What Makes a Family Firm Innovative? CEO Risk-Taking Propensity and the Organizational Context of Family Firms

Investigating the new product portfolio innovativeness of family firms connects two important topics that have recently received considerable attention in innovation and family firm research. First, new product portfolio innovativeness has been identified as a critical determinant of firm performance. Second, research on family firms has focused on the questions of if and why family firms are more or less innovative than other organizational forms. Research investigating the innovativeness of family firms has often applied a risk-oriented perspective by identifying socioemotional wealth (SEW) as the main reference that determines firm behavior. Thus, prior research has mainly focused on the organizational context to predict innovation-related family firm behavior and neglected the impact of preferences and the behavior of the chief executive officer (CEO), which have both been shown to affect firm outcomes. Hence, this study aims to extend the previous research by introducing the CEO's disposition to organizational context variables to explain the new product portfolio innovativeness of small and medium-sized family firms. Specifically, this study explores how the organizational context (i.e., ownership by top management team [TMT] family members and generation in charge of the family firm) of family firms interacts with CEO risk-taking propensity to affect new product portfolio innovativeness. Using a sample of 114 German CEOs of small and medium-sized family firms operating in manufacturing industries, the results show that CEO risk-taking propensity has a positive effect on new product portfolio innovativeness. Moreover, the analyses show that the organizational context of family firms impacts the relationship between CEO risk-taking propensity and new product portfolio innovativeness. Specifically, the relationship between CEO risk-taking propensity and new product portfolio innovativeness is weaker if levels of ownership by TMT family members are high (high SEW). Additionally, the effect of CEO risk-taking propensity on new product portfolio innovativeness is stronger in family firms at earlier generational stages (high SEW). This result suggests that if SEW is a strong reference, family firm-specific characteristics can affect individual dispositions and, in turn, the behaviors of executives. Therefore, this study helps extend the knowledge on the determinants of new product portfolio innovativeness of family firms by considering an individual CEO preference and the organizational context variables of family firms simultaneously.

Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation

Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts: experimental evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.

Conceptualizing impulsivity and risk taking in bipolar disorder: importance of history of alcohol abuse

Elevated levels of impulsivity and increased risk taking are thought to be core features of both bipolar disorder (BD) and addictive disorders. Given the high rates of comorbid alcohol abuse in BD, alcohol addiction may exacerbate impulsive behavior and risk-taking propensity in BD. Here we examine multiple dimensions of impulsivity and risk taking, using cognitive tasks and self-report measures, in BD patients with and without a history of alcohol abuse. Thirty-one BD subjects with a prior history of alcohol abuse or dependence (BD-A), 24 BD subjects with no history of alcohol abuse/dependence (BD-N), and 25 healthy control subjects (HC) were assessed with the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) and the computerized Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). Both BD groups scored significantly higher than controls on the BIS. In contrast, only the BD-A group showed impaired performance on the BART. BD-A subjects popped significantly more balloons than the BD-N and HC groups. In addition, subjects in the BD-A group failed to adjust their performance after popping balloons. Severity of mood symptomatology was not associated with performance on either task. The current study supports a primary role of prior alcohol abuse in risk-taking propensity among patients with bipolar disorder. In addition, findings suggest that impulsivity and risky behavior, as operationalized by self-report and experimental cognitive probes, respectively, are separable constructs that tap distinct aspects of the bipolar phenotype.

On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking

We analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilise unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the bank level. We show that when the market power is low, banks invest in the gambling asset. On the other hand, for sufficiently high levels of market power, all banks choose the prudent asset to invest in. We further show that a merger of two neighboring banks increases the likelihood of prudent behaviour. Finally, introduction of a deposit insurance scheme exacerbates banks’ moral hazard problem.

