Abordagem à prática de estratégias de interação adulto-criança no contexto pré-escolar

Relatório de Estágio apresentado à Escola Superior de Educação de Paula Frassinetti para obtenção do grau de Mestre em educação Pré-Escolar

Time to Set Banking Regulation Right. CEPS Paperbacks. March 2012

Excessive leverage and risk-taking by large international banks were the main causes of the 2008-09 financial crisis and the ensuing sharp drop in economic activity and employment. World leaders and central bankers promised that it would not happen again and, to this end, undertook to overhaul banking regulation, first and foremost by rectifying Basel prudential rules. This study argues that the new Basel III Accord and the ensuing EU Capital Requirements Directive IV fail to correct the two main shortcomings of international prudential rules: 1) reliance on banks’ risk management models for the calculation of capital requirements and 2) the lack of accountability by supervisors. Accordingly, the authors propose the calculation of capital requirements without risk adjustment and creation of a system of mandated action by supervisors modelled on the US framework of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA). They also recommend that banks should be required to issue large amounts of debentures that are convertible into equity in order to strengthen market discipline on management and shareholders.

Banks and Bankers of the Keystone State: containing a complete history of the banking interests of Pennsylvania from the organization of the first bank in 1780 to the present time, together with portraits and biographical sketches of the prominent figures in a century and a quarter of financial history.

Mode of access: Internet.

This Time is Different: Causes and Consequences of British Banking Instability over the Long Run

This paper addresses three questions: (1) How severe were the episodes of banking instability
experienced by the UK over the past two centuries? (2) What have been the macroeconomic
indicators of UK banking instability? and (3) What have been the consequences of UK banking
instability for the cost of credit? Using a unique dataset of bank share prices from 1830 to 2010
to assess the stability of the UK banking system, we find that banking instability has grown more
severe since the 1970s. We also find that interest rates, inflation, lending growth, and equity
prices are consistent macroeconomic indicators of UK banking instability over the long run.
Furthermore, utilising a unique dataset of corporate-bond yields for the period 1860 to 2010, we
find that there is a significant long-run relationship between banking instability and the creditrisk
premium faced by businesses.

Identity management : strengthening one-time password authentication through usability

Usability in HCI (Human-Computer Interaction) is normally understood as the simplicity and clarity with which the interaction with a computer program or a web site is designed. Identity management systems need to provide adequate usability and should have a simple and intuitive interface. The system should not only be designed to satisfy service provider requirements but it has to consider user requirements, otherwise it will lead to inconvenience and poor usability for users when managing their identities. With poor usability and a poor user interface with regard to security, it is highly likely that the system will have poor security. The rapid growth in the number of online services leads to an increasing number of different digital identities each user needs to manage. As a result, many people feel overloaded with credentials, which in turn negatively impacts their ability to manage them securely. Passwords are perhaps the most common type of credential used today. To avoid the tedious task of remembering difficult passwords, users often behave less securely by using low entropy and weak passwords. Weak passwords and bad password habits represent security threats to online services. Some solutions have been developed to eliminate the need for users to create and manage passwords. A typical solution is based on generating one-time passwords, i.e. passwords for single session or transaction usage. Unfortunately, most of these solutions do not satisfy scalability and/or usability requirements, or they are simply insecure. In this thesis, the security and usability aspects of contemporary methods for authentication based on one-time passwords (OTP) are examined and analyzed. In addition, more scalable solutions that provide a good user experience while at the same time preserving strong security are proposed.

No variance for filed orders: Hayes v Westpac Banking Corporation [2015] QCA 260

In Hayes v Westpac Banking Corporation [2015] QCA 260 the Queensland Court of Appeal examined the relationship between rules 7 (extending and shortening time) and 667 (setting aside) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), and held that r667(1) does not enable the court to set aside or vary an order after the order has been filed. The court found that, to the extent that this conclusion was contrary to the decision in McIntosh v Linke Nominees Pty Ltd [2010] 1 Qd R 152, the decision in McIntosh was wrong and should not be followed.

Time and Location as Customer Perceived Value Drivers

Since the emergence of service marketing, the focus of service research has evolved. Currently the focus of research is shifting towards value co-created by the customer. Consequently, value creation is increasingly less fixed to a specific time or location controlled by the service provider. However, present service management models, although acknowledging customer participation and accessibility, have not considered the role of the empowered customer who may perform the service at various locations and time frames. The present study expands this scope and provides a framework for exploring customer perceived value from a temporal and spatial perspective. The framework is used to understand and analyse customer perceived value and to explore customer value profiles. It is proposed that customer perceived value can be conceptualised as a function of technical, functional, temporal and spatial value dimensions. These dimensions are suggested to have value-increasing and value-decreasing facets. This conceptualisation is empirically explored in an online banking context and it is shown that time and location are more important value dimensions relative to the technical and functional dimensions. The findings demonstrate that time and location are important not only in terms of having the possibility to choose when and where the service is performed. Customers also value an efficient and optimised use of time and a private and customised service location. The study demonstrates that time and location are not external elements that form the service context, but service value dimensions, in addition to the technical and functional dimensions. This thesis contributes to existing service management research through its framework for understanding temporal and spatial dimensions of perceived value. Practical implications of the study are that time and location need to be considered as service design elements in order to differentiate the service from other services and create additional value for customers. Also, because of increased customer control and the importance of time and location, it is increasingly relevant for service providers to provide a facilitating arena for customers to create value, rather than trying to control the value creation process. Kristina Heinonen is associated with CERS, the Center for Relationship Marketing and Service Management at the Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration

