Legal Uncertainty, Competition Law Enforcement Procedures and Optimal Penalties

In this paper we make three contributions to the literature on optimal Competition Law enforcement procedures. The first (which is of general interest beyond competition policy) is to clarify the concept of “legal uncertainty”, relating it to ideas in the literature on Law and Economics, but formalising the concept through various information structures which specify the probability that each firm attaches – at the time it takes an action – to the possibility of its being deemed anti-competitive were it to be investigated by a Competition Authority. We show that the existence of Type I and Type II decision errors by competition authorities is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty, and that information structures with legal uncertainty can generate higher welfare than information structures with legal certainty – a result echoing a similar finding obtained in a completely different context and under different assumptions in earlier Law and Economics literature (Kaplow and Shavell, 1992). Our second contribution is to revisit and significantly generalise the analysis in our previous paper, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), involving a welfare comparison of Per Se and Effects- Based legal standards. In that analysis we considered just a single information structure under an Effects-Based standard and also penalties were exogenously fixed. Here we allow for (a) different information structures under an Effects-Based standard and (b) endogenous penalties. We obtain two main results: (i) considering all information structures a Per Se standard is never better than an Effects-Based standard; (ii) optimal penalties may be higher when there is legal uncertainty than when there is no legal uncertainty.

Incentivising Innovation? The competition law approach to the new challenge clauses in the competition rules for technology licensing agreements of the EU

Tutkielman aiheena on EU:n kilpailuoikeudellinen lähestymistapa challenge-lausekkeisiin teknologinsiirtosopimuksia koskevassa ryhmäpoikkeusasetuksessa. Teknologian lisensoinnin katsotaan olevan tärkeä väline teknologian kehityksen levittämisessä ja innovaation edistämisessä. Joissakin tapauksissa lisenssisopimus voi sisältää kilpailua rajoittavia lausekkeita, joiden voidaan kuitenkin nähdä hyödyttävän kilpailua kokonaisuutta arvostellen. Tällaisia lausekkeita ovat niin sanotut ”no-challenge” – lauseke, eli sopimusehto, jonka nojalla lisenssinsaaja sitoutuu olemaan haastamatta lisensoidun immateriaalioikeuden pätevyyttä ja ”termination-on-challenge” – lauseke, joka antaa lisensoijalle haastettaessa oikeuden päättää lisenssisopimus. Tutkielmassa perehdytään challenge -lausekkeiden hyväksyttävyyden arviointiin Euroopan unionin kilpailuoikeuden näkökulmasta uuden 1.5.2014 voimaan tulleen ryhmäpoikkeusasetuksen valossa. Muissa kuin yksinoikeuksia luovissa teknologiansiirtosopimuksissa olevat termination-on-challenge – lausekkeita tulee uusimmassa ryhmäpoikkeusetuksessa aina perustua yritysten itse suorittamaan tapauskohtaiseen arviointiin. No-challenge – lausekkeet ovat jatkossakin aiemman käytännön mukaisesti ryhmäpoikkeuksen soveltamisalan ulkopuolella. Komission on perustellut challenge - lausekkeiden jättämistä asetuksen ulkopuolelle julkisella intressillä, joka on päästä eroon mitättömistä immateriaalioikeuksista. Komission on katsonut, että challenge – lausekkeiden kilpailua rajoittava ominaisuus on mitättömien immateriaalioikeuksien esiintyminen markkinoilla, mikä osaltaan vääristää kilpailua ja hidastaa toimijoiden markkinoille pääsyä. Toisaalta lausekkeiden voidaan sanoa edistävän kilpailua, sillä ne usein tarjoavat immateriaalioikeuden haltijalle riittävän oikeussuojan ja kannustimen lisensoida teknologia, mikä lisää kilpailua, keksijöiden kannustimia panostaa innovaatioihin sekä vähentää transaktiokustannuksia. Tutkielman keskeinen tulos on ennen kaikkea challenge-lausekkeiden kilpailuvaikutusten tunnistamisessa ja komission perusteluiden kriittisessä arvioinnissa. Komission linjauksen perustelut eivät saa riittävää tukea ottaen huomioon vaikutustenarvioinnin, EU:n tuomioistuinkäytännön sekä taloustieteellisen lähestymistavan. Tutkielman tulosten pohjalta ja tukeutuen eri oikeuslähteisiin, taloustieteellisiin argumentteihin ja oikeusvertailevaan tutkimukseen, on mahdollista tehdä johtopäätöksiä niistä seikoista ja argumenteista, joilla on merkitystä uuden politiikkalinjauksen kilpailuvaikutuksiin.