Inequality and Risk-Taking Behaviour

This paper investigates social influences on attitudes to risk and offers an evolutionary explanation of risk-taking by young low-ranked males. Becker, Murphy and Werning (2005) found that individuals about to participate in a status tournament may take fair gambles even though they are risk averse in both wealth and status. Here their model is generalised by use of the insight of Hopkins and Kornienko (2010) that in a tournament or status competition one can consider equality in terms of the status or rewards available as well as in initial endowments. While Becker et al. found that risk-taking is increasing in the equality of initial endowments, it is found here that it is increasing in the inequality of rewards in the tournament. Further, it is shown that the poorest will be risk loving if the lowest level of status awarded is sufficiently low. Thus, the disadvantaged in society rationally engage in risky behavior when social rewards are sufficiently unequal. Finally, as greater inequality in terms of social status induces gambling, it can cause greater inequality of wealth.

Investor protection and income inequality: risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.

Behaviour evaluation for risk-taking adolescents (BERTA): an easy to use and assess instrument to detect adolescent risky behaviours in a clinical setting.

To create an instrument to be used in an outpatient clinic to detect adolescents prone to risk-taking behaviours. Based on previous research, five identified variables (relationship with parents and teachers, liking going to school, average grades, and level of religiosity) were used to create a screening tool to detect at least one of ten risky behaviours (tobacco, alcohol, cannabis and other illegal drugs use; sexual intercourse and sexual risky behaviour; driving while intoxicated, riding with an intoxicated driver, not always using a seat belt, and not always using a helmet). The instrument was tested using the Barcelona Adolescent Health Survey 1993. A Receiver Operating Characteristics curve was used to find the best cut-off point between high and low risk score. Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals were calculated to detect at least one risky behaviour and for each individual behaviour. In order to assess its predictive value, the analysis was repeated using the Barcelona Adolescent Health Survey 1999. In both cases, analyses were conducted for the whole sample and for younger and older adolescents. Adolescents with a high-risk score were more likely to take at least one risky behaviour both when the whole sample was analysed and by age groups. With very few exceptions, the Behaviour Evaluation for Risk-Taking Adolescents showed significant odds ratios for each individual variable. CONCLUSION: The Behaviour Evaluation for Risk-Taking Adolescents has shown its potential as an easy to use instrument to screen for risk-taking behaviours. Future research must aim towards assessing this instrument's predictive value in the clinical setting and it's application to other populations.

Skill, Luck, Overconfidence, and Risk Taking

In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We compare experimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill alone and combinations of skill and luck. We find more risk taking with skill and luck as opposed to skill alone, particularly for males, and little overconfidence. Our data support an explanation based on differential attitudes toward luck by those whose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making luck more important induces greater optimism for the former, while the latter maintain a belief that high levels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance.

When "hope springs eternal": The role of chance in risk taking

In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We contrastexperimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill as opposed tocombinations of skill and chance. Our data show differential attitudes toward chance by thosewhose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making chance more important induces greateroptimism for the former who start taking more risk, while the latter maintain a belief that highlevels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance. Finally, although weobserved excess entry (i.e., too many participants entered markets), this could not beattributed to overconfidence.

Leverage and beliefs: Personal experience and risk taking in margin lending

What determines risk-bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets? Thispaper uses unique micro-data on collateralized lending contracts during a period of financialdistress to address this question. An investor syndicate speculating in English stocks wentbankrupt in 1772. Using hand-collected information from Dutch notarial archives, we examinechanges in lenders' behavior following exposure to potential (but not actual) losses. Before thedistress episode, financiers that lent to the ill-fated syndicate were indistinguishable from therest. Afterwards, they behaved differently: they lent with much higher haircuts. Only lendersexposed to the failed syndicate altered their behavior. The differential change is remarkable sincethe distress was public knowledge, and because none of the lenders suffered actual losses ? allfinanciers were repaid in full. Interest rates were also unaffected; the market balanced solelythrough changes in collateral requirements. Our findings are consistent with a heterogeneousbeliefs-interpretation of leverage. They also suggest that individual experience can modify thelevel of leverage in a market quickly.