Global trade in GM food and the cartagena protocol on biosafety: Consequences for China

The UN Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety adopted in Montreal, 29 January, 2000 and opened for signature in Nairobi, 15-26 May, 2000 will exert a profound effect on international trade in genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and their products. In this paper, the potential effects of various articles of the Protocol on international trade in GMOs are analyzed. Based on the present status of imports of GMOs and domestic research and development of biotechnology in China, likely trends in imports of foreign GM food and related products after China accedes to WTO is explored. Also, China's potential countermeasures to control and regulate imports of GMOs in line with implementation of the Protocol are discussed. China, in recent times, has increased its food and agricultural imports substantially from USA and Canada. China imported soybean 10.42 mill. tons in 2000 and about 15 mill tons in 2001, of which majority are from USA where GM soybean accounts for 60%. The plantation of US Monsanto's transgenic Bt cotton was increased to more than 1 million ha in China in 2001. Though China has paid great attention to develop biotechnology, it appears to have little scope to export GMOs and GM products. So China may consider a range of administrative measures to implement the Cartagena Protocol and to regulate its import of GMOs and GM agricultural products. Consequently, the Regulation on Safety of Agri-GMOs was issued on June, 2001 and followed three detailed rules issued in Jan. of 2002, with a priority to limit foreign GMOs importing by safety certification and labeling system. These were outlined taking into account policies adopted in Western countries such as green barriers to international trade.

Parasitological stool sample exam by spontaneous sedimentation method using conical tubes: effectiveness, practice, and biosafety

INTRODUCTION: Spontaneous sedimentation is an important procedure for stool examination. A modification of this technique using conical tubes was performed and evaluated. METHODS: Fifty fecal samples were processed in sedimentation glass and in polypropylene conical tubes. Another 50 samples were used for quantitative evaluation of protozoan cysts. RESULTS: Although no significant differences occurred in the frequency of protozoa and helminths detected, significant differences in protozoan cyst counts did occur. CONCLUSIONS: The use of tube predicts a shorter path in the sedimentation of the sample, increases concentration of parasites for microscopy analysis, minimizes the risks of contamination, reduces the odor, and optimizes the workspace.

Biosafety of Recombinant Adeno-associated Virus Vectors.

It is hoped that the use of gene transfer technology to treat both monogenetic and acquired diseases may soon become a common therapy option in medicine. For gene therapy to achieve this objective, any gene delivery method will have to meet several criteria, including ease of manufacturing, efficient gene transfer to target tissue, long-term gene expression to alleviate the disease, and most importantly safety in patients. Viral vectors are an attractive choice for use in gene therapy protocols due to their relative efficiency in gene delivery. Since there is inherent risk in using viruses, investigators in the gene therapy community have devoted extensive efforts toward reengineering viral vectors for enhance safety. Here we review the approaches and technologies that are being evaluated for the use of recombinant vectors based upon adeno-associated virus (AAV) in the treatment of a variety of human diseases. AAV is currently the only known human DNA virus that is non-pathogenic and AAV-based vectors are classified as Risk Group 1 agents for all laboratory and animal studies carried out in the US. Although its apparent safety in natural infection and animals appears well documented, we examine the accumulated knowledge on the biology and vectorology of AAV, lessons learned from gene therapy clinical trials, and how this information is impacting current vector design and manufacturing with an overall emphasis on biosafety.

Biosafety assessment of probiotics used for human consumption: recommendations from the EU-PROSAFE project

On June 26-27, 2006, 60 academic and industry scientists gathered during the PROSAFE workshop to discuss recommendations on taxonomy, antibiotic resistance, in vitro assessment of virulence and in vivo assessment of safety of probiotics used for human consumption. For identification of lactic acid bacteria (LAB) intended for probiotic use, it was recommended that conventional biochemical methods should be complemented with molecular methods and that these should be performed by an expert lab. Using the newly developed LAB Susceptibility test Medium (LSM), tentative epidemiological cut-off values were proposed. It was recommended that potentially probiotic strains not belonging to the wildtype distributions of relevant antimicrobials should not be developed as future products for human or animal consumption. Furthermore, it was recommended that the use of strains harbouring known and confirmed virulence genes should be avoided. Finally, for in vivo assessment of safety by investigating strain pathogenicity in animal models, the rat endocarditis model appeared to be the most reliable model tested in the PROSAFE project. Moreover, consensus was reached for approving the necessity of a human colonisation study in a randomised placebo-controlled double-blind design; however, further discussions are needed on the details of such as study.

Animal Biosafety Level 1 Training Video

This training video is intended to familiarise researchers and technicians working with Hazard Group 1 pathogens in Containment Level 1 animal facilities. It is in Flash video format which will require a free media player such as VLC Media Player (http://www.videolan.org/vlc/) to watch.

Animal Biosafety Level 3 Training Video

This training video is intended to familiarise researchers and technicians working with Hazard Group 3 pathogens in Containment Level 3 animal facilities. It is in Flash video format which will require a free media player such as VLC Media Player (http://www.videolan.org/vlc/) to watch.

