Climate change and reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases from ships : an appraisal

Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol imposes an obligation only on certain developed countries, working through the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), to pursue the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from marine bunker fuels. The IMO recently took the initiative to adopt a new legal instrument for the reduction of shipgenerated greenhouse gas emissions. Some developing countries have suggested that the proposed IMO initiative should strictly adhere to Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol and the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR). Against this backdrop, this article intends to review the extent to which it is possible to propose an international legal instrument for the reduction of GHG emissions from marine bunker fuels which is applicable only to ships from developed countries considering the complex characteristics of the international shipping industry. This article also examines how far this approach is justifiable even within the framework of the CBDR principle.

Climate change and IMO technical and operational measures for reduction of emissions of greenhouse gas from ships

According to a study conducted by the International Maritime organisation (IMO) shipping sector is responsible for 3.3% of the global Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol calls upon states to pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of GHG from marine bunker fuels working through the IMO. In 2011, 14 years after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) of the IMO has adopted mandatory energy efficiency measures for international shipping which can be treated as the first ever mandatory global GHG reduction instrument for an international industry. The MEPC approved an amendment of Annex VI of the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78) to introduce a mandatory Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for new ships and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) for all ships. Considering the growth projections of human population and world trade the technical and operational measures may not be able to reduce the amount of GHG emissions from international shipping in a satisfactory level. Therefore, the IMO is considering to introduce market-based mechanisms that may serve two purposes including providing a fiscal incentive for the maritime industry to invest in more energy efficient manner and off-setting of growing ship emissions. Some leading developing countries already voiced their serious reservations on the newly adopted IMO regulations stating that by imposing the same obligation on all countries, irrespective of their economic status, this amendment has rejected the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (the CBDR Principle), which has always been the cornerstone of international climate change law discourses. They also claimed that negotiation for a market based mechanism should not be continued without a clear commitment from the developed counters for promotion of technical co-operation and transfer of technology relating to the improvement of energy efficiency of ships. Against this backdrop, this article explores the challenges for the developing counters in the implementation of already adopted technical and operational measures.

The role of common but differentiated responsibility in the 2020 climate regime

The principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) will play a role in the 2020 Climate Regime. This Article starts by examining differential treatment within the international legal order, finding that it is ethically and practically difficult to implement an international climate instrument based on formal equality. There is evidence of state parties accepting differential responsibilities in a number of areas within the international legal order and the embedding of CBDR in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), means that that differential commitments will lie at the heart of the 2020 climate regime. The UNFCCC applies the implementation method of differentiation, while the Kyoto Protocol applies both the obligation and implementation method of differentiation. It is suggested that the implementation model will be the differentiation model retained in the 2020 climate agreement. The Parties’ submissions under the Durban Platform are considered in order to gain an understanding of their positions on CBDR. While there are areas of contention including the role of principles in shaping obligations and the ongoing legal status of Annex I and Non-Annex I distinction, there is broad consensus among the parties in favour of differentiation by implementation with developed and major economies undertaking Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Objectives (economy wide targets) and developing countries that are not major economies undertaking sectoral targets.

Emerging Powerful Southern Voices: Role of BASIC Nations in Shaping Climate Change Mitigation Commitments

This book chapter explores the role of Brazil, China, India and South Africa (BASIC) in shaping mitigation commitments within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

Rethinking special and differential treatment in the WTO

Special and differential treatment (S&D) allows differentiated treatment for developing countries within the WTO system by justifying a deviation from the most-favoured-nation obligation. Since it was incorporated into the GATT (the predecessor of the WTO) in the 1960s, S&D has played a significant role in promoting the integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system. However, S&D is undergoing complicated and entangled discussion at the current multilateral trade negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda. There are a number of reasons to make opposing arguments in developed and developing countries, among which this paper focuses on two elements: diversification of developing countries and instability of preferential schemes. In order to overcome these problems and in order to make S&D more effective and operational, this paper considers the following alternative approaches: differentiation among developing countries applying the common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) principle by analogy and codification of a preferential scheme as a multilateral agreement in the manner of North-South RTAs with flexibility.