The construction contract bidder homogeneity assumption : an empirical test

This paper describes an empirical study to test the proposition that all construction contract bidders are homogeneous ie. they can be treated as behaving collectively in an identical (statistical) manner. Examination of previous analyses of bidding data reveals a flaw in the method of standardising bids across different size contracts and a new procedure is proposed which involves the estimation of a contract datum. Three independent sets of bidding data were then subjected to this procedure and estimates of the necessary distributional parameters obtained. These were then tested against the bidder homogeneity assumption resulting in the conclusion that the assumption may be appropriate for a three parameter log-normal shape, but not for scale and location.

Improving the estimation of probability of bidder participation in procurement auctions

Anticipating the number and identity of bidders has significant influence in many theoretical results of the auction itself and bidders’ bidding behaviour. This is because when a bidder knows in advance which specific bidders are likely competitors, this knowledge gives a company a head start when setting the bid price. However, despite these competitive implications, most previous studies have focused almost entirely on forecasting the number of bidders and only a few authors have dealt with the identity dimension qualitatively. Using a case study with immediate real-life applications, this paper develops a method for estimating every potential bidder’s probability of participating in a future auction as a function of the tender economic size removing the bias caused by the contract size opportunities distribution. This way, a bidder or auctioner will be able to estimate the likelihood of a specific group of key, previously identified bidders in a future tender.

Crowland Municipality : an act for regulating and governing auctioneers, and other persons putting up for sale, goods, wares, and merchandise to the highest or best bidder., 1854

On February 1st, 1854 an act was passed in order to regulate the sale of goods, wares and merchandise. Section I pertained to the fact that any merchant would first obtain a license. Section II deemed that no merchant should sell any wine or spirituous liquors, beer or ale within the municipality of Crowland in any less quantity than 5 gallons or less than 12 bottles in any place other than a House of Public Entertainment without having obtained a license. Section III was in regard to licensing any person who would use a billiard table which was set up for hire or gain. Section IV stated that all sums of money paid by the keepers of Houses of Public Entertainment plus the imperial duty of 2 pound would be payable to the Treasurer of the Municipality of Crowland. Section V was written regarding the continuance of the act to regulate inns, taverns, temperance houses and other Houses of Public Entertainment. Section VI specified that all recesses (not authorized to sell liquor) would pay the sum of 2 pounds. Section VII declared that Peter Benedict was appointed Revenue Inspector of the township and section VIII stated that recess-keepers who took out liquor licenses would be required to pay 6 pounds 5 shillings and for violating this they would pay a penalty. This document was written by Leonard M. Matthews, Township reeve and Alex Reid, clerk.

Improving the estimation of probability of bidder participation in procurement auctions

Anticipating the number and identity of bidders has significant influence in many theoretical results of the auction itself and bidders' bidding behaviour. This is because when a bidder knows in advance which specific bidders are likely competitors, this knowledge gives a company a head start when setting the bid price. However, despite these competitive implications, most previous studies have focused almost entirely on forecasting the number of bidders and only a few authors have dealt with the identity dimension qualitatively. Using a case study with immediate real-life applications, this paper develops a method for estimating every potential bidder's probability of participating in a future auction as a function of the tender economic size removing the bias caused by the contract size opportunities distribution. This way, a bidder or auctioner will be able to estimate the likelihood of a specific group of key, previously identified bidders in a future tender.

