859 resultados para Board roles
Resumo:
We highlight how directors and senior managers perceive the roles of a board to involve overseeing risk and compliance, strategy, governance, developing the CEO and senior management and managing stakeholders. We find that managers and directors perceive board effectiveness as linked to different combinations of these roles and that there appear to be differences in perceptions between different types of firms. We conclude that clarity around the board’s role set is critical to furthering the corporate governance research agenda, and that the relationship between board roles and perceived board effectiveness differs between managers and directors.
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Over the last ten years, the corporate governance context in most Western countries has changed as a result of irregularities, increased regulation, heightened societal expectations and shareholder activism. This paper examines the impact of the changing context on the role of chairmen of supervisory boards in the Netherlands. Based on a combination of thirty semi-structured interviews with board members of leading Dutch corporations and secondary data on the position of supervisory board chairmen at the top-100 listed firms in the Netherlands, the study reveals that board chairmen have become increasingly involved in both their control and service roles. While the demographics (i.e., age, tenure, gender and nationality) of chairmen have hardly changed over the last decade, chairmen are spending considerably more time on boards and committees, have reduced the number of board interlocks and have become more active on the forefront of the corporate governance discussion. The paper highlights several implications for scholars and practitioners.
Resumo:
Purpose: This study investigates boards of directors in small firms and explores the link between board effectiveness and the composition, roles and working styles of the boards. Design/methodology/approach: The study analyses data from a telephone survey of boards in 45 small firms. The survey included both the CEO and the chairperson of the board. Findings: The study identifies three groups of small firms: ‘paperboards’, ‘professional boards’, and ‘management lead’ boards. Results show that board composition, board roles and board working style influence board effectiveness in small firms. Research limitations/implications: Although the present study has found a link between board effectiveness and the role, composition and working style of boards of small firms, other potentially influential factors are also worthy of investigation; for example, the personal characteristics of the individuals involved, generational factors in family firms, and the situational circumstances of various firms. Practical implications: The study reveals that, in practice, the management team and the board are substantially intertwined in small firms. Originality/value: The main contributions are that the study explores how boards in small firms actually function and gives a detailed account of their composition and roles.More insight into this issue is important given the overemphasis within the governance literature on input-output studies using samples of large publiclylisted firms.
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While previous research has helped to improve our understanding of corporate governance and boards of directors, less is known about the factors that affect boards’ tasks and roles and directors’ motivation and engagement. This requires knowledge of how board decisions are being made and the internal and external factors that affect the decision-making process. Large inferential leaps have been made from board demographics to firm performance with equivocal results. This thesis concentrates on how the institutional, behavioral and social identification factors impact the enactment of board roles and tasks. Data used in this thesis were collected in 2009 through a mailed survey to Finnish large and middle-sized corporations. The findings suggest that firstly, the national context of an organization is reflected in board roles and shapes how and for what reasons the board roles are carried out; secondly, the directors’ human and external social capital invariably impacts their engagement in board tasks and that conflicts among directors moderate those relationships; finally, directors’ identification with the organization, its shareholders and its customers affect the directors’ involvement in board tasks. By addressing the impact of organisational context, board-internal behaviour and social identification of board members on board roles and tasks, this thesis firstly complements the shareholder supremacy view as the only reason for the board’s involvement with specific tasks; secondly questions the existence of the board as separate from its institutional context; and thirdly questions the view that a board is a ‘black box’, subject to a selection of input demographic variables and producing quantifiable results. The thesis demonstrates that boards are complex organisational bodies, which involve much interaction among board members. Director behaviour and its influence on board decision making is an important determinant of board tasks and boards are likely subjected to inter-group tensions and are susceptible to the influence of internal and external social forces.
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This article assesses the corporate governance-related antecedents of nomination committee adoption, and the impact of nomination committees’ existence and their composition on board independence and board demographic diversity. We conducted a longitudinal study of board composition amongst 210 Swiss public companies from January 2001 through December 2003, a period during which the Swiss (Stock) Exchange (SWX) introduced new corporate governance-related disclosure guidelines. We find firms with nomination committees are more likely to have a higher number of independent and foreign directors, but not more likely to have a higher number of female board members. Further, the existence of nomination committees is associated with a higher degree of nationality diversity but is not related to board educational diversity. We also find that nomination committee composition matters in the nomination of independent and foreign, but not of female directors. Our results suggest that understanding different board roles and composition require a multi-theoretical approach, and that agency theory, resource-dependence theory and group effectiveness theory help to explain different aspects of board composition and effectiveness. Finally, the article discusses the concept of diversity and appropriate ways to study diversity in a boardroom context.
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Pressure on boards to improve corporate performance and management oversight has led to a series of inquiries and reports advocating governance reform. These reports largely reflect an agency perspective of governance and seek to ensure greater board independence from and control of management. While board independence is important to good governance, we contend that frameworks, models and advice centred on one element of governance ignore the complexity of how boards work. We develop a holistic board framework based upon the concept of board intellectual capital to address this concern. Our framework proposes a series of inputs (e.g. company history, company constitution, legal environment) that lead to a particular mix of board intellectual capital. We contend that the balance of the different elements of board intellectual capital will lead to a series of board behaviours. Further, the board needs to mobilise its intellectual capital to carry out a series of roles. The exact nature of these roles will depend on the company's requirements. Thus, the governance outputs of organisational performance, board effectiveness and director effectiveness will depend on the match between the board's intellectual capital and the roles required of it. We conclude by demonstrating the benefits of this framework as a diagnostic tool. We outline how boards wishing to improve their governance systems can diagnose common governance problems by evaluating their own board's capabilities in relation to the different components of the framework.
