Forecasting outcomes in tennis matches using within-match betting markets

Klaassen and Magnus (2003) provide a model of the probability of a given player winning a tennis match, with the prediction updated on a point-by-point basis. This paper provides a point-by-point comparison of that model with the probability of a given player winning the match, as implied by betting odds. The predictions implied by the betting odds match the model predictions closely, with an extremely high correlation being found between the model and the betting market. The results for both men’s and women’s matches also suggest that there is a high level of efficiency in the betting market, demonstrating that betting markets are a good predictor of the outcomes of tennis matches. The significance of service breaks and service being held is anticipated up to four points prior to the end of the game. However, the tendency of players to lose more points than would be expected after conceding a break of service is not captured instantaneously in betting odds. In contrast, there is no evidence of a biased reaction to a player winning a game on service.

Information aggregation and belief elicitation in experimental parimutuel betting markets

This paper studies the impact of belief elicitation on informational efficiency and individual behavior in experimental parimutuel betting markets. In one treatment, groups of eight participants, who possess a private signal about the eventual outcome, play a sequential betting game. The second treatment is identical, except that bettors are observed by eight other participants who submit incentivized beliefs about the winning probabilities of each outcome. In the third treatment, the same individuals make bets and assess the winning probabilities of the outcomes. Market probabilities more accurately reflect objective probabilities in the third than in the other two treatments. Submitting beliefs reduces the favorite-longshot bias and making bets improves the accuracy of elicited beliefs. A level-k framework provides some insights about why belief elicitation improves the capacity of betting markets to aggregate information. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

A betting market: Description and a theoretical explanation of bets in pelota matches

In pelota matches, bets are made between viewers through a middleman who receives 16% of the finally paid amount. In this paper a description of the way bets are made and an explanation of the existence of those markets is presented. Taking betting markets as a simplified analogy for financial markets we have searched for the explanation in a world where both sides of the market are not different in believes and preferences. Taking observations from actually made bets a preliminary analysis about the biases of those markets is presented.

Information and efficiency: goal arrival in soccer betting

An efficient market incorporates news into prices immediately and fully. Tests for efficiency in financial markets have been undermined by information leakage. We test for efficiency in sports betting markets – real-world markets where news breaks remarkably cleanly. Applying a novel identification to high-frequency data, we investigate the reaction of prices to goals scored on the ‘cusp’ of half-time. This strategy allows us to separate the market's response to major news (a goal), from its reaction to the continual flow of minor game-time news. On our evidence, prices update swiftly and fully.

Match-fixing and Money-laundering

his essay is premised on the following: a conspiracy to fix or otherwise manipulate the outcome of a sporting event for profitable purpose. That conspiracy is in turn predicated on the conspirators’ capacity to: (a) ensure that the fix takes place as pre-determined; (b) manipulate the betting markets that surround the sporting event in question; and (c) collect their winnings undetected by either the betting industry’s security systems or the attention of any national regulatory body or law enforcement agency.

Unlike many essays on this topic, this contribution does not focus on the “fix”– part (a) of the above equation. It does not seek to explain how or why a participant or sports official might facilitate a betting scam through either on-field behaviour that manipulates the outcome of a game or by presenting others with privileged inside information in advance of a game. Neither does this contribution seek to give any real insight into the second part of the above equation: how such conspirators manipulate a sports betting market by playing or laying the handicap or in-play or other offered betting odds. In fact, this contribution is not really about the mechanics of sports betting or match fixing at all; rather it is about the sometimes under explained reason why match fixing has reportedly become increasingly attractive as of late to international crime syndicates. That reason relates to the fact that given the traditional liquidity of gambling markets, sports betting can, and has long been, an attractively accessible conduit for criminal syndicates to launder the proceeds of crime. Accordingly, the term “winnings”, noted in part (c) of the above equation, takes on an altogether more nefarious meaning.

This essay’s attempt to review the possible links between match fixing in sport, gambling-related “winnings” and money laundering is presented in four parts.

First, some context will be given to what is meant by money laundering, how it is currently policed internationally and, most importantly, how the growth of online gambling presents a unique set of vulnerabilities and opportunities to launder the proceeds of crime. The globalisation of organised crime, sports betting and transnational financial services now means that money laundering opportunities have moved well beyond a flutter on the horses at your local racetrack or at the roulette table of your nearest casino. The growth of online gambling platforms means that at a click it is possible for the proceeds of crime in one jurisdiction to be placed on a betting market in another jurisdiction with the winnings drawn down and laundered in a third jurisdiction and thus the internationalisation of gambling-related money laundering threatens the integrity of sport globally.

Second, and referring back to the infamous hearings of the US Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organised Crime in Interstate Commerce of the early 1950s, (“the Kefauver Committee”), this article will begin by illustrating the long standing interest of organised crime gangs – in this instance, various Mafia families in the United States – in money laundering via sports gambling-related means.

Third, and using the seminal 2009 report “Money Laundering through the Football Sector” by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, an inter-governmental body established in 1989 to promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system), this essay seeks to assess the vulnerabilities of international sport to match fixing, as motivated in part by the associated secondary criminality of tax evasion and transnational economic crime.

The fourth and concluding parts of the essay spin from problems to possible solutions. The underlying premise here is that heretofore there has been an insularity to the way that sports organisations have both conceptualised and sought to address the match fixing threat e.g., if we (in sport) initiate player education programmes; establish integrity units; enforce codes of conduct and sanctions strictly; then our integrity or brand should be protected. This essay argues that, although these initiatives are important, the source and process of match fixing is beyond sport’s current capacity, as are the possible solutions.

Parimutuel betting under asymmetric information

This paper examines simple parimutuel betting games under asymmetric information, with particular attention to differences between markets in which bets are submitted simultaneously versus sequentially. In the simultaneous parimutuel betting market, all (symmetric and asymmetric) Bayesian-Nash equilibria are generically characterized as a function of the number of bettors and the quality of their private information. There always exists a separating equilibrium, in which all bettors follow their private signals. This equilibrium is unique if the number of bettors is sufficiently large. In the sequential framework, earlier bets have information externalities, because they may reveal private information of bettors. They also have payoff externalities, because they affect the betting odds. One effect of these externalities is that the separating equilibrium disappears if the number of betting periods is sufficiently large. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

If You Prohibit It, Bootleggers Will Come: A Mixed Method Study of the Landscape of College Basketball Betting

Over the past 25 years, betting on sports in the United States has grown dramatically with the majority of wagers being placed in illicit markets. Only 1% of an estimated 500 billion dollar sports betting industry in the United States is done legally. With this much at stake, the incentives to alter the outcome of the games are high. Corrupt gamblers can “fix” the match by offering payments to players to “throw the game,” that is, to predetermine the outcome in exchange for a payment (match fixing). This paper addresses whether match fixing in college basketball can be detected and contained with the current policies. A mixed method design will be used to identify possible “triggers” in Nevada Casino betting line movements that might warrant an investigation of cheating in the games. If match fixing can be detected at acceptable levels of probability, then current federal prohibitive law on sports betting might no longer be appropriate. Additionally, a survey will be administered to bettors in Nevada to analyze perceptions of the game’s integrity, further eroding the logic of current law.