Bank capital and stock performance around the subprime lending risis

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Macroprudential policy, countercyclical bank capital buffers and credit supply: Evidence from the Spanish dynamic provisioning experiments

We analyze the impact of countercyclical capital buffers held by banks on the supplyof credit to firms and their subsequent performance. Spain introduced dynamicprovisioning unrelated to specific bank loan losses in 2000 and modified its formulaparameters in 2005 and 2008. In each case, individual banks were impacteddifferently. The resultant bank-specific shocks to capital buffers, coupled withcomprehensive bank-, firm-, loan-, and loan application-level data, allow us toidentify its impact on the supply of credit and on real activity. Our estimates showthat countercyclical dynamic provisioning smooths cycles in the supply of credit andin bad times upholds firm financing and performance.

The cyclical behavior of bank capital buffers in an emerging economy: size do matters

Using a panel of Colombian banks and quarterly data between 1996:1 and 2010:3, we study the relationship between short-run adjustemnts in bank capital buffers and the business cycle. We follow a partial adjustment framework and control for several variables that have been identified as important determinants of bank capital buffers in previous studies, and find that bank capital buffers vary over the business cycle. We are able to identify a negative co-movement of capital buffers and and the business cycle. However, we also find that capital buffers of small and large banks behave asymmetrically during the business cycle. While the former appear to be constant over time, once the appropriate set of control variables is used, the latter present a countercyclical behavior. Our results suggest the possible need of the implementation of regulatory policy measures in developing countries

Excess capital and bank behavior : evidence from Indonesia

The Indonesian banking sector has been restructured since Asian financial crisis and restored to soundness. The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) returned to a sound level; however, the average excess capital has become too high, while credit disbursement has remained low. This paper investigates the determinants of excess capital among Indonesian banks and its effects on credit growth during the 2000s. The results indicate that the determinants of excess capital vary widely depending on bank type. Return on equity (ROE) affects excess capital negatively among domestic banks, and the effect of non-performing loans is mixed, differing for various bank types. Excess capital affects credit growth positively, except among foreign banks.

Capital bancário e crédito: um estudo empírico no mercado brasileiro de 2003 a 2012

Este trabalho realiza um teste empírico associando capital bancário e oferta de crédito livre no mercado brasileiro de 2003 a 2012. Em uma primeira etapa, propõem-se a estimativa do capital alvo, ativamente gerenciado pelos bancos de acordo com seu risco, características idiossincráticas e expectativas; e o cálculo do capital excedente a partir deste capital alvo. Na segunda etapa, investiga-se se este capital excedente e outros indicadores de capital associam-se com o crescimento do crédito livre. Os resultados indicam relação positiva, mas economicamente modesta (contrariando a premissa da alavancagem constante), entre o crescimento do crédito livre e o capital excedente. A relação é mais forte na segunda parte do período de análise, de setembro de 2008 a dezembro de 2012. O crescimento do crédito livre e os indicadores contábeis (Patrimônio Líquido sobre Ativo Total e índice de Basileia) apresentam relação positiva neste segundo período, também com efeitos econômicos modestos. Nos bancos públicos, não se encontrou relação significante entre o capital excedente – assim como entre os outros indicadores de capital – e o crescimento do crédito livre.

Ending uncertainty: recapitalisation under European Central Bank supervision. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/18, 17 December 2013

Estimates of the recapitalisation needs of the euro-area banking system vary between €50 and €600 billion. The range shows the considerable uncertainty about the quality of banks’ balance sheets and about the parameters of the forthcoming European Central Bank stress tests, including the treatment of sovereign debt and systemic risk. Uncertainty also prevails about the rules and discretion that will applyto bank recapitalisation, bank restructuring and bank resolution in 2014 and beyond. The ECB should communicate the relevant parameters of its exercise early and in detail to give time to the private sector to find solutions. The ECB should establish itself as a tough supervisor and force non-viable banks into restructuring. This could lead to short-term financial volatility, but it should be weighed against the cost of a durably weak banking system and the credibility risk to the ECB. The ECB may need to provide large amounts of liquidity to the financial system. Governments should support the ECB, accept cross-border bank mergers and substantial creditor involvement under clear bail-in rules and should be prepared to recapitalise banks. Governments should agree on the eventual creation of a single resolution mechanism with efficient and fast decision-making procedures, and which can exercise discretion where necessary. A resolution fund, even when fully built-up, needs to have a common fiscal backstop to be credible.

