Abordagem à prática de estratégias de interação adulto-criança no contexto pré-escolar

Relatório de Estágio apresentado à Escola Superior de Educação de Paula Frassinetti para obtenção do grau de Mestre em educação Pré-Escolar

Time to Set Banking Regulation Right. CEPS Paperbacks. March 2012

Excessive leverage and risk-taking by large international banks were the main causes of the 2008-09 financial crisis and the ensuing sharp drop in economic activity and employment. World leaders and central bankers promised that it would not happen again and, to this end, undertook to overhaul banking regulation, first and foremost by rectifying Basel prudential rules. This study argues that the new Basel III Accord and the ensuing EU Capital Requirements Directive IV fail to correct the two main shortcomings of international prudential rules: 1) reliance on banks’ risk management models for the calculation of capital requirements and 2) the lack of accountability by supervisors. Accordingly, the authors propose the calculation of capital requirements without risk adjustment and creation of a system of mandated action by supervisors modelled on the US framework of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA). They also recommend that banks should be required to issue large amounts of debentures that are convertible into equity in order to strengthen market discipline on management and shareholders.

Banks and Bankers of the Keystone State: containing a complete history of the banking interests of Pennsylvania from the organization of the first bank in 1780 to the present time, together with portraits and biographical sketches of the prominent figures in a century and a quarter of financial history.

Mode of access: Internet.

This Time is Different: Causes and Consequences of British Banking Instability over the Long Run

This paper addresses three questions: (1) How severe were the episodes of banking instability
experienced by the UK over the past two centuries? (2) What have been the macroeconomic
indicators of UK banking instability? and (3) What have been the consequences of UK banking
instability for the cost of credit? Using a unique dataset of bank share prices from 1830 to 2010
to assess the stability of the UK banking system, we find that banking instability has grown more
severe since the 1970s. We also find that interest rates, inflation, lending growth, and equity
prices are consistent macroeconomic indicators of UK banking instability over the long run.
Furthermore, utilising a unique dataset of corporate-bond yields for the period 1860 to 2010, we
find that there is a significant long-run relationship between banking instability and the creditrisk
premium faced by businesses.

Portuguese commercial banking: An assessment of competition in the 1960-2013 period

Strong consolidation is one of the most evident developments of banking markets around the world in recent decades. This change is raising questions on how and to what an extent competition is affected by the expansion of the largest banks. The aim of the present study is to measure the degree of competition in the Portuguese commercial banking market in the long-run, during the period ranging from1960 to 2013, by using the non-structural model developed by Panzar and Rosse. The main findings are that the Portuguese banking system, despite the legal restrictions in place, operated mostly in a market with some degree of competition and, at some points in time, presented some interesting competitive features. More recently, it has evolved into functioning as a cartel.

A model of shadow banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, ii) intermediary assets and leverage move together as in Adrian and Shin (2010), and iii) intermediaries increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce their idiosyncratic risk through diversification, as in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010). Under rational expectations, the shadow banking system is stable and improves welfare. When investors and intermediaries neglect tail risks, however, the expansion of risky lending and the concentration of risks in the intermediaries create financial fragility and fluctuations in liquidity over time.

Probabilistic maximal covering location-allocation models with constrained waiting time or queue length for congested systems

When dealing with the design of service networks, such as healthand EMS services, banking or distributed ticket selling services, thelocation of service centers has a strong influence on the congestion ateach of them, and consequently, on the quality of service. In this paper,several models are presented to consider service congestion. The firstmodel addresses the issue of the location of the least number of single--servercenters such that all the population is served within a standard distance,and nobody stands in line for a time longer than a given time--limit, or withmore than a predetermined number of other clients. We then formulateseveral maximal coverage models, with one or more servers per service center.A new heuristic is developed to solve the models and tested in a 30--nodesnetwork.

Evaluation of the integrity of human corneal epithelium maintained in organ-culture during eye banking using Corneamax®

Purpose: Mediums have been developed to conserve corneal endothelium in organ-culture during eye banking. CorneaMax® is used by 25% of Eye Bank in Europe. Only little is known about conservation of corneal epithelium with this medium during banking. Its preservation could be of interest in clinic to cure corneal disease with stem cells deficiency. Therefore, we wanted to examine the integrity of human corneal epithelium maintained in CorneaMax®. Methods: Human corneas, considered unsuitable for transplantation, were obtained from the Eye Bank in Lausanne. Average post-mortem time was 14 hours. Cornoscleral rings were maintained in organ-culture in Corneamax® at 32°C. Samples were formalin-fixed after period ranging from 0 (D0) to 35 days (D35, N=5 for each time points) and stained with H&E. Proliferation and apoptosis were evaluated by immunostaining with antibody against Ki67 and Caspase3 respectively. Results: Corneas, which were not in organ-cultured (D0), showed different morphology, including intact epithelium with 5 to 7 layers, but also completely denuded basement membrane. In two cases, at D0, the epithelium lost its adherence to the basal lamina of the cornea creating a large epithelial sheet. During the two first days, corneas and limbus area lost totally their epithelium, except for some remaining limbal basal cells. From day 2 to day 10, regeneration of the epithelium took place, starting from the limbal region in direction to the central cornea. From day 10 to day 35, corneal epithelium appeared as an atrophic epithelium, consisting of only two cell layers. Proliferation happened in the whole cornea during the 35 days of organ-culture, as shown by Ki67 positive cells. Apoptosis was rarely detected in the corneal epithelium. Conclusions: Corneas maintained in CorneaMax® showed a complete disappearance of the corneal epithelium during the two first days and a conservation of limbal basal cells in the limbal region. These remaining cells allowed a full regeneration of the tissue, leading to an atrophic epithelium, composed of only two cell layers. This atrophic epithelium could be seen in all the organ-cultured corneas during the 35 days of conservation. This study is a first step to develop medium in organ-culture in order to conserve corneal epithelial cells.

