Bilateral investment treaties with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Peoples' Republic of the Congo, the Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia, and two protocols to treaties with Finland and Ireland : hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, August 4, 1992.

Mode of access: Internet.

Learning from Incredible Commitments: Evolution and Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties

Ostensibly, BITs are the ideal international treaty. First, until just recently, they almost uniformly came with explicit dispute resolution mechanisms through which countries could face real costs for violation (Montt 2009). Second, the signing, ratification, and violation of them are easily accessible public knowledge. Thus countries presumably would face reputational costs for violating these agreements. Yet, these compliance devices have not dissuaded states from violating these agreements. Even more interestingly, in recent years, both developed and developing countries have moved towards modifying the investor-friendly provisions of these agreements. These deviations from the expectations of the credible commitment argument raise important questions about the field's assumptions regarding the ability of international treaties with commitment devices to effectively constrain state behavior.

Challenges to Slovakia and Poland health policy decisions: use of investment treaties to claim compensation for reversal of privatisation/liberalisation policies

Investment treaties, and possibly the EU Treaty itself, are being used by multinational companies Penta and Eureko to try and force the Slovak government to pay compensation for reversing health privatisation and liberalisation policies. Similar action has been used against the Polish government by Eureko to win compensation worth nearly 2 billion Euros and a policy commitment to further privatisation.

Los acuerdos de protección y promoción recíproca de inversiones (APPRI) o biteral investment treaties (BIT) en Colombia

La inversión extranjera constituye una oportunidad de elevar los índices de crecimiento y desarrollo económico de Colombia. Desde la reforma económica de 1990-1994, el país cambió su política frente a temas como: la economía, las finanzas públicas, la estructura empresarial, el sector agrícola y la base tributaria, entre otros. En respuesta a este cambio, con la entrada de las políticas de corte neoliberal y el nuevo sistema político e institucional del país, se modificaron sus estructuras e instituciones. Asimismo surgieron nuevas prioridades. De ahí que se iniciaran también nuevas relaciones estratégicas‚ con otros Estados, para satisfacer estos nuevos intereses. Dentro de estas nuevas prioridades surgió el interés de atraer inversión extranjera directa y de portafolio. En ese momento‚ e inclusive ahora se hace necesario financiar la economía emergente y nada más propicio que la inversión extranjera para este propósito. Es decir, se complementa el crecimiento económico, con flujos de capital externo, que puede llegar en forma de inversión directa o de figuras financieras como las acciones, los bonos, etc.

Trade and investment rules: Latin American perspectives

Includes bibliography

Labour Migration, Trade and Investment: From Fragmentation to Coherence

Trade, investment and migration are strongly intertwined, being three key factors in international production. Yet, law and regulation of the three has remained highly fragmented. Trade is regulated by the WTO on the multilateral level, and through preferential trade agreements on the regional and bilateral levels – it is fragmented and complex in its own right. Investment, on the other hand, is mainly regulated through bilateral investment treaties with no strong links to the regulation of trade or migration. And, finally, migration is regulated by a web of different international, regional and bilateral agreements which focus on a variety of different aspects of migration ranging from humanitarian to economic. The problems of institutional fragmentation in international law are well known. There is no organizational forum for coherent strategy-making on the multilateral level covering all three areas. Normative regulations may thus contradict each other. Trade regulation may bring about liberalization of access for service providers, but eventually faces problems in recruiting the best people from abroad. Investors may withdraw investment without being held liable for disruptions to labour and to the livelihood and infrastructure of towns and communities affected by disinvestment. Finally, migration policies do not seem to have a significant impact as long as trade policies and investment policies are not working in a way that is conducive to reducing migration pressure, as trade and investment are simply more powerful on the regulatory level than migration. This chapter addresses the question as to how fragmentation of the three fields could be reme-died and greater coherence between these three areas of factor allocation in international economic relations and law could be achieved. It shows that migration regulation on the international level is lagging behind that on trade and investment. Stronger coordination and consideration of migration in trade and investment policy, and stronger international cooperation in migration, will provide the foundations for a coherent international architecture in the field.

