Do board contacts matter? : an analysis of the relationship between boards of directors’ ties and the performance of Australia’s largest companies.

Boards of directors are thought to provide access to a wealth of knowledge and resources for the companies they serve, and are considered important to corporate governance. Under the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) boards are viewed as a strategic resource available to firms. As a consequence there has been a significant research effort aimed at establishing a link between board attributes and company performance. In this thesis I explore and extend the study of interlocking directorships (Mizruchi, 1996; Scott 1991a) by examining the links between directors’ opportunity networks and firm performance. Specifically, I use resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and social capital theory (Burt, 1980b; Coleman, 1988) as the basis for a new measure of a board’s opportunity network. I contend that both directors’ formal company ties and their social ties determine a director’s opportunity network through which they are able to access and mobilise resources for their firms. This approach is based on recent studies that suggest the measurement of interlocks at the director level, rather than at the firm level, may be a more reliable indicator of this phenomenon. This research uses publicly available data drawn from Australia’s top-105 listed companies and their directors in 1999. I employ Social Network Analysis (SNA) (Scott, 1991b) using the UCINET software to analyse the individual director’s formal and social networks. SNA is used to measure a the number of ties a director has to other directors in the top-105 company director network at both one and two degrees of separation, that is, direct ties and indirect (or ‘friend of a friend’) ties. These individual measures of director connectedness are aggregated to produce a board-level network metric for comparison with measures of a firm’s performance using multiple regression analysis. Performance is measured with accounting-based and market-based measures. Findings indicate that better-connected boards are associated with higher market-based company performance (measured by Tobin’s q). However, weaker and mostly unreliable associations were found for accounting-based performance measure ROA. Furthermore, formal (or corporate) network ties are a stronger predictor of market performance than total network ties (comprising social and corporate ties). Similarly, strong ties (connectedness at degree-1) are better predictors of performance than weak ties (connectedness at degree-2). My research makes four contributions to the literature on director interlocks. First, it extends a new way of measuring a board’s opportunity network based on the director rather than the company as the unit of interlock. Second, it establishes evidence of a relationship between market-based measures of firm performance and the connectedness of that firm’s board. Third, it establishes that director’s formal corporate ties matter more to market-based firm performance than their social ties. Fourth, it establishes that director’s strong direct ties are more important to market-based performance than weak ties. The thesis concludes with implications for research and practice, including a more speculative interpretation of these results. In particular, I raise the possibility of reverse causality – that is networked directors seek to join high-performing companies. Thus, the relationship may be a result of symbolic action by companies seeking to increase the legitimacy of their firms rather than a reflection of the social capital available to the companies. This is an important consideration worthy of future investigation.

Boards of directors' contribution to strategy : a literature review and research agenda

Research Question/Issue: Over the last four decades, research on the relationship between boards of directors and strategy has proliferated. Yet to date there is little theoretical and empirical agreement regarding the question of how boards of directors contribute to strategy. This review assesses the extant literature by highlighting emerging trends and identifying several avenues for future research. Research Findings/Results: Using a content-analysis of 150 articles published in 23 management journals up to 2007, we describe and analyze how research on boards of directors and strategy has evolved over time. We illustrate how topics, theories, settings, and sources of data interact and influence insights about board–strategy relationships during three specific periods. Theoretical Implications: Our study illustrates that research on boards of directors and strategy evolved from normative and structural approaches to behavioral and cognitive approaches. Our results encourage future studies to examine the impact of institutional and context-specific factors on the (expected) contribution of boards to strategy, and to apply alternative methods to fully capture the impact of board processes and dynamics on strategy making. Practical Implications: The increasing interest in boards of directors’ contribution to strategy echoes a movement towards more strategic involvement of boards of directors. However, best governance practices and the emphasis on board independence and control may hinder the board contribution to the strategic decision making. Our study invites investors and policy-makers to consider the requirements for an effective strategic task when they nominate board members and develop new regulations.

Enterprise business technology governance: A validation of three technology-governance competencies for boards of directors

The competent leadership and governance of digital transformation needs to involve the board of directors. The reported lack of such capability in boards is becoming a pressing issue. Underpinning leadership in such transformation are the competencies to effectively govern Enterprise Technology (ETG). In this paper we take the position that ETG competencies are essential in boards because competent enterprise business technology governance has been shown to contribute to increased revenue, profit, and returns. We report the industry validation processes of a set of three board-of-director competencies needed for effective ETG related to strategy and planning; investment and risk; and, innovation and value creation. We conclude that gaps in board ETG competence remain.

Enterprise technology governance: New information and technology core competencies for boards of directors

Boards of directors have legal and ethical responsibilities to be competent. Yet, in a world where business models and whole sectors are being disrupted by rapid information and technology change, a majority of directors lack IT governance knowledge and skills. Individual IT competency and collective board Enterprise Technology Governance capability is a global problem. Without capability, boards are potentially flying blind, and risk is increased and opportunities to lead and govern digital transformation lost. To address this capability gap, this research provides the first multi-industry validated Enterprise Technology Governance competency set for use in board evaluation, recruitment and professional development.

