Regulating industrial forest concessions in Central Africa and South America

Tropical countries face special specific problems in implementing sustainable forest management (SFM). In many countries, questions are raised on whether tropical forests should be publicly, commonly or privately owned and managed in order to enhance sustainability. Other debates also focus on whether small-scale enterprises are better positioned than large-scale industrial concessions to reduce poverty and attain sustainable management. In countries where large tracts of forest are state-owned, concessions are viewed as a means of delivering services of public and collective interest through an association of private investment and public regulation. However, the success of an industrial concession model in countries with large forest resource endowment to achieve multiple goals such as sustainable forest management and local/regional development depends on two critical assumptions. First, forest functions and services should be managed and maintained as public goods. In many cases, additional uses - and corresponding rights - can take place alongside logging activities. Industrial concessions can be more efficient than other tenure models (such as community-based forest management and small-scale enterprises) in achieving SFM, add value to raw material and comply with growing environmental norms. This is especially the case in market-remote areas with low population density and poor infrastructure. Secondly, to achieve these different outcomes, any concession system needs to be monitored and regulated, especially in contexts dominated by asymmetrical information between regulating authorities and concessionaires. New institutional responses have recently been put forward in several countries, providing valuable materials to design a renewed policy mix which associates public and private incentives. This paper provides a survey of the experience of forest concessions in several Central African and South American countries. The concession system is examined in order to clarify the issues involved, the problems encountered, and what can be learned from the shared experience of these countries in the last decade. This paper argues that despite a sometimes patchy record, concessions can help promote SFM so long as they are packaged with a certain number of specific measures. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Un partenariat public-privé rigide ou flexible ? Théorie et application aux concessions routières à péage

In this article, we explore the contractual design of toll road concession contracts. We highlight the fact that contracting parties try to sign not only complete rigid contracts in order to avoid renegotiations but also flexible contracts in order to adapt contractual framework to contingencies and to create incentives for cooperative behavior. This gives rise to multiple toll adjustment provisions and to a tradeoff between rigid and flexible contracts. Such a tradeoff is formalized using an incomplete contract framework - including ex post maladaptation and renegotiation costs - and propositions are tested using an original database of 71 concession contracts. Our results suggest an important role for economic efficiency concerns, as well as politics, in designing such public-private contracts. Codes JEL : D23, H11, H54, L14, L9.

Winner's curse in toll road concessions

We empirically assess the effect of the winner's curse in auctions for toll road concessions, taking into account, to our knowledge for the first time, problems of commitment and enforcement, using a unique dataset of 49 worldwide road concessions.

Special investigation of the University of Northern Iowa Events Complex Concessions for the period October 1, 2006 through March 31, 2012

Special investigation of the University of Northern Iowa Events Complex Concessions for the period October 1, 2006 through March 31, 2012

[Joseph] Guinchard, CGT [secrétaire de la Fédération nationale des moyens de transport, le 26/4/20, près de la Maison des syndicats] : [photographie de presse] / [Agence Rol]

Référence bibliographique : Rol, 59067

[Jules] Lapierre, secrétaire CGT [Comité fédéral des cheminots, le 26/4/20, près de la Maison des syndicats] : [photographie de presse] / [Agence Rol]

Référence bibliographique : Rol, 59070

[Georges] Dumoulin, secrétaire adjoint CGT [Comité fédéral des cheminots, le 26/4/20, devant la Maison des syndicats] : [photographie de presse] / [Agence Rol]

Référence bibliographique : Rol, 59071

[Henri] Sirolle, CGT [Comité fédéral des cheminots, le 26/4/20, près de la Maison des syndicats] : [photographie de presse] / [Agence Rol]

Référence bibliographique : Rol, 59072

Regulating Concessions of Toll Motorways, An Empirical Study on Fixed vs. Variable Term Contracts

Recent theoretical developments on concession contracts for long term infrastructure projects under uncertain demand show the benefits of allowing for flexible term contracts rather than fixing a rigid term. This study presents a simulation to compare both alternatives by using real data from the oldest Spanish toll motorway. For this purpose, we analyze how well the flexible term would have performed instead of the fixed length actually established. Our results show a huge reduction of the term of concession that would have dramatically decreased the firm’s benefits and the user’s overpayment due to the internalization of an unexpected traffic increase.

13/5/20, meeting de la CGT au Pré-Saint-Gervais : [photographie de presse] / [Agence Rol]

Référence bibliographique : Rol, 59270