Law and Foreign Direct Investment. IES WORKING PAPER 4/2011

In this paper we examine the effect of law on foreign direct investment outflows with a specific interest in the relationship between international investment law and domestic private property laws. Our results indicate that FDI investor is indifferent to host country property rights, hence shareholder protection by law is not a significant determinant of FDI outflows. We argue that FDI, in contrast with other types of capital flows, can effectively mitigate the agency problem through majority ownership and control, hence reduce exposure to ex-post expropriation by the affiliate. On the other hand, FDI investor remains exposed to risk of expropriation by the host government and is strongly sensitive to the enforcement of law in the host country. In contrast with recent literature we conclude that there are no causal relationship between bilateral investment treaties and FDI.

The EU-China Bilateral Investment Agreement: Between High Hopes and Real Challenges. Security Policy Brief No. 68, February 2016

In 2012, negotiations over an EU–China bilateral investment agreement were launched to fully tap into the potential of bilateral investments. This policy brief gives an overview of the current negotiation process and argues that the high hopes advanced politically and economically in the agreement must be weighed against the many challenges and obstacles the negotiations face, regarding current events in EU–China relations, in global trade and investment regimes, and the limits of EU competencies. Strategically, the agreement could be important, as it offers the potential to strengthen the EU’s global economic relevance. This brief concludes that there is much to gain if the EU follows a coordinated approach and remains mindful of these (potential) obstacles.

Direito do investimento e inovação tecnológica: o histórico regulatório da transferência de tecnologia no Brasil em face das cláusulas de proteção dos acordos bilaterais de investimentos (BITs)

A regulação direta ou indireta da transferência de tecnologia pelo Brasil desde o final da década de 50 do século XX nem sempre foi devidamente compreendida. O uso da tributação, com efeitos fiscais e extrafiscais, teve reflexos sobre a atuação do INPI e do Banco Centra do Brasil (BACEN) que permanecem até os dias de hoje, mas tinham como fundamento uma política industrial específica e a limitação dos seus efeitos no balanço de pagamentos do país. O Brasil nunca se fechou totalmente aos investidores estrangeiros, mas sempre utilizou limitações setoriais, posteriormente o registro do ingresso do capital estrangeiro e, por muito tempo, o desincentivo à sua saída por medidas limitadoras ou proibitivas de remessas de dividendos e royalties, até mesmo com o uso da extrafiscalidade. Como o país apenas recentemente realmente prioriza de forma geral a pesquisa e desenvolvimento (P&D) tecnológico, o que resulta em pouca tecnologia gerada internamente, os royalties devidos pelo uso da tecnologia das empresas transnacionais sempre foram objeto de crítica e, consequentemente, medidas limitadoras. Essa atuação regulatória representa um risco político aos investidores, com os acordos bilaterais de investimentos (BITs) sendo os tratados internacionais mais utilizados para afastá-lo. O Brasil, porém, apesar de ter assinado diversos deles, não possui nenhum em vigor. O confronto entre as cláusulas de proteção dos BITs e a política regulatória sobre a transferência de tecnologia e investimento estrangeiro que durante muito tempo vigorou no país representa um caso concreto extremamente interessante para avaliar a aplicação desses tratados e eventuais medidas que os violam, auxiliando, ainda, a compreensão de algumas das medidas regulatórias que permanecem em vigor.

The International Regulatory Regime on Capital Flows

Capital controls and exchange restrictions are used to restrict international capital flows during economic crises. This paper looks at the legal implications of these restrictions and explores the current international regulatory framework applicable to international capital movements and current payments. It shows how international capital flows suffer from the lack of a comprehensive and coherent regulatory framework that would harmonize the patchwork of
multilateral, regional, and bilateral treaties that currently regulate this issue. These treaties include the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF Articles), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), free-trade agreements, the European Union treaty, bilateral investment treaties, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements (OECD Code of Capital Movement). Each
of these instruments regulate differently capital movements with little coordination with other areas of law. This situation sometimes leads to regulatory overlaps and conflict between different sources of law. Given the strong links between capital movements and trade in services, this paper pays particular attention to the rules of the GATS on capital flows and discusses the policy space available in the GATS for restricting capital flows in times of crisis.