Governance of enterprise Information and Technology: A new core competency for boards of directors

With the level of digital disruption that is affecting businesses around the globe, you might expect high levels of Governance of Enterprise Information and Technology (GEIT) capability within boards. Boards and their senior executives know technology is important. More than 90% of boards and senior executives currently identify technology as essential to their current businesses, and to their organization’s future. But as few as 16% have sufficient GEIT capability. Global Centre for Digital Business Transformation’s recent research contains strong indicators of the need for change. Despite board awareness of both the likelihood and impact of digital disruption, things digital are still not viewed as a board-level matter in 45% of companies. And, it’s not just the board. The lack of board attention to technology can be mirrored at senior executive level as well. When asked about their organization’s attitude towards digital disruption, 43% of executives said their business either did not recognise it as a priority or was not responding appropriately. A further 32% were taking a “follower” approach, a potentially risky move as we will explain. Given all the evidence that boards know information and technology (I&T***) is vital, that they understand the inevitably, impact and speed of digital change and disruption, why are so many boards dragging their heels? Ignoring I&T disruption and refusing to build capability at board level is nothing short of negligence. Too many boards risk flying blind without GEIT capability [2]. To help build decision quality and I&T governance capability, this research: • Confirms a pressing need to build individual competency and cumulative, across-board capability in governing I&T • Identifies six factors that have rapidly increased the need, risk and urgency • Finds that boards may risk not meeting their duty of care responsibilities when it comes to I&T oversight • Highlights barriers to building capability details three GEIT competencies that boards and executives can use for evaluation, selection, recruitment and professional development.

Leading Digital Transformation: Building Technology and Information Governance Capability in Boards of Directors and the C-Suite

Information and technology and its use in organisation transformation presents unprecedented opportunities and risks. Increasingly, the Governance of Enterprise Information and Technology (GEIT) competency in the board room and executive is needed. Whether your organization is small or large, public, private or not for profit or whether your industry is not considered high-tech, IT is impacting your sector – no exceptions. But there is a skill shortage in boards: GEIT capability is concerningly low. This capability is urgently needed across the board, including those directors who come from finance, legal, marketing, operations and HR backgrounds. Digital disruption also affects all occupations. Putting in place a vision will help ensure emergency responses will meet technology-related duty of care responsibilities. When GEIT-related forward thinking and planning is carried out at the same time that you put your business strategy and plan in place, your organization has a significantly increased chance of not only surviving, but thriving into the future. Those organizations that don’t build GEIT capability risk joining the growing list of once-leading firms left behind in the digital ‘cloud of smoke’. Those organizations that do will be better placed to reap the benefits and hedge against the risks of a digital world. This chapter provides actionable, research-based considerations and processes for boards to use, to build awareness, knowledge and skills in governing technology-related organization strategy, risk and value creation.

Towards Explaining the Tasks and Roles of the Boards of Directors

While previous research has helped to improve our understanding of corporate governance and boards of directors, less is known about the factors that affect boards’ tasks and roles and directors’ motivation and engagement. This requires knowledge of how board decisions are being made and the internal and external factors that affect the decision-making process. Large inferential leaps have been made from board demographics to firm performance with equivocal results. This thesis concentrates on how the institutional, behavioral and social identification factors impact the enactment of board roles and tasks. Data used in this thesis were collected in 2009 through a mailed survey to Finnish large and middle-sized corporations. The findings suggest that firstly, the national context of an organization is reflected in board roles and shapes how and for what reasons the board roles are carried out; secondly, the directors’ human and external social capital invariably impacts their engagement in board tasks and that conflicts among directors moderate those relationships; finally, directors’ identification with the organization, its shareholders and its customers affect the directors’ involvement in board tasks. By addressing the impact of organisational context, board-internal behaviour and social identification of board members on board roles and tasks, this thesis firstly complements the shareholder supremacy view as the only reason for the board’s involvement with specific tasks; secondly questions the existence of the board as separate from its institutional context; and thirdly questions the view that a board is a ‘black box’, subject to a selection of input demographic variables and producing quantifiable results. The thesis demonstrates that boards are complex organisational bodies, which involve much interaction among board members. Director behaviour and its influence on board decision making is an important determinant of board tasks and boards are likely subjected to inter-group tensions and are susceptible to the influence of internal and external social forces.

Boards of directors and bank performance in United Arab Emirates

This study presents an empirical analysis about corporate governance of financial institutions in United Arab Emirates (UAE). The purpose of this research is to analyze the influence of the structure of board of directors on the performance of these institutions. To examine the effect of control exerted by particular families on bank management, we estimated models where the dependent variable is return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), independent variables are board of directors variables, and control variables are bank management variables. Our results show that the control of corporate governance by a ruler's family within a board of directors has a positive effect on bank profitability. Our results indicate that control by a ruler's family through a bank's board of directors compensates for the inadequacy of UAE's corporate governance system.

"Management of private corporations" ... with notes on organization, meetings and records, giving decisions of the courts touching the acts of corporations, boards of directors and corporation officers.

Mode of access: Internet.