The distribution of Bidder's organ in the Bufonidae, by D. Dwight Davis.

v.20:no.15(1936)

Crowland Municipality : an act for regulating and governing auctioneers, and other persons putting up for sale, goods, wares, and merchandise to the highest or best bidder., 1854

On February 1st, 1854 an act was passed in order to regulate the sale of goods, wares and merchandise. Section I pertained to the fact that any merchant would first obtain a license. Section II deemed that no merchant should sell any wine or spirituous liquors, beer or ale within the municipality of Crowland in any less quantity than 5 gallons or less than 12 bottles in any place other than a House of Public Entertainment without having obtained a license. Section III was in regard to licensing any person who would use a billiard table which was set up for hire or gain. Section IV stated that all sums of money paid by the keepers of Houses of Public Entertainment plus the imperial duty of 2 pound would be payable to the Treasurer of the Municipality of Crowland. Section V was written regarding the continuance of the act to regulate inns, taverns, temperance houses and other Houses of Public Entertainment. Section VI specified that all recesses (not authorized to sell liquor) would pay the sum of 2 pounds. Section VII declared that Peter Benedict was appointed Revenue Inspector of the township and section VIII stated that recess-keepers who took out liquor licenses would be required to pay 6 pounds 5 shillings and for violating this they would pay a penalty. This document was written by Leonard M. Matthews, Township reeve and Alex Reid, clerk.

Improving the estimation of probability of bidder participation in procurement auctions

Anticipating the number and identity of bidders has significant influence in many theoretical results of the auction itself and bidders' bidding behaviour. This is because when a bidder knows in advance which specific bidders are likely competitors, this knowledge gives a company a head start when setting the bid price. However, despite these competitive implications, most previous studies have focused almost entirely on forecasting the number of bidders and only a few authors have dealt with the identity dimension qualitatively. Using a case study with immediate real-life applications, this paper develops a method for estimating every potential bidder's probability of participating in a future auction as a function of the tender economic size removing the bias caused by the contract size opportunities distribution. This way, a bidder or auctioner will be able to estimate the likelihood of a specific group of key, previously identified bidders in a future tender.

Efeito do hormônio 17β-estradiol na gametogênese dos órgãos de Bidder e testículos e no tecido hepático em machos de Rhinella schneideri (Anura: Bufonidae)

Pós-graduação em Biologia Animal - IBILCE

A abordagem centrada na pessoa e a psicologia do esporte : vivência de um psicólogo com jogadores e a comissão técnica de uma equipe durante os períodos de preparação e disputa da Copa São Paulo de Futebol Júnior

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

Reserve price commitments in auctions

It is well known that the optimal auction-one that maximizes the seller's expected revenue-can be implemented using a standard auction format with a suitably chosen reserve price. This reserve price is above the seller's value of retaining the object and the mechanism requires a commitment not to sell the object below the reserve. This commitment is what makes the reserve valuable to the seller. However, in practice, a reserve price commits the seller to sell the object if the reserve is reached, but does not commit her to withhold the object from sale if bidding falls short of the reserve. In this note we investigate whether reserve prices remain valuable for the seller when she may negotiate with the highest bidder if the reserve is not met. We show that the value of the reserve price may be completely undermined if the seller is a sufficiently weak bargainer. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Sequential asymmetric auctions with endogenous participation

In this paper we suggest a model of sequential auctions with endogenous participation where each bidder conjectures about the number of participants at each round. Then, after learning his value, each bidder decides whether or not to participate in the auction. In the calculation of his expected value, each bidder uses his conjectures about the number of participants for each possible subgroup. In equilibrium, the conjectured probability is compatible with the probability of staying in the auction. In our model, players face participation costs, bidders may buy as many objects as they wish and they are allowed to drop out at any round. Bidders can drop out at any time, but they cannot come back to the auction. In particular we can determine the number of participants and expected prices in equilibrium. We show that for any bidding strategy, there exists such a probability of staying in the auction. For the case of stochastically independent objects, we show that in equilibrium every bidder who decides to continue submits a bid that is equal to his value at each round. When objects are stochastically identical, we are able to show that expected prices are decreasing.