Macroeconomic Dynamics of Market Risk Capital Requirements and Credit Supply Interdependence

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Three essays in risk management in financial institutions

The choice to adopt risk-sensitive measurement approaches for operational risks: the case of Advanced Measurement Approach under Basel II New Capital Accord This paper investigates the choice of the operational risk approach under Basel II requirements and whether the adoption of advanced risk measurement approaches allows banks to save capital. Among the three possible approaches for operational risk measurement, the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) is the most sophisticated and requires the use of historical loss data, the application of statistical tools, and the engagement of a highly qualified staff. Our results provide evidence that the adoption of AMA is contingent on the availability of bank resources and prior experience in risk-sensitive operational risk measurement practices. Moreover, banks that choose AMA exhibit low requirements for capital and, as a result might gain a competitive advantage compared to banks that opt for less sophisticated approaches. - Internal Risk Controls and their Impact on Bank Solvency Recent cases in financial sector showed the importance of risk management controls on risk taking and firm performance. Despite advances in the design and implementation of risk management mechanisms, there is little research on their impact on behavior and performance of firms. Based on data from a sample of 88 banks covering the period between 2004 and 2010, we provide evidence that internal risk controls impact the solvency of banks. In addition, our results show that the level of internal risk controls leads to a higher degree of solvency in banks with a major shareholder in contrast to widely-held banks. However, the relationship between internal risk controls and bank solvency is negatively affected by BHC growth strategies and external restrictions on bank activities, while the higher regulatory requirements for bank capital moderates positively this relationship. - The Impact of the Sophistication of Risk Measurement Approaches under Basel II on Bank Holding Companies Value Previous research showed the importance of external regulation on banks' behavior. Some inefficient standards may accentuate risk-taking in banks and provoke a financial crisis. Despite the growing literature on the potential effects of Basel II rules, there is little empirical research on the efficiency of risk-sensitive capital measurement approaches and their impact on bank profitability and market valuation. Based on data from a sample of 66 banks covering the period between 2008 and 2010, we provide evidence that prudential ratios computed under Basel II standards predict the value of banks. However, this relation is contingent on the degree of sophistication of risk measurement approaches that banks apply. Capital ratios are effective in predicting bank market valuation when banks adopt the advanced approaches to compute the value of their risk-weighted assets.

Pankkien vakavaraisuuskehikon uudistaminen erityisesti markkinakurin edellytysten kannalta

Tutkielman tavoitteena on kuvata ja analysoida valmisteilla olevan pankkien vakavaraisuuskehikon uudistuksen eri osa-alueita erityisesti markkinakurin edellytysten parantamisen kannalta keskittyen julkistamisvaatimuksiin. Lisäksi tutkielmassa arvioidaan koko uudistuksen pankille ja sen eri intressiryhmille aiheuttamia seurauksia, uudistuksen hyviä ja huonoja puolia sekä mahdollisia ongelmakohtia. Tutkielma perustuu Baselin pankkivalvontakomitean ja Euroopan komission toisiin ehdotuksiin vakavaraisuuskehikon uudistamiseksi. Lisää perspektiiviä antavat aiheesta kirjoitetut artikkelit ja julkaisut sekä haastattelut. Pankkien vakavaraisuuskehikon uudistus muodostuu kolmesta toisiaan täydentävästä niin kutsutusta pilarista, jotka ovat 1) vähimmäisvakavaraisuuden laskentatapa, 2) valvontaprosessin vahvistaminen ja 3) markkinakurin edellytysten parantaminen. Uudistus on vielä kesken ja sen sisältö muuttuu jatkuvasti eri tahojen kantojen kirkastuessa. Varsinaisten johtopäätösten teko on siis vielä liian aikaista, mutta jo nyt on selvää, että kyseessä on laaja ja merkittävä uudistus. Se muun muassa mahdollistaa sisäisten riskiluokitusten käytön ja kannustaa pankkeja tehokkaampaan riskien hallintaan sekä moninkertaistaa julkistettavan tiedon määrän nykyiseen säännöstöön verrattuna. Uudistuksen suuntalinjoista vallitsee kansainvälinen yhteisymmärrys, mutta monia ongelmia on vielä ratkaistava. Sen vuoksi laatijatahot ovat päättäneet antaa vielä kolmannen ehdotuksen ennen lopullista päätöstä. Suurimpia huolenaiheita ovat tällä hetkellä yhdenmukainen kansainvälinen täytäntöönpano ja säännösten tasapuolinen noudattaminen. Myös kehikon yksityiskohtaisuus arveluttaa monia.

