Term loans and theories of bank liquidity.

Bibliography: p. 427-434.

A gestão do risco de liquidez e a concessão de crédito durante os períodos de crise

Dissertação de Mestrado Apresentada ao Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças, sob orientação do Doutor Mário Joel Matos Veiga de Oliveira Queirós.

Mercados interbancarios no colateralizados e información asimétrica: un mecanismo para lograr la participación plena de los bancos deficitarios cuando existen altos niveles y dispersión del riesgo de contraparte

En este trabajo se proponen dos tipos de contratos para los préstamos interbancarios con el fin de que los bancos suavicen sus choques de liquidez a través del mercado interbancario. En particular, se estudia la situación en la que los bancos con faltantes de liquidez que tienen bajo riesgo de crédito abandonan el mercado debido a que la tasa de interés es alta en relación a su fuente alterna de financiamiento. La asimetría en la información acerca del riesgo de crédito impide que los bancos con excedentes de liquidez ajusten la tasa de interés considerando el riesgo de su contraparte. Dado lo anterior, se diseñan dos contratos para los créditos interbancarios que se diferencian en las tasas de interés cobradas. Así, siempre que un banco constituya un depósito podrá obtener liquidez a bajas tasas de interés; en la situación contraria la tasa será más elevada.

Developing “Best Practices” for bankers’ pay in line with Basel III

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.

O canal de empréstimos bancários no Brasil: uma evidência microeconômica

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the existence and relevance of the bank-lending channel in Brazil. For that purpose we use balance-sheet data of Brazilian financial institutions, and adopt a methodology based in Kashyap and Stein (2000), who use twostage and panel estimations. We find that restrictive monetary policy – represented by interest rate increases – lower the sensibility of bank lending to the liquidity of its assets. In other words, increases in the interest rate lead to less binding bank liquidity restrictions. Therefore, the existence of a bank-lending channel for the transmission of monetary policy in Brazil is refused.

Bank market concentration, relationship banking and small business liquidity

This paper examines two contrasting interpretations of how bank market concentration (Market Power Hypothesis) and banking relationships (Information Hypothesis) affect three sources of small firm liquidity (cash, lines of credit and trade credit). Supportive of a market power interpretation, we find that in a highly concentrated banking market, small firms hold less cash, have less access to lines of credit, and are more likely to be financially constrained, use greater amounts of more expensive trade credit and face higher penalties for trade credit late payment. We also find support for the information hypothesis: relationship banking improves small business liquidity, particularly in a concentrated banking market, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of bank market concentration derived from market power. Our results are robust to different cash, lines of credit and trade credit measures and to alternative empirical approaches.

Central bank balance sheet concerns and credible optimal escape from the Liquidity trap

I show that when a central bank is financially independent from the treasury and has balance sheet concerns, an increase in the size or a change in the composition of the central bank's balance sheet (quantitative easing) can serve as a commitment device in a liquidity trap scenario. In particular, when the short-term interest rate is up against the zero lower bound, an open market operation by the central bank that involves purchases of long-term bonds can help mitigate the deation and a large negative output gap under a discretionary equilibrium. This is because such an open market operation provides an incentive to the central bank to keep interest rates low in future in order to avoid losses in its balance sheet.

Bank Run Risk and Optimal Reserves

We characterize the optimal reserves, and the generated probability of a bank run, as a function of the penalty imposed by the central bank, the probability of depositors’ liquidity needs, and the return on outside investment opportunities.

The impact of credit conditions on market liquidity – a case for European stock markets

The recent financial crisis has drawn the attention of researchers and regulators to the importance of liquidity for stock market stability and efficiency. The ability of market-makers and investors to provide liquidity is constrained by the willingness of financial institutions to supply funding capital. This paper sheds light on the liquidity linkages between the Central Bank, Monetary Financial Institutions and market-makers as crucial elements to the well-functioning of markets. Results suggest the existence of causality between credit conditions and stock market liquidity for the Eurozone between 2003 and 2015. Similar evidence is found for the UK during the post-crisis period. Keywords: stock

Determinants and Effects of Maturity Mismatches in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Bank Level Data

Despite the extensive work on currency mismatches, research on the determinants and effects of maturity mismatches is scarce. In this paper I show that emerging market maturity mismatches are negatively affected by capital inflows and price volatilities. Furthermore, I find that banks with low maturity mismatches are more profitable during crisis periods but less profitable otherwise. The later result implies that banks face a tradeoff between higher returns and risk, hence channeling short term capital into long term loans is caused by cronyism and implicit guarantees rather than the depth of the financial market. The positive relationship between maturity mismatches and price volatility, on the other hand, shows that the banks of countries with high exchange rate and interest rate volatilities can not, or choose not to hedge themselves. These results follow from a panel regression on a data set I constructed by merging bank level data with aggregate data. This is advantageous over traditional studies which focus only on aggregate data.

Central bank cooperation during the great recession. Bruegel Policy Contribution. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/08, 20 June 2013

During the Great Recession, central banks went well beyond their normal operations and provided liquidity in unlimited amounts, in foreign currency and to foreign banks. Central bank cooperation took the form of a swap network, and amounted to an episode of global monetary policy. However, though bank cooperation will continue to contribute to global governance, the swap network should not be made permanent and given an institutional basis to provide international lending of last resort. Swaps are a monetary policy tool and should continue to be decided on by central banks like all other monetary policy tools,to avoid impinging on their independence, which a difficult historical process has shown to be the best basis for price stability.

Ending uncertainty: recapitalisation under European Central Bank supervision. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/18, 17 December 2013

Estimates of the recapitalisation needs of the euro-area banking system vary between €50 and €600 billion. The range shows the considerable uncertainty about the quality of banks’ balance sheets and about the parameters of the forthcoming European Central Bank stress tests, including the treatment of sovereign debt and systemic risk. Uncertainty also prevails about the rules and discretion that will applyto bank recapitalisation, bank restructuring and bank resolution in 2014 and beyond. The ECB should communicate the relevant parameters of its exercise early and in detail to give time to the private sector to find solutions. The ECB should establish itself as a tough supervisor and force non-viable banks into restructuring. This could lead to short-term financial volatility, but it should be weighed against the cost of a durably weak banking system and the credibility risk to the ECB. The ECB may need to provide large amounts of liquidity to the financial system. Governments should support the ECB, accept cross-border bank mergers and substantial creditor involvement under clear bail-in rules and should be prepared to recapitalise banks. Governments should agree on the eventual creation of a single resolution mechanism with efficient and fast decision-making procedures, and which can exercise discretion where necessary. A resolution fund, even when fully built-up, needs to have a common fiscal backstop to be credible.