups feel victimised. In the case of the democratic process the integration of the police into the excessively centralised system of executive government, coupled with the refusal of the Minister for Justice to accept responsibility for operational matters, project a barrier between the police and their accountability to the public. The third component details proposals on how the current structures of police accountability in Ireland can be strengthened without interfering with the fundamentals of the law, the democratic process or the legal and constitutional status of the police. The key elements in these proposals are the establishment of an independent administrative procedure for handling citizen complaints against the police and the establishment of a network of local police-community liaison councils throughout the country coupled with a centralised parliamentary committee on the police. While these proposals are analysed from the perspective of maximising the degree of police accountability to the public they also take into account the need to ensure that the police capacity to deliver an effective police service is not unduly impaired as a result.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

A manual of the constitutional history of Canada from the earliest period to the year 1888; including the British North America Act, 1867, and a digest of judicial decisions on questions of legislative jurisdiction.

"This treatise is in a large measure a revised republication of certain chapters of the author's large book on Parliamentary practice and procedure in Canada".--Prefatory note.

Modern American law; a systematic and comprehensive commentary on the fundamental principles of American law and procedure, accompanied by leading illustrative cases and legal forms, with a rev. ed. of Blackstone's Commentaries;

v. I. The modern democracy, the citizen and the law - Legal ethics - Law : its origin, nature, development - Courts : federal and state - Law of contracts -- v. 2. Law of torts -- v. 3. Criminal Law - Law of criminal procedure - Law of persons and domestic relations -- v. 4. Personal property and bailments - Law of liens and pledges - Law of agency - Law of sales of personal property -- v. 5. Law of real property -- v. 6. Law of descent and distribution, wills and administration, guardian and ward - Law of landlord and tenant - Law of irrigation and water rights - Law of mines and mining -- v. 7. Equity - Law of trusts - Law of quasi-contacts - Law of estoppel -- v. 8. Law of negotiable instruments - Law of suretyship and guaranty - Law of mortgages : real and chattel - Interpretation of statutes -- v. 9. Law of private corporations - Law of partnership - law of banks, banking and trust companies - Law of receivers -- v. 10. Pleadings in civil actions at common law and under modern statutes - Practice in civil actions - Law of equity pleading - Law of evidence - Laws of attachment and garnishments - Law of judgments and executions - Law of extraordinary remedies - Law of habeas corpus -- v. 11. Constitutional law : definitions and general principles - Organization and powers of the United States Government - Constitutional guaranties of fundamental rights - Eminent domain - Taxation - Naturalization -- v. 12. Conflict of laws - International law - Law of interstate commerce - Law of bankruptcy - Law of patents - Law of copyright - Law of trademarks - Unfair competition and good-will -- v. 13. Law of public service companies, especially common carriers - Law of municipal corporations - Law of public officers and elections - Parliamentary law -- v. 14. Law of damages - Law of insurance - Admiralty law - Medical jurisprudence - Forms -- v. 15. Blackstone's Commentaries.

Cases and other materials on judicial remedies, from the forms of actions and the classical equity practice to the Federal rules of civil procedure,

"Tables of cases": p. 1295-1301. "Table of statutes, constitutional provisions and rules of court": p. 1303-1309

Osteryoung square wave voltammetric determination of lactose in food samples by a derivative procedure

A method for determination of lactose in food samples by Osteryoung square wave voltammetry (OSWV) was developed. It was based on the nucleophilic addition reaction between lactose and aqua ammonia. The carbonyl group of lactose can be changed into imido group, and this increases the electrochemical activity in reduction and the sensitivity. The optimal condition for the nucleophilic addition reaction was investigated and it was found that in NH4Cl–NH3 buffer of pH 10.1, the linear range between the peak current and the concentration of lactose was 0.6–8.4 mg L−1, and the detection limits was 0.44 mg L−1. The proposed method was applied to the determination of lactose in food samples and satisfactory results were obtained.

Voter behaviour and constitutional change in Australia since 1967

Australian Constitutional referendums have been part of the Australian political system since federation. Up to the year 1999 (the time of the last referendum in Australia), constitutional change in Australia does not have a good history of acceptance. Since 1901, there have been 44 proposed constitutional changes with eight gaining the required acceptance according to section 128 of the Australian Constitution. In the modern era since 1967, there have been 20 proposals over seven referendum votes for a total of four changes. Over this same period, there have been 13 federal general elections which have realised change in government just five times. This research examines the electoral behaviour of Australian voters from 1967 to 1999 for each referendum. Party identification has long been a key indicator in general election voting. This research considers whether the dominant theory of voter behaviour in general elections (the Michigan Model) provides a plausible explanation for voting in Australian referendums. In order to explain electoral behaviour in each referendum, this research has utilised available data from the Australian Electoral Commission, the 1996 Australian Bureau of Statistics Census data, and the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study. This data has provided the necessary variables required to measure the impact of the Michigan Model of voter behaviour. Measurements have been conducted using bivariate and multivariate analyses. Each referendum provides an overview of the events at the time of the referendum as well as the =yes‘ and =no‘ cases at the time each referendum was initiated. Results from this research provide support for the Michigan Model of voter behaviour in Australian referendum voting. This research concludes that party identification, as a key variable of the Michigan Model, shows that voters continue to take their cues for voting from the political party they identify with in Australian referendums. However, the outcome of Australian referendums clearly shows that partisanship is only one of a number of contributory factors in constitutional referendums.