Essais sur les frictions financières dans les modèles d'équilibre général dynamique

Cette thèse examine les effets des imperfections des marchés financiers sur la macroéconomie. Plus particulièrement, elle se penche sur les conséquences de la faillite dans les contrats financiers dans une perspective d'équilibre général dynamique. Le premier papier construit un modèle qui utilise l'avantage comparatif des banques dans la gestion des situations de détresse financière pour expliquer le choix des firmes entre les prêts bancaires et les prêts du marché financier. Le modèle réussit à expliquer pourquoi les firmes plus petites préfèrent le financement bancaire et pourquoi les prêts bancaires sont plus répandus en Europe. Le premier fait est expliqué par le lien négatif entre la valeur nette de l'entreprise et la probabilité de faire faillite. Le deuxième fait s'explique par le coût fixe d'émission de bons plus élevé en Europe. Le deuxième papier examine l'interaction entre les contraintes de financement affectant les ménages et les firmes. Une interaction positive pourrait amplifier et augmenter la persistance de l'effet d'un choc agrégé sur l'économie. Je construis un nouveau modèle qui contient des primes de financement externes pour les firmes et les ménages. Dans le modèle de base avec prix et salaires flexibles, j'obtiens une faible interaction négative entre les coûts de financement des firmes et des ménages. Le facteur clé qui explique ce résultat est l'effet du changement contre cyclique du coût de financement des ménages sur leur offre de travail et leur demande de prêts. Dans une période d'expansion, cet effet augmente les taux d'intérêt, réduit l'investissement et augmente le coût de financement des entreprises. Le troisième papier ajoute les contraintes de financement des banques dans un modèle macroéconomiques avec des prêts hypothécaires et des fluctuations dans les prix de l'immobilier. Les banques dans le modèle ne peuvent pas complètement diversifier leurs prêts, ce qui génère un lien entre les risques de faillite des ménages et des banques. Il y a deux effets contraires des cycles économiques qui affectent la prime de financement externe de la banque. Premièrement, il y a un lien positif entre le risque de faillite des banques et des emprunteurs qui contribue à rendre le coût de financement externe des banques contre cyclique. Deuxiément, le lissage de la consommation par les ménages rend la proportion de financement externe des banques pro cyclique, ce qui tend à rendre le coût de financement bancaire pro cyclique. En combinant ces deux effets, le modèle peut reproduire des profits bancaires et des ratios d'endettement bancaires pro cycliques comme dans les données, mais pour des chocs non-financiers les frictions de financement bancaire dans le modèle n'ont pas un effet quantitativement significatif sur les principales variables agrégées comme la consommation ou l'investissement.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

European deposit insurance: financing the transition. CEPS Commentary, 6 September 2012

Arguing that the planned move to put the ECB in charge of banking supervision would be incomplete without a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA), Daniel Gros and Dirk Schoenmaker spell out in a new CEPS Commentary some underlying principles to guide a gradual transition under which only future risks would be shared while past losses would remain at the national level. They show that ultimately such a new institution would serve as a genuine source of confidence in the European banking system.

The roadmap to banking union: a call for consistency. CEPS Commentary, 30 August 2012

The proposal to move to a full banking union in the eurozone means a radical regime shift for the EU, since the European Central Bank will supervise the eurozone banks and effectively end ‘home country rule’. But how this is implemented raises a number of questions and needs close monitoring, explains CEPS CEO Karel Lannoo in this new Commentary.