The Bayesian view of extreme events

The Bayesian perspective of designing for the consequences of hazard is discussed. Structural engineers should be educated in Bayesian theory and its underlying philosophy, and about the centrality to the prediction problem of the predictive distribution. The primary contribution that Bayesianism can make to the debate about extreme possibilities is its clarification of the language of and thinking about risk. Frequentist methodologies are the wrong approach to the decisions that engineers need to make, decisions that involve assessments of abstract future possibilities based on incomplete and abstract information.

The management of innovation under ambiguity

De récents développements en théorie de la decision ont largement enrichi notre connaissance de la notion d'incertitude knightienne, usuellement appelée ambiguïté. Néanmoins ces dévelopement tardent à être intégrés au coeur de la théorie économique. Nous suggérons que l'analyse de phénonèmes économiques tel que l'innovation et la Recherche et Développement gagnerait à intégrer les modèles de décision en situation d'ambiguïté. Nous étayons notre propos en analysant l'allocation des droits de propriété d'une découverte. Les deux premières parties de la présentation s'inspire d'un modèle d'Aghion et de Tirole, The Management of Innovation, portant sur l'allocation des droits de propriété entre une unité de recherche et un investisseur. Il est démontré qu'un désaccord entre les agents sur la technologie de recherche affecte leur niveau d'effort, l'allocation des droits de propriété et l'allocation des revenus subséquents. Finalement, nous examinons une situation où plusieurs chercheurs sont en compétition en s'inspirant du traitement de l'incertitude de Savage. La présence d'ambuïgité affecte le comportement des agents et l'allocation des droits de propriétés de manière qui n'est pas captée en assumant l'hypothèse de risque.

Teoría de la decisión individual bajo incertidumbre: algunas conexiones con la planeación estratégica.

En éste documento nos preguntamos por la posible compatibilidad entre una herramienta estadística en particular, la Teoría Bayesiana de la Decisión individual bajo la incertidumbre, con procesos de planeación estratégica a largo plazo en cualquier tipo de organización. Esta compatibilidad la buscamos a partir de las afirmaciones de dos autores en particular: Herbert SIMON y Henry MINTZBERG.

Sets of probability distributions, independence, and convexity

This paper analyzes concepts of independence and assumptions of convexity in the theory of sets of probability distributions. The starting point is Kyburg and Pittarelli's discussion of "convex Bayesianism" (in particular their proposals concerning E-admissibility, independence, and convexity). The paper offers an organized review of the literature on independence for sets of probability distributions; new results on graphoid properties and on the justification of "strong independence" (using exchangeability) are presented. Finally, the connection between Kyburg and Pittarelli's results and recent developments on the axiomatization of non-binary preferences, and its impact on "complete" independence, are described.

Why I Am Not a Likelihoodist

Frequentist statistical methods continue to predominate in many areas of science despite prominent calls for "statistical reform." They do so in part because their main rivals, Bayesian methods, appeal to prior probability distributions that arguably lack an objective justification in typical cases. Some methodologists find a third approach called likelihoodism attractive because it avoids important objections to frequentism without appealing to prior probabilities. However, likelihoodist methods do not provide guidance for belief or action, but only assessments of data as evidence. I argue that there is no good way to use those assessments to guide beliefs or actions without appealing to prior probabilities, and that as a result likelihoodism is not a viable alternative to frequentism and Bayesianism for statistical reform efforts in science.

Skepticism and epistemic closure : two Bayesian accounts

Peer reviewed

Skepticism and epistemic closure : two Bayesian accounts

Peer reviewed