Basel III new capital requirements, impacts and bank behavior

For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of capital adequacy on the risk profile of banks, as shareholders could increase the riskiness of the assets (qualitative effect), crowding-out the effect of reduced leverage (volume effect). Some shareholders might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they may lack the power to do so. Considering only ”powerful” shareholders, definitive conclusions were drawn but with constant ownership profile. In this paper I investigate whether there is a significant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory capital shocks and, if so, will the banking system be in the hands of more “desired” shareholders. I find that ownership profile responds to a regulatory shock, changing the risk appetite of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the government in the ownership of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional shareholders and free float. I claim that these new shareholders may not the desired ones, given the objective of the regulatory change, as they are associated with a preference for more leverage. One possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to contain idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that contains systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on ownership. Another insight can be drawn from the tests: supervisors should be aware of significant ownership movements that cause the crowding-out.

Excess capital and bank behavior : evidence from Indonesia

The Indonesian banking sector has been restructured since Asian financial crisis and restored to soundness. The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) returned to a sound level; however, the average excess capital has become too high, while credit disbursement has remained low. This paper investigates the determinants of excess capital among Indonesian banks and its effects on credit growth during the 2000s. The results indicate that the determinants of excess capital vary widely depending on bank type. Return on equity (ROE) affects excess capital negatively among domestic banks, and the effect of non-performing loans is mixed, differing for various bank types. Excess capital affects credit growth positively, except among foreign banks.

Especulative (sic) attack on exchange rate target zone regime : the uncertainty case

We present a continuous time target zone model of speculative attacks. Contrary to most of the literature that considers the certainty case, i.e., agents know for sure the Central Bank behavior in the future, we build uncertainty into the madel in two different ways. First, we consider the case in whicb the leveI of reserves at which the central bank lets the regime collapse is uncertain. Alternatively, we ana1ize the case in which, with some probability, the government may cbange its policy reducing the initially positive trend in domestic credito In both cases, contrary to the case of a fixed exchange rate regime, speculators face a cost of launching a tentative attack that may not succeed. Such cost induces a delay and may even prevent its occurrence. At the time of the tentative attack, the exchange rate moves either discretely up, if the attack succeeds, or down, if it fails. The remlts are consistent with the fact that, typically, an attack involves substantial profits and losses for the speculators. In particular, if agents believed that the government will control fiscal imbalances in the future, or alternatively, if they believe the trend in domestic credit to be temporary, the attack is postponed even in the presence of a signal of an imminent collapse. Finally, we aIso show that the timing of a speculative attack increases with the width of the target zone.

Monetary policy and risk taking. Bruegel Working Paper 2010/00, February 2010

We assess, through VAR evidence, the effects of monetary policy on banks’ risk exposure and find the presence of a risk-taking channel. A model combining fragile banks prone to risk mis-incentives and credit constrained firms, whose collateral fluctuations generate a balance sheet channel, is used to rationalize the evidence. A monetary expansion increases bank leverage. With two consequences: on the one side this exacerbates risk exposure; on the other, the risk spiral depresses output, therefore dampening the conventional amplification effect of the financial accelerator. Keywords: monetary policy, bank behavior, leverage, financial accelerator.

Media bias and central bank response. Evidence from the nominal exchange rate behavior in Colombia

Since 1991 Colombia has had a market-determined Peso - US Dollar Nominal Exchange Rate (NER), after more than 20 years of controlled and multiple exchange rates. The behavior (revaluation / devaluation) of the NER is constantly reported in news, editorials and op-eds of major newspapers of the nation with particular attention to revaluation. The uneven reporting of revaluation episodes can be explained by the existence of an interest group particulary affected by revaluation, looking to increase awareness and sympathy for help from public institutions. Using the number of news and op-eds from a major Colombian newspaper, it is shown that there is an over-reporting of revaluation episodes in contrast to devaluation ones. Secondly, using text analysis upon the content of the news, it is also shown that the words devaluation and revaluation are far apart in the distribution of words within the news; and revaluation is highly correlated with words related to: public institutions, exporters and the need of assistance. Finally it is also shown that the probability of the central bank buying US dollars to lessen revaluation effects increases with the number of news; even though the central bank allegedly intervenes in the exchange rate market only to tame volatility or accumulate international reserves.

