"Viewers should not try this at home". Die Verfassungsgerichte Bosnien-Herzegowinas und Kosovos in deren Rolle als Schlichtungsinstanzen in ethnopolitischen Konflikten = The constitutional courts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in their role as arbitration bodies in ethno-political conflicts. EDAP 01/2014

The article analyzes the role of constitutional courts in Bosnia and Kosovo, both characterized by their partly internationalized membership, in the adjudication of cases that are highly controversial between the different ethno-political factions. The main focus is on the Constitutional Court of Bosnia, which presents one of the richest and most interesting examples of “lawfare” in divided societies. The concept of lawfare has been adapted to refer to the continuation of political battles by ethno-political actors through legal means, in this case, constitutional adjudication. In Kosovo, the Constitutional Court has been an important defender of diversity, albeit its primary focus and merit are to have contributed to the establishment of a concept of democracy close to the people of Kosovo. The article concludes that constitutional courts represent important institutions of internal conflict resolution in divided societies, which have been instrumental in shaping multiculturalism in these post-conflict societies divided by deep ethnic cleavages.

The German Constitutional Court’s decision about the European Central Bank’s OMT [Outright Monetary Transactions] mechanism: A masterpiece of judicial arrogance. European Policy Briefs No. 30, April 2014

The German Constitutional Court (BVG) recently referred different questions to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. They concern the legality of the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transaction mechanism created in 2012. Simultaneously, the German Court has threatened to disrupt the implementation of OTM in Germany if its very restrictive analysis is not validated by the European Court of Justice. This raises fundamental questions about the future efficiency of the ECB’s monetary policy, the damage to the independence of the ECB, the balance of power between judges and political organs in charge of economic policy, in Germany and in Europe, and finally the relationship between the BVG and other national or European courts.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Judicial Impartiality and Independence in Divided Societies: An Empirical Analysis of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The role of Constitutional Courts in deeply divided societies is complicated by the danger that the salient societal cleavages may influence judicial decision-making and, consequently, undermine judicial independence and impartiality. With reference to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article investigates the influence of ethno-nationalism on judicial behaviour and the extent to which variation in judicial tenure amplifies or dampens that influence. Based on a statistical analysis of an original dataset of the Court’s decisions, we find that the judges do in fact divide predictably along ethno-national lines, at least in certain types of cases, and that these divisions cannot be reduced to a residual loyalty to their appointing political parties. Contrary to some theoretical expectations, however, we find that long-term tenure does little to dampen the influence of ethno-nationalism on judicial behaviour. Moreover, our findings suggest that the longer a judge serves on the Court the more ethno-national affiliation seems to influence her decision-making. We conclude by considering how alternative arrangements for the selection and tenure of judges might help to ameliorate this problem.

Da intercepção de comunicações, acções encobertas e serviços de informações

The Portuguese Intelligence Services have their operational skills limited due to the grievances caused by the Dictatorship and, in particular, by its political police. With the help of historical elements, and by analyzing current legislation, we demonstrate that such grievances are today unjustified and misplaced, mainly taking into account the Risk Society’s multifaceted threats. Also part of our analysis is the impugnment of the Constitutional Court’s decision nº 413/2015, which pronounced unconstitutional the norm contained in Decree nº 426/XII, of the Republic’s Assembly, article nº 78, nº2, which intended to allow Intelligence Services access to the so-called “metadata”, as well as to tax and banking information. It is our understanding, and we demonstrate it in our dissertation, that should be allowed the access of, not only the above mentioned information, but also the means known as communications interception and undercover operations to the Intelligence Services, as long as properly supervised and inspected.

Dinámicas de las relaciones políticas franco-alemanas en el marco de la Unión Europea. Un análisis en el contexto de la crisis griega. Período 8 de diciembre del 2009- 21 de febrero del 2012

La crisis griega no condicionó de manera especial la manera de negociar de Francia y Alemania. Si se comparan las ruedas de negociación para votar los salvavidas económicos y las negociaciones que se dieron para la firma del Tratado de Maastricht, se puede concluir que, en general, negociaron de una manera similar.