Market impact of international sporting and cultural events

We study market reaction to the announcements of the selected country hosting the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, the World Football Cup, the European Football Cup and World and Specialized Exhibitions. We generalize previous results analyzing a large number and different types of mega-events, evaluate the effects for winning and losing countries, investigate the determinants of the observed market reaction and control for the ex ante probability of a country being a successful bidder. Average abnormal returns measured at the announcement date and around the event are not significantly different from zero. Further, we find no evidence supporting that industries, that a priori were more likely to extract direct benefits from the event, observe positive significant effects. Yet, when we control for anticipation, the stock price reactions around the announcements are significant.

Procedimentos e dinâmicas inerentes ao processo dos concursos públicos e à realização de "empreitadas de obras públicas, em Portugal"

Trabalho de relatório de Estágio de natureza científica para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Civil na Área de Especialização em Edificações

A decision- theoretic model for M&A sale processes

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Double Degree in Economics and International Business from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics and Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa

On information and competition in private value auctions

How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment?We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of buyers updated expected valuations. We define the class of precision criteria following this approach and different notions of dispersion, and relate them to existing criteria of informativeness. Using supermodular precision, we obtain three results: (1) a more precise information structure yields a more efficient allocation; (2) the auctioneer provides less than the efficient level of information since more information increases bidder informational rents; (3) there is a strategic complementarity between information and competition, so that both the socially efficient and the auctioneer s optimal choice of precision increase with the number of bidders, and both converge as the number of bidders goes to infinity.

Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition

A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller extracts the entire bidder¿s expected future surplus differential between having won the first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On the one hand, first auction winner becomes ¿stronger¿, so that expected payments rise in a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively ¿weaker¿, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric bidders are presented in the appendix

The Use of Fly Ash in Highway Construction, HR-1031, 1990

In 1982 the Iowa DOT allowed a successful bidder the option of submitting materials and proportions using fly ash to produce a portland cement concrete (PCC) paving mixture to meet a specified compressive strength. The contractor, Irving F. Jensen, received approval for the use of a concrete mixture utilizing 500 lbs. of portland cement and 88 lbs. of fly ash as a replacement of 88 lbs. of portland cement. The PCC mixture was utilized on the Muscatine County US 61 relocation bypass paved as project F-61-4(32)--20-70. A Class "C" fly ash obtained from the Chillicothe electric generating plant approximately 100 miles away was used in the project. This use of fly ash in lieu of portland cement resulted in a cost savings of $64,500 and an energy savings of approximately 16 billion BTU. The compressive strength of this PCC mixture option was very comparable to concrete mixtures produced without the use of fly ash. The pavement has been performing very well. The substitution of fly ash for 15% of the cement has been allowed as a contractor's option since 1984. Due to the cost savings, it has been used in almost all Iowa PCC paving since that time.

The Use of Fly Ash in Highway Construction, HR-1031, Progress Report, 1986

In 1982 the Iowa DOT allowed a successful bidder the option of submitting materials and proportions using fly ash to produce a portland cement concrete (PCC) paving mixture to meet a specified compressive strength. The contractor, Irving F. Jensen, received approval for the use of a concrete mixture utilizing 500 lbs. of portland cement and 88 lbs. of fly ash as a replacement of 88 lbs. of portland cement. The PCC mixture was utilized on the Muscatine County US 61 relocation bypass paved as project F-61-4(32)--20-70. A Class "C" fly ash obtained from the Chillicothe electric generating plant approximately 100 miles away was used in the project. This use of fly ash in lieu of portland cement resulted in a cost savings of $64,500 and an energy savings of approximately 16 billion BTU. The compressive strength of this PCC mixture option was very comparable to concrete mixtures produced without the use of fly ash. The pavement has been performing very well. The substitution of fly ash for 15% of the cement has been allowed as a contractor's option since 1984. Due to the cost savings, it has been used in almost all Iowa PCC paving since that time.