The cyclical behavior of bank capital buffers in an emerging economy: size do matters

Using a panel of Colombian banks and quarterly data between 1996:1 and 2010:3, we study the relationship between short-run adjustemnts in bank capital buffers and the business cycle. We follow a partial adjustment framework and control for several variables that have been identified as important determinants of bank capital buffers in previous studies, and find that bank capital buffers vary over the business cycle. We are able to identify a negative co-movement of capital buffers and and the business cycle. However, we also find that capital buffers of small and large banks behave asymmetrically during the business cycle. While the former appear to be constant over time, once the appropriate set of control variables is used, the latter present a countercyclical behavior. Our results suggest the possible need of the implementation of regulatory policy measures in developing countries

A Novel Behavior Observed in Humpback Whales on Wintering Grounds at Abrolhos Bank (Brazil)

We describe a novel behavior, termed “tail-up,” observed in humpback whales (Megaptera novaeangliae) on wintering grounds on Abrolhos Bank, Brazil. The behavior involves the whale positioned vertically in the water column with its tail in the air. Wirh the exception of calves, tail-up was observed in all social classes, and its frequency increased through the end of the season. Tail-ups were recorded in 144 (5.8%) of 2,465 groups of whales observed from a shore station, and in 297 (14.9%) of 1,996 groups observed from vessel surveys; biases in each method suggest that the true frequency lies between these sources. One hundred and fifty-two hours of continuous sampling showed that the duration of tail-up events lasted from a few seconds to 12 min and was longest in groups comprised of a single adult. The maximum duration of a recorded period that consistently included tail-up was 10 h; however, some individuals were observed to engage in the behavior at night and for four consecutive days. Tail-up movement speed did not vary by social class; however, it varied according to wind direction and speed. The characteristics of tail-up that we observed showed that it differed from the descriptions of similar behaviors in other cetacean species. The function of tail-up is unknown, but we suggest that it may be a multifunctional behavior.

Building bank brands:how leadership behavior influences employee commitment

Front line employees are critical to service brand success, as their performance brings brand promises to life. Banking employees, like others, must remain committed to their employers, to live the brand, particularly during periods of economic uncertainty and customer frustration. Employees' commitment influences their brand adoption and brand-supporting behavior during service encounters. Effective leadership fosters employee commitment and brand supporting behaviors. This study examines the nature of employee commitment in banking, distinguishing between affective, continuance and normative commitment. The study explores bank leaders, examining whether initiating structure leader behavior or considerate leader behavior is most effective in encouraging employee commitment. Data from a sample of 438 employees in a leading Irish bank reveals the optimal leadership style for employee commitment. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.

Human immunodeficiency virus test-seeking blood donors in a large blood bank in Sao Paulo, Brazil

BACKGROUND: Persons with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) risk behaviors are excluded from donation to reduce the risk of transfusion-transmitted infection. Persons donating to be tested for HIV may therefore deny risk behaviors. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: A random sample of donors completed a survey on motivations, knowledge, and attitudes on the screening process. Donors were considered test seekers if they agreed with two statements ""I think that blood donation is a good, fast, and anonymous way to get my blood tested"" and ""I donate to get my test results."" This study was conducted from June to November 2006 at the largest blood bank in Sao Paulo, Brazil. RESULTS: Of 3061 participants, 208 (7%) were test seekers. They tended to be male and had a lower educational level. They were more likely to have incorrect knowledge about blood safety (e.g., not knowing that a unit can test antibody negative and still transmit infection, 60% vs. 42%, p = 0.02), express dissatisfaction with screening questions (e.g., feeling that important questions were not asked, 14% vs. 5%, p < 0.01), and concur that donors do not answer questions truthfully (e.g., donors have more sexual partners than they admit, 29% vs. 18%, p < 0.01). Test seekers were more likely to believe that it is acceptable to donate blood to get tested for HIV (41% vs. 10%, p < 0.01). CONCLUSIONS: Test-seeking motivation, coupled with low knowledge of window period risk, is counter to improving blood safety and to donor prevention needs. Donor education needs to be improved along with availability of appropriate HIV counseling and testing.