Parental and Successor Liability in EU Competition Law Infringements

Under EU competition law, parent companies may be held jointly and severally liable for the competition law infringements committed by their subsidiaries. The possibility of holding parent companies liable demonstrates a significant exception from the idea of separate legal entities. However, it is not the only deviation developed under EU competition law. In cases, where the legal entity responsible for the anti-competitive conduct has changed its form, liability can be attributed to the new operator, in particular, to its successor. The principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations are issues that surround the doctrines of parental and successor liability. The aim of this thesis is to present a comprehensive comparative analysis of the parental and successor liability doctrines and to clarify the conditions under which it is possible to attribute liability for the infringements of EU competition law. The main purpose is therefore to demonstrate the problems related to the allocation of liability and to discuss whether these liability principles, established to assure the effective enforcement of the EU competition rules, are good solutions. The research methods used in this thesis are the legal dogmatic approach and the comparative law approach. The former enables the possibility of using the case law and legislation as a framework in which the difficulties concerning the application of parental and successor liability can be discussed while the latter ensures the comparison of the characteristics and judgments. The doctrines of parental and successor liability are both well established, but the application practice has caused several difficulties. These problems derive from, inter alia, the broadness and disjointed developed of the doctrines. There has been much recent case law dealing with these issues and having the potential to open up a considerable risk and to allocate strict liability for parent and successor companies.

Patent pools and competition law : an examination of the enforcement strategies of competition authorities

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit, option recherche"

The Application of European Competition Law in Arbitration Proceedings

This work provides several policy proposals capable to strengthen the private enforcement of EU competition law in arbitration. It focuses on the procedural law aspects that are permeated by legal uncertainty and that have not yet fallen under the scrutiny of the law and economics debate. The policy proposals described herein are based on the functional approach to law and economics and aim to promote a more qualified decision making process by: adjudicators, private parties and lawmakers. The resulting framework of procedural rules would be a cost-effective policy tool that could sustain the European Commission’s effort to guarantee a workable level of competition in the EU internal market. This project aims to answer the following broad research question: which procedural rules can improve the efficiency of antitrust arbitration by decreasing litigation costs for private parties on the one hand, and by increasing private parties’ compliance with competition law on the other hand?Throughout this research project, such broad question has been developed into research sub-questions revolving around several key legal issues. The chosen sub-research questions result from a vacuum in the European enforcement system that leaves several key legal issues in antitrust arbitration unresolved. The legal framework proposed in this research project could prevent such a blurry scenario from impairing the EU private enforcement of competition law in arbitration. Therefore, our attention was triggered by those legal issues whose proposed solutions lead to relevant uncertainties and that are most suitable for a law and economics analysis.