Banking in Crisis: The Rise and Fall of British Banking Stability, 1800 to the Present

Can the lessons of the past help us to prevent another banking collapse in the future? This is the first book to tell the story of the rise and fall of British banking stability in the past two centuries, and it sheds new light on why banking systems crash and the factors underpinning banking stability. John Turner shows that there were only two major banking crises in Britain during this time: the crisis of 1825–6 and the Great Crash of 2007–8. Although there were episodic bouts of instability in the interim, the banking system was crisis-free. Why was the British banking system stable for such a long time and why did the British banking system implode in 2008? In answering these questions, the book explores the long-run evolution of bank regulation, the role of the Bank of England, bank rescues and the need to hold shareholders to account.

Raiffeisenism abroad: why did German cooperative banking fail in Ireland but prosper in the Netherlands?

Why did imitations of Raiffeisen’s rural cooperative savings and loans associations work well in some European countries, but fail in others? This article considers the example of Raiffeisenism in Ireland and in the Netherlands. Raiffeisen banks arrived in both places at the same time, but had drastically different fates. In Ireland they were almost wiped out by the early 1920s, while in the Netherlands they proved to be a long-lasting institutional transplant. Raiffeisen banks were successful in the Netherlands because they operated in niche markets with few competitors, while rural financial markets in Ireland were unsegmented and populated by long- established incumbents, leaving little room for new players, whatever their institu- tional advantages. Dutch Raiffeisen banks were largely self-financing, closely integrated into the wider rural economy, and able to take advantage of economic and religious divisions in rural society. Their Irish counterparts were not.

Portuguese commercial banking: An assessment of competition in the 1960-2013 period

Strong consolidation is one of the most evident developments of banking markets around the world in recent decades. This change is raising questions on how and to what an extent competition is affected by the expansion of the largest banks. The aim of the present study is to measure the degree of competition in the Portuguese commercial banking market in the long-run, during the period ranging from1960 to 2013, by using the non-structural model developed by Panzar and Rosse. The main findings are that the Portuguese banking system, despite the legal restrictions in place, operated mostly in a market with some degree of competition and, at some points in time, presented some interesting competitive features. More recently, it has evolved into functioning as a cartel.

A Legislator under Surveillance: The Creation and Implementation of Swiss Banking Legislation 1910-1934

This paper analyses how banking regulation was introduced in Switzerland - one of the world's most prominent financial centres - which remained in place until the beginning of the twenty-first century. It shows that the law adopted on 8 November 1934 is a perfect example of capture of the regulator by the regulated. Essentially a political response in the context of the economic crisis of the 1930s, it largely reflected the interests of banking circles by limiting the intervention of the State as much as possible. The introduction of the new legislation was facilitated by the temporary weakness of Swiss banking circles, as they depended on the State to delay or prevent the collapse of many major credit institutions. They did not manage to derail the law as they had two decades earlier when they scuppered the federal bill on banks drawn up between 1914 and 1916. But this time they were better organized and more united, and intervened all the more effectively in the legislative process itself. The 1934 law is thus distinctive in that it made no structural changes to the architecture of the financial centre but merely codified its practices through flexible legislation meant to reassure the public. The law was aimed less at controlling banking activity than at keeping - thanks to skilfully calibrated political concessions - the State from having to intervene more directly in the internal management of banks or in the fixing of interest rates and the export of capital.

A study of the co-operative banking system in kerala

The co-operative credit structure in a state set up consists of 3 tiers — Primary Societies at the base, District Co-operative Banks at the middle and State Cooperative Bank at the top. But, some societies at the primary level are governed by, in addition to Co-operative Societies Act, the Banking Regulation Act. Thus they are under dual control. In addition, they are working under the direct purview of Reserve Bank of India. The scope of this study is restricted to such Primary Societies, District Co-operative Banks and State Co-operative Bank. For the evaluation of the working of Co-operative Banks, the board of directors and staff were interviewed with the help of pre-constructed and pre-tested interview schedules. However, the share holders and customers were not interviewed mainly because almost all respondents were reluctant to provide copies of an exhaustive list of share holders and non-share holder customers, for the purpose of maintaining secrecy. This being an individual work, it was found physically and financially very difficult to extend the study so as to cover the share holders and non-share holder customers. Limitations of time were also responsible for restricting this study. The period of study was restricted to 1980-'81 to 1983-'84 as the data relating to earlier periods were firstly not available from all banks and secondly the prior data was considered out of date for the purpose of the study.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

Banking Union in three steps. CEPS Commentary, 12 June 2012

As the banking crisis in the eurozone becomes even more acute, CEPS Chief Executive Karel Lannoo exhorts the EU to not lose further precious time in creating a fully functional bank union, which would entail three main steps: creating a single supervisory authority, a common deposit protection and a harmonised bank resolution and liquidation system.