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The purpose of this article is to investigate how ownership structure, especially family and/or venture-capital involvement, as well as entrepreneurial activities, defined as strategic change and renewal, help explain the involvement of independent members on boards of directors. The CEOs of 2,455 small and medium-sized, private enterprises from practically all industries were contacted in a telephone survey, resulting in an exceptionally high response rate. The findings reveal that family firms are more reluctant to involve independent directors on their boards than non-family firms that presence of venture capitalists increases the frequency of independent board members and that ownership has an impact on board roles. The results do not support the hypothesised relationship that independent directors enhance entrepreneurial activities. One implication of our study is that the often-argued-for strategic contribution of outsiders to the boards in family firms may be overemphasised. Another implication is that family firms that choose to acquire additional capital should be aware that this could result in a change in the board composition and the loss of control of the business. However, new and external owners’ inclusion on the board seems to be negotiable since there are also venture capitalists that do not insist on board representation.
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The law and popular opinion expect boards of directors will actively monitor their organisations. Further, public opinion is that boards should have a positive impact on organisational performance. However, the processes of board monitoring and judgment are poorly understood, and board influence on organisational performance needs to be better understood. This thesis responds to the repeated calls to open the ‘black box’ linking board practices and organisational performance by investigating the processual behaviours of boards. The work of four boards1 of micro and small-sized nonprofit organisations were studied for periods of at least one year, using a processual research approach, drawing on observations of board meetings, interviews with directors, and the documents of the boards. The research shows that director turnover, the difficulty recruiting and engaging directors, and the administration of reporting, had strong impacts upon board monitoring, judging and/or influence. In addition, board monitoring of organisational performance was adversely affected by directors’ limited awareness of their legal responsibilities and directors’ limited financial literacy. Directors on average found all sources of information about their organisation’s work useful. Board judgments about the financial aspects of organisational performance were regulated by the routines of financial reporting. However, there were no comparable routines facilitating judgments about non-financial performance, and such judgments tended to be limited to specific aspects of performance and were ad hoc, largely in response to new information or the repackaging of existing information in a new form. The thesis argues that Weick’s theory of sensemaking offers insight into the way boards went about the task of understanding organisational performance. Board influence on organisational performance was demonstrated in the areas of: compliance; instrumental influence through service and through discussion and decision-making; and by symbolic, legitimating and protective means. The degree of instrumental influence achieved by boards depended on director competency, access to networks of influence, and understandings of board roles, and by the agency demonstrated by directors. The thesis concludes that there is a crowding out effect whereby CEO competence and capability limits board influence. The thesis also suggests that there is a second ‘agency problem’, a problem of director volition. The research potentially has profound implications for the work of nonprofit boards. Rather than purporting to establish a general theory of board governance, the thesis embraces calls to build situation-specific mini-theories about board behaviour.
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As a consequence of recent corporate governance reforms, the work of supervisory board members in the Dutch two-tier system has become more complex. The objectives of this study are to gain more insight in the current challenges that supervisory board members face and assess whether they are well-equipped to manage them. Based on a combination of an analysis of self-assessment reports, a web-based survey and semi-structured interviews, we conclude that the major challenges of supervisory board members lie in the field of interaction and collaboration with executives. Distinct ‘challenge areas’ were relatively often perceived as problematic as well as important, highlighting the need to improve the current functioning of boards. With regard to the skills that are present on supervisory boards, we find that individual qualities, like integrity, professionalism and knowledge, are better recognized than collective qualities for the supervisory board as a whole. In particular, openness and honesty are seen as important, but often lacking. The paper highlights several implications for scholars and practitioners.
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Director independence is a cornerstone of fiduciary responsibility and good corporate governance. However, most directors are recruited because of the roles and networks they hold, meaning that there is an expectation that identities held by a director outside the boardroom will be used to benefit the company. While this often works well, it is acknowledged that many directors, either consciously or subconsciously, will at times allow themselves to be influenced by their other roles to the detriment of the governance process. In this paper we argue that identity theory can be used to explore the impact of ‘identity’ on corporate governance and that practical tools can be developed to actively assist directors to maintain ‘independence’ in the boardroom.
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Triggered by highly publicized corporate scandals, changing societal expectations and the collapse of financial markets, the roles of boards of directors have changed significantly in safeguarding the interest of shareholders and other stakeholders. Yet relatively little is known about contemporary challenges non-executive directors face and whether their boards are well-equipped for their new tasks. Based on self-assessment reports by supervisory boards, a survey and interviews with supervisory board members, this paper investigates the challenges non-executive directors face in the Netherlands, particularly after a decade of corporate governance reform. Non-executive directors’ inadequate role in scrutinizing executive directors’ performance, information asymmetries and dysfunctional working relationships between executive and non-executive directors are among the greatest challenges indicated by non-executive directors on Dutch supervisory boards. The paper discusses several implications for scholars and practitioners and provides a unique insight in boardroom dynamics (word count: 138).
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The ‘Centro case’ confirmed that each individual director is responsible for financial governance and must be able to ‘read and understand’ financial statements. Despite the centrality of director financial literacy to directors duties, practitioner and academic literature have failed to clearly define or provide evidence-based reliable measures of director financial literacy. This paper seeks to address this weakness by presenting the initial results of a Delphi study on unpacking the conceptualisation of director financial literacy. We have found that director financial literacy involves more than reading and understanding financial statements. Rather, it encompasses capabilities in applying accounting concepts to the analysis and evaluation of financial statements. As such director financial literacy may be more accurately described as ‘director accounting literacy’.