Efeito do hormônio 17β-estradiol na gametogênese dos órgãos de Bidder e testículos e no tecido hepático em machos de Rhinella schneideri (Anura: Bufonidae)

Pós-graduação em Biologia Animal - IBILCE

Examining the use of bid information in predicting the contractor’s performance

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the use of bid information, including both price and non-price factors in predicting the bidder’s performance. Design/methodology/approach – The practice of the industry was first reviewed. Data on bid evaluation and performance records of the successful bids were then obtained from the Hong Kong Housing Department, the largest housing provider in Hong Kong. This was followed by the development of a radial basis function (RBF) neural network based performance prediction model. Findings – It is found that public clients are more conscientious and include non-price factors in their bid evaluation equations. With the input variables used the information is available at the time of the bid and the output variable is the project performance score recorded during work in progress achieved by the successful bidder. It was found that past project performance score is the most sensitive input variable in predicting future performance. Research limitations/implications – The paper shows the inadequacy of using price alone for bid award criterion. The need for a systemic performance evaluation is also highlighted, as this information is highly instrumental for subsequent bid evaluations. The caveat for this study is that the prediction model was developed based on data obtained from one single source. Originality/value – The value of the paper is in the use of an RBF neural network as the prediction tool because it can model non-linear function. This capability avoids tedious ‘‘trial and error’’ in deciding the number of hidden layers to be used in the network model. Keywords Hong Kong, Construction industry, Neural nets, Modelling, Bid offer spreads Paper type Research paper

Predicting project performance through neural networks

Successful project delivery of construction projects depends on many factors. With regard to the construction of a facility, selecting a competent contractor for the job is paramount. As such, various approaches have been advanced to facilitate tender award decisions. Essentially, this type of decision involves the prediction of a bidderÕs performance based on information available at the tender stage. A neural network based prediction model was developed and presented in this paper. Project data for the study were obtained from the Hong Kong Housing Department. Information from the tender reports was used as input variables and performance records of the successful bidder during construction were used as output variables. It was found that the networks for the prediction of performance scores for Works gave the highest hit rate. In addition, the two most sensitive input variables toward such prediction are ‘‘Difference between Estimate’’ and ‘‘Difference between the next closest bid’’. Both input variables are price related, thus suggesting the importance of tender sufficiency for the assurance of quality production.

Did the goodwill accounting standard impose material economic consequences on Australian acquirers?

This research explores the empirical association between takeover bid premium and acquired (purchased) goodwill, and tests whether the strength of the association changes after the passage of approved accounting standard AASB 1013 in Australia in 1988. AASB 1013 mandated capitalization and amortization of acquired goodwill to the income statement over a maximum period of 20 years. We use regressions to assess how the association between bid premium and acquired goodwill varies in the pre-AASB and post-AASB 1013 periods after controlling for confounding factors. Our results show that reducing the variety of accounting policy options available to bidder management after an acquisition results in a systematic reduction in the strength of the association between premium and goodwill.

On being balanced in an unbalanced world

This paper examines the case of a procurement auction for a single project, in which the breakdown of the winning bid into its component items determines the value of payments subsequently made to bidder as the work progresses. Unbalanced bidding, or bid skewing, involves the uneven distribution of mark-up among the component items in such a way as to attempt to derive increased benefit to the unbalancer but without involving any change in the total bid. One form of unbalanced bidding for example, termed Front Loading (FL), is thought to be widespread in practice. This involves overpricing the work items that occur early in the project and underpricing the work items that occur later in the project in order to enhance the bidder's cash flow. Naturally, auctioners attempt to protect themselves from the effects of unbalancing—typically reserving the right to reject a bid that has been detected as unbalanced. As a result, models have been developed to both unbalance bids and detect unbalanced bids but virtually nothing is known of their use, success or otherwise. This is of particular concern for the detection methods as, without testing, there is no way of knowing the extent to which unbalanced bids are remaining undetected or balanced bids are being falsely detected as unbalanced. This paper reports on a simulation study aimed at demonstrating the likely effects of unbalanced bid detection models in a deterministic environment involving FL unbalancing in a Texas DOT detection setting, in which bids are deemed to be unbalanced if an item exceeds a maximum (or fails to reach a minimum) ‘cut-off’ value determined by the Texas method. A proportion of bids are automatically and maximally unbalanced over a long series of simulated contract projects and the profits and detection rates of both the balancers and unbalancers are compared. The results show that, as expected, the balanced bids are often incorrectly detected as unbalanced, with the rate of (mis)detection increasing with the proportion of FL bidders in the auction. It is also shown that, while the profit for balanced bidders remains the same irrespective of the number of FL bidders involved, the FL bidder's profit increases with the greater proportion of FL bidders present in the auction. Sensitivity tests show the results to be generally robust, with (mis)detection rates increasing further when there are fewer bidders in the auction and when more data are averaged to determine the baseline value, but being smaller or larger with increased cut-off values and increased cost and estimate variability depending on the number of FL bidders involved. The FL bidder's expected benefit from unbalancing, on the other hand, increases, when there are fewer bidders in the auction. It also increases when the cut-off rate and discount rate is increased, when there is less variability in the costs and their estimates, and when less data are used in setting the baseline values.