Le cadre juridique des investissements miniers et pétroliers chinois en Afrique : instruments pour une lex mercatoria sino-africaine

L’intérêt principal de l’analyse du cadre des investissements miniers et pétroliers chinois en Afrique est la détermination du chantier juridique résultant de la cohabitation de deux cultures juridiques en vue de l’émergence d’une lex mercatoria dans les investissements sino-africains. Elle comprend deux parties principales. D’abord, l’étude se penche sur l’origine des fonds chinois investis sur le continent africain qui sont les fonds souverains. La problématique des fonds souverains est celle de savoir s’il s’agit d’instruments politiques ou financiers. Néanmoins, cette inquiétude ne freine pas la force opérationnelle grandissante des fonds souverains chinois sur le continent africain. Rentrant dans l’encadrement et le contenu du contrat proprement dit, l’analyse des figures contractuelles usitées dans l’industrie pétrolière et minière sino-africaine séparément dans les contextes chinois et africains révèle l’inadéquation des contrats et de la législation africaine aux besoins économiques et technologiques du continent. En outre, l’examen particulier des clauses de choix de la loi applicable et de règlement des différends dans les contextes chinois et africain permet de soulever quelques options possibles pour le contexte sino-africain. Ensuite, l’analyse se penche sur les mécanismes mis en place pour favoriser les investissements chinois miniers et pétroliers sur le continent africain avant de relever les conséquences dans les domaines sociaux et environnementaux desdits investissements. Il ressort donc que des avantages fiscaux et douaniers sont mis en place en faveur des investissements chinois en Afrique ainsi que des traités bilatéraux signés entre la Chine et de nombreux pays africains. Cependant, sur le plan social, l’on s’interroge sur la place accordée à la lutte contre la corruption et la promotion de la transparence dans l’industrie extractive africaine avec ses relations avec la Chine. L’on constate également que l’absence de transfert de technologie influe négativement sur le développement économique et technologique, la concurrence et l’emploi local du pays hôte. De même, la protection de l’environnement dans le contexte sino-africain semble être reléguée au dernier plan. L’environnement africain court donc le risque de connaître une crise comme celle de la chine causée par l’industrialisation du pays. La société civile nous apparaît donc au regard de ces effets peu glorieux des investissements chinois en Afrique dans les domaines miniers et pétroliers comme une troisième partie de cette relation qui devra être la médiatrice ou régulatrice entre les deux autres.

Les tiers dans le contentieux arbitral des investissements internationaux : de l'intervention au recours direct

L’arbitrage public international est demeuré un domaine exclusif aux États souverains jusqu’à la fin des années 50, alors que sont apparus les traités bilatéraux relatifs aux investissements (TBI). La principale caractéristique de ces TBI est sans conteste le recours direct de l’investisseur étranger en arbitrage international contre des États récalcitrants, une alternative aux tribunaux locaux souvent inefficaces. Plus récemment, en 1998, l’organe d’appel de l’OMC est allé jusqu’à accepter l’opinion d’amicus curiae dans un différend opposant des États et aujourd’hui, l’admission de ce type d’opinion est expressément prévue dans plusieurs TBI de nouvelle génération. Mais si l’investisseur bénéficie d’un recours devant une instance arbitrale neutre, il en va tout autrement pour la population locale qui se trouve souvent lésée par la présence, sur son territoire, d’investisseurs étrangers. Le droit de présenter une opinion ne peut remplacer le droit de faire valoir une réclamation. Se pose donc la question : est-ce que, dans le contexte actuel du droit de l’investissement international, des tiers (par rapport aux parties signataires de TBI et par rapport aux parties au différend) peuvent prétendre à une voie de recours direct en arbitrage international? Nous sommes d’avis qu’une telle voie de recours est actuellement possible et que le contexte de l’arbitrage relatif à l’investissement constitue un terrain fertile pour la mise en place de ce droit, étant donné la place déjà faite aux investisseurs. Nous verrons que les principales objections à l’admission de tiers à l’arbitrage international peuvent être rejetées. L’objection de l’absence du consentement des parties intéressées tombe quand on constate les nombreux cas d’arbitrage international où la portée du consentement a été étendue pour inclure des non-parties ou encore pour soumettre à l’arbitrage des matières non envisagées au départ. Par ailleurs, l’absence de qualité pour agir en droit international est un problème théorique, car les investisseurs y ont déjà accès malgré l’absence de cette qualité. Reste donc à déterminer quelle pourrait être la base d’un recours en droit substantiel international pour qu’un tiers puisse faire valoir une réclamation. Nous verrons qu’il existe des instruments juridiques et des principes internationaux dont la contravention pourrait très bien engager la responsabilité de l’État ou de l’investisseur fautif, tout comme il est possible de bien circonscrire les critères d’admissibilité des tiers à la procédure d’arbitrage international.