Animal Biosafety Level 2 Training Video

This training video is intended to familiarise researchers and technicians working with Hazard Group 2 pathogens in Containment Level 2 animal facilities. It is in Flash video format which will require a free media player such as VLC Media Player (http://www.videolan.org/vlc/) to watch.

Animal Biosafety Risk Assessment and Management Training Video

This training video is intended to familiarise researchers and technicians working in animal containment facilities with appropriate risk assessment and risk management systems. It is in Windows Media Video format which will require a free media player such as Windows Media Player or VLC Media Player (http://www.videolan.org/vlc/) to watch.

Viral infections in workers in hospital and research laboratory settings: a comparative review of infection modes and respective biosafety aspects

Objectives: To compare modes and sources of infection and clinical and biosafety aspects of accidental viral infections in hospital workers and research laboratory staff reported in scientific articles. Methods: PubMed, Google Scholar, ISI Web of Knowledge, Scirus, and Scielo were searched (to December 2008) for reports of accidental viral infections, written in English, Portuguese, Spanish, or German; the authors' personal file of scientific articles and references from the articles retrieved in the initial search were also used. Systematic review was carried out with inclusion criteria of presence of accidental viral infection's cases information, and exclusion criteria of absence of information about the viral etiology, and at least probable mode of infection.Results: One hundred and forty-one scientific articles were obtained, 66 of which were included in the analysis. For arboviruses, 84% of the laboratory infections had aerosol as the source; for alphaviruses alone, aerosol exposure accounted for 94% of accidental infections. of laboratory arboviral infections, 15.7% were acquired percutaneously, whereas 41.6% of hospital infections were percutaneous. For airborne viruses, 81% of the infections occurred in laboratories, with hantavirus the leading causative agent. Aerosol inhalation was implicated in 96% of lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus infections, 99% of hantavirus infections, and 50% of coxsackievirus infections, but infective droplet inhalation was the leading mode of infection for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus and the mucocutaneous mode of infection was involved in the case of infection with influenza B. For blood-borne viruses, 92% of infections occurred in hospitals and 93% of these had percutaneous mode of infection, while among laboratory infections 77% were due to infective aerosol inhalation. Among blood-borne virus infections there were six cases of particular note: three cases of acute hepatitis following hepatitis C virus infection with a short period of incubation, one laboratory case of human immunodeficiency virus infection through aerosol inhalation, one case of hepatitis following hepatitis G virus infection, and one case of fulminant hepatitis with hepatitis B virus infection following exposure of the worker's conjunctiva to hepatitis B virus e antigen-negative patient saliva. of the 12 infections with viruses with preferential mucocutaneous transmission, seven occurred percutaneously, aerosol was implicated as a possible source of infection in two cases, and one atypical infection with Macacine herpesvirus 1 with fatal encephalitis as the outcome occurred through a louse bite. One outbreak of norovirus infection among hospital staff had as its probable mode of infection the ingestion of inocula spread in the environment by fomites.Conclusions: The currently accepted and practiced risk analysis of accidental viral infections based on the conventional dynamics of infection of the etiological agents is insufficient to cope with accidental viral infections in laboratories and to a lesser extent in hospitals, where unconventional modes of infection are less frequently present but still have relevant clinical and potential epidemiological consequences. Unconventional modes of infection, atypical clinical development, or extremely severe cases are frequently present together with high viral loads and high virulence of the agents manipulated in laboratories. In hospitals by contrast, the only possible association of atypical cases is with the individual resistance of the worker. Current standard precaution practices are insufficient to prevent most of the unconventional infections in hospitals analyzed in this study; it is recommended that special attention be given to flaviviruses in these settings. (C) 2011 International Society for Infectious Diseases. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Using the results of routine laboratory workplace surveillance activities to assess compliance with recommended biosafety guidelines

The biological safety profession has historically functioned within an environment based on recommended practices rather than regulations, so summary data on compliance or noncompliance with recommended practices is largely absent from the professional literature. The absence of safety performance outcome data is unfortunate since the concept of biosafety containment is based on a combination of facility based controls and workplace practices, and persistent failures in either type of controls could ultimately result in injury or death. In addition, the number of laboratories requiring biosafety containment is likely to grow significantly in the coming years in the wake of the terrorist events of 2001. In this study, the outcomes of 768 biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) safety surveys were analyzed for commonalities and trends. Items of non-compliance noted were classified as facility related or practice related. The most frequent item of noncompliance encountered was the failure to re-certify biosafety cabinetry. Not surprisingly, the preponderance of the other frequent items of non-compliance encountered were practice related, such as general housekeeping orderly, changes in compliance levels, as well as establish trends in the elements of items of non-compliance during the sequential survey period. The findings described in this study are significant because, for the first time, the outcomes of compliance with recommended biosafety practices can be characterized and thus used as the basis for focused interventions. Since biosafety is heavily reliant on adherence to specific safety practices, the ability to focus interventions on objectively identified practice-related items of non-compliance can assist in the reduction of worker risk in this area experiencing tremendous growth. The information described is also of heighten importance given the number of workplaces expected to involve potentially infectious agents in the coming years. ^

Equivalence tests to support environmental biosafety decisions:theory and examples.

2016