British drugs policy: Problematizing the distinction between legal and illegal drugs and the definition of the ‘drugs problem’.

This article draws upon an extensive literature review of the social and medical sciences, official documents and various websites to critically re-evaluate the basis of British drugs policy. The article problematizes the rationale for criminalizing certain substances and questions the distinctions created between legal and illegal drugs; in so doing, the article argues that the definition of the `drugs problem' is the real problem. It shows that the debate on illegal drugs is filled less with factual truths and more with misinformation which creates public fear and provides a questionable basis for public policy. The article questions current thinking regarding the drugs/crime relationship and concludes by exploring some implications for policy and practice.

Textualising British Politics: Deconstructing the subject of British foreign policy

British politics has been described as a sub-discipline crying out for methodological and ideational cross-fertilisation. Where other areas of political science have benefited from new ideas, British politics has remained largely atheoretical and underdeveloped. This has changed recently with the rise of interpretivism but the study of British politics would also benefit from more serious engagement with poststructuralism. With this in mind, I examine how the thought of Jacques Derrida and deconstruction could be useful for thinking through the foundations of British politics, re-examining what appears natural or given and revealing the problematic and contradictory status of these foundations. After suggesting the need to 'textualise' British politics', I illustrate how deconstruction operates in a specific context, that of British foreign policy since 1997. This exploration reveals how certain decisions (such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003) became possible in the first place, and how their basis in an idea of an 'us' and a 'them', a coherent, autonomous subject separate from its object, is deeply problematic. Such a critical reading of British politics is impossible within the dominant interpretivist framework, and opens up new possibilities for thought which form an important supplement to existing ways of studying the field.

‘The “English Disease” is to Look for a “Solution of the Irish Problem”’: British Constitutional Policy in Northern Ireland after Sunningdale 1974–1976

This article reconstructs British constitutional policy in Northern Ireland after power-sharing collapsed in May 1974. Over the following two years, the British government publicly emphasised that Northern Ireland would decide its own future, but ministers secretly considered a range of options including withdrawal, integration and Dominion status. These discussions have been fundamentally misunderstood by previous authors, and this article shows that Harold Wilson did not seriously advocate withdrawal nor was policy as inconsistent as argued elsewhere. An historical approach, drawing from recently released archival material, shows that consociationalists such as Brendan O'Leary and Michael Kerr have neglected the proper context of government policy because of their commitment to a particular form of government, failing to recognise the constraints under which ministers operated. The British government remained committed to an internal devolved settlement including both communities but was unable to impose one.

British public policy and multinationals during the “Dollar Gap” era, 1945–1960

This article examines the role of British exchange and import controls in stimulating the dramatic increase in overseas (particularly American) multinationals in Britain from the end of the Second World War to the late 1950s, together with the ways in which the government used controls to regulate the foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow. Exchange controls were both an important stimulus to inward investment and a powerful and flexible means of regulating its volume and character. Government was relatively successful in using these powers to maximize the dollar balance and industrial benefits of FDI to Britain, given initially severe dollar and capacity constraints, and in liberalizing policy once these constraints receded and competition from other FDI hosts intensified.

How many Frenchmen did you kill? British bombing policy towards France (1940-1945)

The Allied bombing of France between 1940 and 1945 has received comparatively little attention from historians, although the civilian death toll, at about 60,000, was comparable to that of German raids on the UK. This article considers how Allied, and particularly British, bombing policy towards France was developed, what its objectives were and how French concerns about attacks on their territory were (or were not) addressed. It argues that while British policymakers were sensitive to the delicate political implications of attacking France, perceived military necessities tended to trump political misgivings; that Vichy, before November 1942, was a stronger constraint on Allied bombing than the Free French at any time and that the bombing programme largely escaped political control from May 1944.

National interest to global reform: patterns of reasoning in British foreign policy discourse

Discussion of the national interest often focuses on how Britain's influence can be maximized, rather than on the goals that influence serves. Yet what gives content to claims about the national interest is the means-ends reasoning which links interests to deeper goals. In ideal-typical terms, this can take two forms. The first, and more common, approach is conservative: it infers national interests and the goals they advance from existing policies and commitments. The second is reformist: it starts by specifying national goals and then asks how they are best advanced under particular conditions. New Labour's foreign policy discourse is notable for its explicit use of a reformist approach. Indeed, Gordon Brown's vision of a 'new global society' not only identifies global reform as a key means of fulfilling national goals, but also thereby extends the concept of the national interest well beyond a narrow concern with national security.

India-Railway gauge : the debate in the House of Commons, Friday, March 7, 1873, on Mr. Laing's resolution- "That it is contrary to Imperial policy to allow a break of gauge in the railway communications between the important frontier town of Peshawur and the main railway system of India".

"Extracted from "Hansard's parliamentary debates," vol. CCXIV; p. 1535."

Documents on British foreign policy, 1919-1939.

Edited by E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler.

British foreign policy in Europe to the end of the 19th century;

Mode of access: Internet.

British colonial policy, 1754-1765.

Mode of access: Internet.

The Significance of the Disputed Territory in Bechuanaland 1887-1893

British Imperial policy in Southern Africa in the last three decades of the nineteenth century oscillated between two extremes. It began in the early 1870's with Lord Kimberley's attempt to effect confederation as a means of devolving Imperial responsibility and expenditure. It ended in 1899 with Britain's active intervention against the Boers. For most of the remaining years of those decades a middle course was adopted while the British Government struggled to reconcile its diverse political interests. Strategy, supremacy, economy, humanitarianism, and recognition of colonial aspirations were all at one time or another, in varying degrees, motivating forces behind Imperial policy. Many historians have pointed out how incompatible many of these ends were and how the attempt to pursue them all at once almost inevitably ended in at least one of them being sacrificed on the way. This study focusses on a relatively minor problem over a period of about seven years. It attempts to show how the British Government tried to reconcile, in this case, the predominant motives of economy and supremacy. The problem of the Disputed Territory now seems like a small fish in a big ocean because non the great hopes and fears that it raised were ever realized. But the anticlimactic nature of the outcome of events should not be allowed to conceal two important points: first, that the problem loomed large at the time in the eyes of the Imperial Government; and second, that in the case of its policy towards the Disputed Territory, the Government gained a greater degree of success in trying to reconcile seemingly incompatible ends than it did in many other instances.

The Significance of the Disputed Territory in Bechuanaland 1887-1893

British Imperial policy in Southern Africa in the last three decades of the nineteenth century oscillated between two extremes. It began in the early 1870's with Lord Kimberley's attempt to effect confederation as a means of devolving Imperial responsibility and expenditure. It ended in 1899 with Britain's active intervention against the Boers. For most of the remaining years of those decades a middle course was adopted while the British Government struggled to reconcile its diverse political interests. Strategy, supremacy, economy, humanitarianism, and recognition of colonial aspirations were all at one time or another, in varying degrees, motivating forces behind Imperial policy. Many historians have pointed out how incompatible many of these ends were and how the attempt to pursue them all at once almost inevitably ended in at least one of them being sacrificed on the way. This study focusses on a relatively minor problem over a period of about seven years. It attempts to show how the British Government tried to reconcile, in this case, the predominant motives of economy and supremacy. The problem of the Disputed Territory now seems like a small fish in a big ocean because non the great hopes and fears that it raised were ever realized. But the anticlimactic nature of the outcome of events should not be allowed to conceal two important points: first, that the problem loomed large at the time in the eyes of the Imperial Government; and second, that in the case of its policy towards the Disputed Territory, the Government gained a greater degree of success in trying to reconcile seemingly incompatible ends than it did in many other instances.