Jurisdicción constitucional y consolidación de la democracia

Este artículo analiza la relación entre jurisdicción constitucional y consolidación de la democracia. Se ocupa, en primer lugar, de la multidimensionalidad de los factores que influyen en la consolidación de la democracia y la relativa importancia de los tribunales constitucionales en este proceso; en segundo lugar expone la multidimensionalidad de los conceptos de democracia y de consolidación de la democracia y la relevancia que dentro de los diferentes conceptos alcanza la jurisdicción constitucional; tercero, apunta a la interrelación recíproca entre democracia y jurisdicción constitucional, destacando el carácter político de su relación. Por lo demás, hace hincapie en la tesis de que, respecto a esta relación y explicando casos, ¿el contexto hace la diferencia? Se enfoca enseguida en las funciones de la jurisdicción constitucional. Se dedica, primero, a los requisitos irrenunciables que tienen que darse y las condiciones favorables que fomentan el cumplimiento de sus funciones por parte de los tribunalesconstitucionales, y segundo, entra en algunos ámbitos de la jurisdicción constitucional en búsqueda de su relevancia para la consolidación de la democracia. Finalmente, termina afirmando el carácter circular de la relación entre jurisdicción constitucional y consolidación de la democracia,resumiendo algunas de las afirmaciones que de manera diferenciada se han hecho a lo largo del estudio.-----This article analyzes the relationship between constitutional jurisdiction and consolidation of democracy, highlighting first of all the multidimensionality of the factors that influence the consolidation of democracy and the relative importance of the constitutional court in this process; stating secondly the multidimensionality of the concepts of democracy and consolidation of democracy as well as the relevance reached by the constitutional jurisdiction within the different concepts; and thirdly, aiming at the reciprocal interrelationship between democracy and constitutional jurisdiction, emphasizing the political nature of such relationship. In all other respects, the question stressed in the thesis is, with respect to this relationship and detailing certain cases: ¿does context make a difference? Then, the focus shifts towards the role of the constitutional jurisdiction. First, it looks at the inalienable requirements that must be present and the conditions favorable to the promotion of the constitutional courts’ fulfillment of their roles, and secondly, it touches on some aspects of constitutional jurisdiction in search of its relevance regarding the consolidation of democracy. Finally, the circular characteristic of the relationship between constitutional jurisdiction and consolidation of democracy is affirmed, summarizing some of the assertions that have been made distinguishably throughout the study.

Teoría de la interpretación y legitimidad del Tribunal Constitucional (Tema Central)

En este artículo se reflexiona acerca de la posibilidad de establecer la existencia, en la actividad hermenéutica de los Tribunales Constitucionales, de unas directrices o guías interpretativas que una vez especificadas puedan ser utilizadas como parámetro para controlar la juridicidad de la reconducción de la vida constitucional efectiva a las reglas de la Constitución. Todo ello pasando, en primer lugar, por el estudio de dos problemáticas: el papel de la jurisprudencia en el sistema de fuentes y los criterios de interpretación como instrumentos aptos para impedir o facilitar que dicha jurisprudencia pueda ser considerada fuente del Derecho, y, en segundo lugar, de los diferentes instrumentos hermenéuticos que se configuran como enlace entre disposición y norma y sus resultados interpretativos. Todo para llegar a demostrar que la utilización de los diferentes criterios de interpretación no puede ser evaluada por medio de un parámetro externo, como el de la teoría dogmática de la interpretación, sino que ellos se controlan por sí mismos, es decir, que el único control posible es un control de coherencia de su aplicación.

Análisis de la resolución de inconstitucionalidad de la detención en firme por parte del Tribunal Constitucional (Tema Central)

El presente trabajo se enfoca en el análisis de la resolución de inconstitucionalidad de la detención en firme emitida por el Tribunal Constitucional, con la cual, se afectó tanto el plazo razonable de prisión, así como la caducidad de la prisión preventiva. En el análisis se podrá apreciar que la medida contrarió, al principio pro homine, al de inocencia, a las características de las medidas cautelares, al de independencia de los jueces, entre otros. Se reflexiona además, su efecto más grave, el quebrantamiento de los derechos humanos de los detenidos al establecer el carácter irretroactivo de la resolución que, a su vez, dio paso a la equivocada interpretación del art. 169 del Código de Procedimiento Penal, realizada por el Congreso Nacional para evitar nuevamente la aplicación de la caducidad de la prisión preventiva.