How does ownership structure invfluence bank risk? Analyzing the role of managerial incentives

This paper analyzes how ownership concentration and managerial incentives influences bank risk for a large sample of US banks over the period 1997-2007. Using 2SLS simultaneous equations models, we show that ownership concentration has a positive total effect on bank risk. This is the result of a positive direct effect, which reflects monitoring and opportunistic behavior, and a negative indirect effect, which works through the design of managerial incentive contracts and reflects shareholder preferences toward risk. Large shareholders reduce bank risk by reducing the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (Vega) and by increasing the CEO pay-performance sensitivity (Delta). In addition, we show that the direct and indirect effect of ownership concentration on bank risk depends on the type of the largest shareholder (a family, a bank, a corporation or an institutional investor), as well as, on the total shareholding held by each type as a group. Our results suggest that the positive relation between ownership concentration and risk is not the result of preferences towards more risk. Rather, they point at opportunistic behavior of large shareholders.

What do outside experts bring to a committee? Evidence from the Bank of England

We test whether outside experts have information not available to insiders by usingthe voting record of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. Memberswith more private information should vote more often against conventional wisdom,which we measure as the average belief of market economists about future interest rates. We find evidence that external members indeed have information notavailable to internals, but also use a quasi-natural experiment to show they mayexaggerate their expertise to obtain reappointment. This implies that an optimalcommittee, even outside monetary policy, should potentially include outsiders, butneeds to manage career concerns.

Fertility differentials of Jewish women living in Israel and the West Bank

Israël est l’un des pays développés les plus féconds dans le monde et maintient un taux de fécondité stable depuis 1995. Il a échappé à la chute spectaculaire de la fécondité qui a été observée dans la plupart des pays occidentaux. Le taux de fécondité était de 2,96 enfants par femme en 2009 (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 2010, tableau 3.14). Le maintien d’une si forte fécondité pourrait être dû à l’immigration et à la “guerre démographique” qui sévit entre les différentes communautés vivant dans le pays (Sardon, 2006). Toutefois, on observe une différence significative entre les niveaux de fécondité des juifs d’Israël et de Cisjordanie depuis plusieurs années. Les études qui portent sur la fécondité en Israël sont faites au niveau national, ce qui ne fournit aucune explication sur cette différence. Pour ces raisons, l’étude de la fécondité en Israël mérite une attention particulière. Ce projet vise à identifier les différents facteurs qui ont une incidence sur la fécondité des femmes juives vivant en Israël et en Cisjordanie. Il contribuera à une meilleure compréhension des comportements liés à la fécondité de la population juive de la Cisjordanie et peut fournir des indices sur les mécanismes complexes qui régissent les relations entre Juifs et Arabes dans les territoires occupés. Grâce aux données recueillies dans l’Enquête sociale générale de 2004 d’Israël,des analyses descriptives et explicatives ont été produites. Dans un premier temps, les facteurs qui ont un impact sur la fécondité dans chaque région ont été déterminés et par la suite, une analyse de l’importance de ces facteur sur la fécondité a été produite. Le nombre d’enfants nés de femmes âgées de 20 à 55 ans constitue la variable d’intérêt et les variables explicatives retenues sont les suivantes: religiosité, éducation, revenu familial mensuel, statut d’emploi, pays d’origine, âge et état matrimonial. Cette étude a montré que les femmes juives qui résident en Cisjordanie ont un nombre prévu d’enfants de 13% supérieur à celui des femmes juives qui résident en Israël lorsque l’on contrôle toutes les variables. Il est notamment montré que la religion joue un rôle important dans l’explication de la forte fécondité des femmes juives dans les deux régions, mais son impact est plus important en Israël. L’éducation joue également un rôle important dans la réduction du nombre prévu d’enfants, en particulier en Cisjordanie. Tous ces facteurs contribuent à expliquer les différents niveaux de fécondité dans les deux régions, mais l’étude montre que ces facteurs ne permettent pas une explication exhaustive de la forte fécondité en Israël et en Cisjordanie. D’autres forces qui ne sont pas mesurables doivent avoir une incidence sur la fécondité telles que le nationalisme ou la laïcisation, par exemple.