A Legislator under Surveillance: The Creation and Implementation of Swiss Banking Legislation 1910-1934

This paper analyses how banking regulation was introduced in Switzerland - one of the world's most prominent financial centres - which remained in place until the beginning of the twenty-first century. It shows that the law adopted on 8 November 1934 is a perfect example of capture of the regulator by the regulated. Essentially a political response in the context of the economic crisis of the 1930s, it largely reflected the interests of banking circles by limiting the intervention of the State as much as possible. The introduction of the new legislation was facilitated by the temporary weakness of Swiss banking circles, as they depended on the State to delay or prevent the collapse of many major credit institutions. They did not manage to derail the law as they had two decades earlier when they scuppered the federal bill on banks drawn up between 1914 and 1916. But this time they were better organized and more united, and intervened all the more effectively in the legislative process itself. The 1934 law is thus distinctive in that it made no structural changes to the architecture of the financial centre but merely codified its practices through flexible legislation meant to reassure the public. The law was aimed less at controlling banking activity than at keeping - thanks to skilfully calibrated political concessions - the State from having to intervene more directly in the internal management of banks or in the fixing of interest rates and the export of capital.

Emergence and development of a financial cluster: the evolution of Andorra’s banking deposits in the long-term, 1931-2007

This paper explores the origins of Andorra’s financial cluster. It shows that the free movement of currency, the protection of infant industry, and geographical concentration lie at the foundation of the cluster’s competitive advantage. Drawing on a new set of data, the paper also provides for the first time an estimate of the total deposits held by Andorra’s banks between 1931 and 2007. Based on this new information, the paper reaches the conclusion that the development of the cluster went through four distinct phases in which large companies, acting as leaders, played an important role in enhancing the cluster’s business capabilities.

Mobile Banking and Mobile Payments: Changing Banking Services in Finland

The purpose of this thesis is to examine how mobile banking and mobile payments services will change the banking sector in Finland, and what role non-bank companies from the IT and telecom industries will play in this process. The thesis consists of a literature review and a qualitative study. The literature review forms a comprehensive overview of mobile banking and mobile payments services. The qualitative research was conducted as a descriptive study, focusing on the views of bank and non-bank players. The results show that banks have a significant advantage over their IT and telecom rivals in regards to their service offering, financial buffer, and status as trustworthy institutions. The banks’ embrace of mobile financial services will change the Finnish banking sector into one, with a light branch network focused on sales power, and a heavy emphasis on new mobile devices providing service power regardless of time and place.

A study of the co-operative banking system in kerala

The co-operative credit structure in a state set up consists of 3 tiers — Primary Societies at the base, District Co-operative Banks at the middle and State Cooperative Bank at the top. But, some societies at the primary level are governed by, in addition to Co-operative Societies Act, the Banking Regulation Act. Thus they are under dual control. In addition, they are working under the direct purview of Reserve Bank of India. The scope of this study is restricted to such Primary Societies, District Co-operative Banks and State Co-operative Bank. For the evaluation of the working of Co-operative Banks, the board of directors and staff were interviewed with the help of pre-constructed and pre-tested interview schedules. However, the share holders and customers were not interviewed mainly because almost all respondents were reluctant to provide copies of an exhaustive list of share holders and non-share holder customers, for the purpose of maintaining secrecy. This being an individual work, it was found physically and financially very difficult to extend the study so as to cover the share holders and non-share holder customers. Limitations of time were also responsible for restricting this study. The period of study was restricted to 1980-'81 to 1983-'84 as the data relating to earlier periods were firstly not available from all banks and secondly the prior data was considered out of date for the purpose of the study.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

Banking Union in three steps. CEPS Commentary, 12 June 2012

As the banking crisis in the eurozone becomes even more acute, CEPS Chief Executive Karel Lannoo exhorts the EU to not lose further precious time in creating a fully functional bank union, which would entail three main steps: creating a single supervisory authority, a common deposit protection and a harmonised bank resolution and liquidation system.