A multivariate approach to bidding strategies

A multivariate approach to bidding strategy is presented in comparison with previous standard approaches. An optimal formulation is derived and a method of parameter estimation proposed. A case study illustrates the derivation of optimal and other strategic mark up values against a single bidder. Concluding remarks concern extensions to multiple competitors differing levels of information, and sensitivity analysis.

An efficient eAuction potocol

A secure protocol for electronic, sealed-bid, single item auctions is presented. The protocol caters to both first and second price (Vickrey) auctions and provides full price flexibility. Both computational and communication cost are linear with the number of bidders and utilize only standard cryptographic primitives. The protocol strictly divides knowledge of the bidder's identity and their actual bids between, respectively, a registration authority and an auctioneer, who are assumed not to collude but may be separately corrupt. This assures strong bidder-anonymity, though only weak bid privacy. The protocol is structured in two phases, each involving only off-line communication. Registration, requiring the use of the public key infrastructure, is simultaneous with hash-sealed bid-commitment and generates a receipt to the bidder containing a pseudonym. This phase is followed by encrypted bid-submission. Both phases involve the registration authority acting as a communication conduit but the actual message size is quite small. It is argued that this structure guarantees non-repudiation by both the winner and the auctioneer. Second price correctness is enforced either by observing the absence of registration of the claimed second-price bid or, where registered but lower than the actual second price, is subject to cooperation by the second price bidder - presumably motivated through self-interest. The use of the registration authority in other contexts is also considered with a view to developing an architecture for efficient secure multiparty transactions

Kumarina and bidders voting in transfer schemes

Transfer schemes are an alternative means of acquiring control of a company to making a takeover bid under the provisions in Ch 6 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The recent decision Re Kumarina Resources Ltd [2013] FCA 549 overturned long-standing practice in relation to a certain type of transfer scheme. If followed, the decision would allow a “bidder” to vote at scheme meetings where the scheme consideration for the acquisition of the target shares are shares in another company, and the scheme results in a merger. But the bidder is not allowed to vote where the scheme consideration is cash. The article points out the difficulties arising from this decision and argues that it should not be followed. In providing a “no objection” statement, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has created uncertainty as to the approach it will take towards the bidders being allowed to vote at scheme meetings where the scheme consideration for the acquisition of target shares are shares in another company. The article also points out that in providing the no objection statement in Kumarina, ASIC appears to have ignored breaches of s 606(1) of the Corporations Act. There is a pressing need for ASIC to clarify its position and, in particular, whether or not it will provide a no objection statement in respect of future transfer schemes where a bidder (or its parent company) votes at the scheme meeting.

kmth price sealed-bid auctions with general independent values and equilibrium linear mark-ups

A generalised bidding model is developed to calculate a bidder’s expected profit and auctioners expected revenue/payment for both a General Independent Value and Independent Private Value (IPV) kmth price sealed-bid auction (where the mth bidder wins at the kth bid payment) using a linear (affine) mark-up function. The Common Value (CV) assumption, and highbid and lowbid symmetric and asymmetric First Price Auctions and Second Price Auctions are included as special cases. The optimal n bidder symmetric analytical results are then provided for the uniform IPV and CV models in equilibrium. Final comments concern implications, the assumptions involved and prospects for further research.