¿Constitución sin constitucionalismo?. Urgencia de un Tribunal Constitucional independiente (Tema Central)

En este artículo se desarrollan dos temáticas relacionadas: 1. una aproximación a la importancia jurídica y política de la Corte o Tribunal Constitucional, y 2. una serie de propuestas para la nueva Constitución ecuatoriana para ser discutida por la Constituyente de 2007-2008. Estos planteamientos derivan en una propuesta de articulado constitucional sobre la integración y funciones del Tribunal o Corte Constitucional. Las ideas centrales del análisis y de la propuesta responden al objetivo político de fortalecimiento del Tribunal Constitucional mediante la preservación de su independencia, así como la especialización y fortalecimiento de sus atribuciones. Más específicamente, se propone un Tribunal realmente independiente del Congreso y con poder para controlar la constitucionalidad de sus actos.

Hermenéutica y Tribunal Constitucional (Tema Central)

En este artículo se reflexiona sobre las decisiones del Tribunal Constitucional, que al no disponer de una legitimación popular directa pueden considerarse legítimas tan solo si aparecen como aplicación de Derecho, y no como creación política de normas. Para ello se analiza la relevancia que, en este proceso de legitimación, pueden tener las teorías de la interpretación en consideración de la peculiaridad de los enunciados normativos de la Constitución que evidencian cómo el problema de la objetividad del parámetro de control no puede encontrar su solución desde el punto de vista teórico-normativo, llegando a la conclusión que la misma condición jurídica o política del control de constitucionalidad dependerá de la existencia de criterios de valoración permanentes, esto es, de una teoría de la interpretación elaborada por cada uno de los tribunales constitucionales.

El bloque de constitucionalidad pergeñado por el Tribunal Constitucional (Artículos Varios)

Las siguientes líneas glosan una importante Resolución del Tribunal Constitucional ecuatoriano, que por primera vez esboza el difícil concepto de bloque de constitucionalidad. Para hacerlo, el autor comienza narrando de forma sucinta los antecedentes del fallo, luego especifica cuáles fueron las principales consideraciones del Tribunal y finaliza esta primera parte del artículo pergeñando, a la luz de la Resolución, la noción ecuatoriana de bloque de constitucionalidad. Mas, lo verdaderamente interesante de este trabajo viene cuando se señalan algunas trascendentales implicaciones prácticas de la adopción de éste nuevo concepto. Por ejemplo: redimensiona la hermenéutica jurídica, eleva los tratados de derechos humanos y algunas otras normas -incluso internas- al estatus constitucional, entre otros interesantísimos efectos.

La autodisciplina de la Corte Constitucional colombiana (Artículos Varios)

En este trabajo se hace un análisis crítico de la idea según la cual la Corte Constitucional de Colombia ejerce un poder ilimitado y arbitrario. Se pretende demostrar que ha sido la propia Corte quien ha impuesto límites al ejercicio de sus competencias y atribuciones. Estas limitaciones provienen no solo de textos constitucionales, sino fundamental y principalmente de las exigencias de interpretación y argumentación en materia constitucional, tales como la obligatoriedad del precedente, la formación y seguimiento de líneas jurisprudenciales, los sistemas legítimos e ilegítimos de manipulación del precedente, la aplicación de los métodos tradicionales de interpretación y las nuevas técnicas argumentativas en materia constitucional como la ponderación, el juicio de razonabilidad y la determinación del contenido esencial de los principios y los derechos fundamentales, etc.

Sentencia de la Corte Constitucional del Ecuador sobre la constitucionalidad de la obligación del afianzamiento tributario (Jurisprudencia)

Los sujetos pasivos que impugnen ante la vía judicial un acto administrativo mediante el cual se pretenda determinar o recaudar tributos, deben rendir una caución equivalente al 10% de la cuantía de su demanda, de no presentársela en el término de quince días, el acto impugnado queda ejecutoriado y los jueces deben ordenar el archivo del proceso. Nuestra Corte Constitucional para el Período de Transición considera que no se vulnera derecho alguno en ese caso, siempre y cuando se exija rendir la caución después de calificada la demanda. Estudiaremos los fundamentos que tuvo la Corte Constitucional para llegar a esa conclusión. Pretenderemos analizarlos y cuestionarlos objetivamente, para así demostrar por qué su falta de coherencia y de sustento permite concluir que su análisis pecó por falto de imparcialidad, y por qué es razonable suponer que sus móviles no fueron jurídicos en lo absoluto, sin perjuicio de que, a la par, demos nuestro parecer al respecto. Independientemente de la trascendencia jurídica que puedan o no tener en nuestro ordenamiento, esperamos se entienda por qué creemos que estos precedentes deben ser considerados como un capítulo funesto en la historia de la jurisprudencia constitucional ecuatoriana.