EC Electronic Communications and Competition Law

Telecommunications have developed at an incredible speed over the last couple of decades. The decreasing size of our phones and the increasing number of ways in which we can communicate are barely the only result of this (r)evolutionary development. The latter has indeed multiple implications. The change of paradigm for telecommunications regulation, epitomised by the processes of liberalisation and reregulation, was not sufficient to answer all regulatory questions pertinent to communications. Today, after the transition from monopoly to competition, we are faced perhaps with an even harder regulatory puzzle, since we must figure out how to regulate a sector that is as dynamic and as unpredictable as electronic communications have proven to be, and as vital and fundamental to the economy and to society at large. The present book addresses the regulatory puzzle of contemporary electronic communications and suggests the outlines of a coherent model for their regulation. The search for such a model involves essentially deliberations on the question "Can competition law do it all?", since generic competition rules are largely seen as the appropriate regulatory tool for the communications domain. The latter perception has been the gist of the 2002 reform of the European Community (EC) telecommunications regime, which envisages a withdrawal of sectoral regulation, as communications markets become effectively competitive and ultimately bestows the regulation of the sector upon competition law only. The book argues that the question of whether competition law is the appropriate tool needs to be examined not in the conventional contexts of sector specific rules versus competition rules or deregulation versus regulation but in a broader governance context. Consequently, the reader is provided with an insight into the workings and specific characteristics of the communications sector as network-bound, converging, dynamic and endowed with a special societal role and function. A thorough evaluation of the regulatory objectives in the communications environment contributes further to the comprehensive picture of the communications industry. Upon this carefully prepared basis, the book analyses the communications regulatory toolkit. It explores the interplay between sectoral communications regulation, competition rules (in particular Article 82 of the EC Treaty) and the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) relevant to telecommunications services. The in-depth analysis of multilevel construct of EC communications law is up-to-date and takes into account important recent developments in the EC competition law in practice, in particular in the field of refusal to supply and tying, of the reform of the EC electronic communications framework and new decisions of the WTO dispute settlement body, such as notably the Mexico-Telecommunications Services Panel Report. Upon these building elements, an assessment of the regulatory potential of the EC competition rules is made. The conclusions drawn are beyond the scope of the current situation of EC electronic communications and the applicable law and explore the possible contours of an optimal regulatory framework for modern communications. The book is of particular interest to communications and antitrust law experts, as well as policy makers, government agencies, consultancies and think-tanks active in the field. Experts on other network industries (such as electricity or postal communications) can also profit from the substantial experience gathered in the communications sector as the most advanced one in terms of liberalisation and reregulation.

EC Electronic Communications and Competition Law

Telecommunications have developed at an incredible speed over the last couple of decades. The decreasing size of our phones and the increasing number of ways in which we can communicate are barely the only result of this (r)evolutionary development. The latter has indeed multiple implications. The change of paradigm for telecommunications regulation, epitomised by the processes of liberalisation and reregulation, was not sufficient to answer all regulatory questions pertinent to communications. Today, after the transition from monopoly to competition, we are faced perhaps with an even harder regulatory puzzle, since we must figure out how to regulate a sector that is as dynamic and as unpredictable as electronic communications have proven to be, and as vital and fundamental to the economy and to society at large. The present book addresses the regulatory puzzle of contemporary electronic communications and suggests the outlines of a coherent model for their regulation. The search for such a model involves essentially deliberations on the question "Can competition law do it all?", since generic competition rules are largely seen as the appropriate regulatory tool for the communications domain. The latter perception has been the gist of the 2002 reform of the European Community (EC) telecommunications regime, which envisages a withdrawal of sectoral regulation, as communications markets become effectively competitive and ultimately bestows the regulation of the sector upon competition law only. The book argues that the question of whether competition law is the appropriate tool needs to be examined not in the conventional contexts of sector specific rules versus competition rules or deregulation versus regulation but in a broader governance context. Consequently, the reader is provided with an insight into the workings and specific characteristics of the communications sector as network-bound, converging, dynamic and endowed with a special societal role and function. A thorough evaluation of the regulatory objectives in the communications environment contributes further to the comprehensive picture of the communications industry. Upon this carefully prepared basis, the book analyses the communications regulatory toolkit. It explores the interplay between sectoral communications regulation, competition rules (in particular Article 82 of the EC Treaty) and the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) relevant to telecommunications services. The in-depth analysis of multilevel construct of EC communications law is up-to-date and takes into account important recent developments in the EC competition law in practice, in particular in the field of refusal to supply and tying, of the reform of the EC electronic communications framework and new decisions of the WTO dispute settlement body, such as notably the Mexico-Telecommunications Services Panel Report. Upon these building elements, an assessment of the regulatory potential of the EC competition rules is made. The conclusions drawn are beyond the scope of the current situation of EC electronic communications and the applicable law and explore the possible contours of an optimal regulatory framework for modern communications. The book is of particular interest to communications and antitrust law experts, as well as policy makers, government agencies, consultancies and think-tanks active in the field. Experts on other network industries (such as electricity or postal communications) can also profit from the substantial experience gathered in the communications sector as the most advanced one in terms of liberalisation and reregulation.