School management and sexual behavior of teenagers

This paper asks whether school based management may help reducing risky sexual behavior of teenagers. For this purpose we use student level data from Bogot´a to identify students from Concession School (CS), who are enrolled in public education system with a more school management autonomy at school level, and to compare them with those students at the traditional public education system. We use propensity score matching methods to have a comparable sample between pupils at CS and traditional schools. Our results show that on average the behavior of students from CS do not have a sexual behavior that differs from those in traditional public schools except for boys in CS who have a lower probability of being sexual active. However, there are important differences when heterogeneity is considered. For example we find that CS where girls per boys ratio is higher have lower teenage pregnancy rates than public schools with also high girls per boys ratios. We also find that teachers’ human capital, teacher-pupil ratio or whether school offers sexual education are also related to statistically significant differences between CS and traditional public schools.

House price dynamics and bank herding: European empirical evidence

This paper investigates the behavior of residential property and examines the linkages between house price dynamics and bank herding behavior. The analysis presents evidence that irrational behaviour may have played a significant role in several countries, including; United Kingdom, Spain, Denmark, Sweden and Ireland. In addition, we also provide evidence indicative of herding behaviour in the European residential mortgage loan market. Granger Causality tests indicate that non-fundamentally justified prices dynamics contributed to herding by lenders and that this behaviour was a response by the banks as a group to common information on residential property assets. In contrast, in Germany, Portugal and Austria, residential property prices were largely explained by fundamentals. Furthermore, these countries show no evidence of either irrational price bubbles or herd behaviour in the mortgage market. Granger Causality tests indicate that both variables are independent.

Bank dividends and signaling to information-sensitive depositors

Esta tese investiga se a composição do endividamento dos bancos afeta sua política de dividendos. Identificou-se que investidores sensíveis a informações (investidores institucionais) são alvos de sinalização através de dividendos por parte dos bancos. Utilizando uma base de dados exclusiva de bancos brasileiros, foi possível identificar vários tipos de credores, especificamente, investidores institucionais, empresas não financeiras e pessoas físicas, que são alvos potenciais de sinalização por dividendos. Adicionalmente, a existência de vários bancos de capital fechado, controlados e geridos por um pequeno grupo de acionistas, em que a sinalização direcionada a acionistas é implausível, permite inferir que bancos que utilizam mais fundos de investidores sensíveis a informações (institucionais) pagam mais dividendos, controlando por diversas características. Durante a crise financeira, este comportamento foi ainda mais pronunciado. Esta relação reforça o papel dos dividendos como uma forma custosa e crível de comunicar sobre a qualidade dos ativos dos bancos. A hipótese de que os dividendos podem ser utilizados como uma forma de expropriação dos depositantes por parte dos acionistas é refutada, uma vez que, se fosse esse o caso, observar-se-ia esse maiores dividendos em bancos com depositantes menos sensíveis a informação. Além disso, foi verificada uma relação negativa entre o pagamento de dividendos e o custo de captação (juros pagos em certificados de depósito bancário) e uma relação positiva de dividendos com o tamanho e com os lucros passados, e que os bancos de capital fechado pagam mais dividendos do que os de capital aberto, uma descoberta que também se alinha com a ideia de que os depositantes seriam os alvos da sinalização por dividendos. Finalmente, encontrou-se também uma relação negativa entre dividendos e adequação de capital do bancos, o que indica que pressões regulatórias podem induzir os bancos a pagar menos dividendos e que o pagamento de dividendos é negativamente relacionado com o crescimento da carteira de crédito, o que é consistente com a ideia de que os bancos com maiores oportunidades de investimento retêm seus lucros para aumentar seu patrimônio líquido e sua capacidade de conceder crédito.