Financial analysis : short-term funding needs of the Bank Insurance Fund and the Resolution Trust Corporation /

"August 1991".

"Public on the outside, private on the inside": the organizational hybridization, sense of belonging and identity strategies of the employees of a public unemployment insurance fund in Switzerland

A number of studies show that New Public Management reforms have altered the current identity benchmarks of public officials, particularly by hybridizing values or management practices. However, existing studies have largely glossed over the sense of belonging of officials when their organization straddles the concerns of public service and private enterprise, so that the boundary between public and private sector is blurred. The purpose of this article is precisely to explore this sense of belonging in the context of organizational hybridization. It does so by drawing on the results of research conducted among the employees of a public unemployment insurance fund in Switzerland. On the one hand, the analysis shows how much their markers of belonging are hybrid, multiple and constructed in negative terms (with regard to the State), while indicating that the working practices of the employees point to an identity that is nevertheless closely bound with the public sector. On the other hand, the analysis shows that the organization plays strategically with its State status, by exploiting either its private or public identity in line with the needs related to its external image. The article concludes with a discussion of the results highlighting the strategic functionality of the hybrid identity of the actors.

Ohio State workmen's compensation insurance fund manual: premium rules and rates.

Vols. for 1923-61 include financial statements of the Ohio State insurance fund for the preceding calendar year.

Opinion on the reports of the recent investigation of the New York State Insurance Fund /

Mode of access: Internet.

Tentative drafts of Workmen's Compensation Act. Act creating bureau to enforce workmen's compensation act. Act creating state insurance fund. Act regulating policies of insurance against liability arising under article III of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Act authorizing the creation of mutual liability insurance associations. Act exempting farm and domestic employees from Workmen's Compensation Act. Joint resolution amending the constitution of Pennsylvania.

Mode of access: Internet.

Management audit : regulation of grain dealers and warehousemen and the administration of the Grain Insurance Fund : Illinois Department of Agriculture and the Grain Insurance Corporation.

"The audit was conducted pursuant to Legislative Audit Commission Resolution Number 125, which was adopted December 11, 2002. This audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and the audit standards promulgated by the Office of the Auditor General at 74 Ill. Adm. Code 420.310. This audit report is transmitted in conformance with Section 3-14 of the Illinois State Auditing Act."--Cover letter.

Ohio state insurance fund actuarial survey. Report, dated November 26, 1934, to Governor's Investigating Committee, Workmen's Compensation Law.

Mode of access: Internet.

Ohio state workmen's compensation insurance fund manual.

Ohio state workmen's compensation insurance fund manual.

Ohio State Workmen's Compensation Insurance Fund Manual. Premium Rules and Rates

Title and Subtitle Vary: 1916-1936, the Ohio State Insurance Manual; 1937-1950, Ohio State Workmen's Compensation Insurance Fund Manual

The changing business of banking : a study of failed banks from 1987 to 1992.

"June 1994"--Cover.

A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update. CEPS Policy Brief No. 283, 11 September 2012

Cross-border banking is currently not stable in Europe. Cross-border banks need a European safety net. Moreover, a truly integrated European level banking system may help to break the diabolical loop between the solvency of the domestic banking system and the fiscal standing of the national sovereign. This policy paper first sketches the building blocks of a banking union. Importantly, a new European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA) should start simultaneously with the ECB assuming supervisory powers. A combination of European supervision and local resolution cannot work because it is not ‘incentive compatible’. Next, this paper proposes a transition period to gradually phase in the European deposit insurance coverage. Finally, we calculate that a European Deposit Insurance Fund would amount to about €30-50 billion for the 75 euro area banks that were subject to the EBA stress tests. This Fund could be created over a period of time through risk-based deposit insurance premiums levied on these banks. Once up and running, the Fund would then turn into a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund to also deal with the resolution of one or more of these European banks.

Completing the Banking Union: Deposit Insurance. CEPS Policy Brief No. 335, 3 December 2015

It is generally agreed that a Banking Union should have common or ‘single’ institutions responsible for carrying out three basic functions: supervision, resolution and deposit insurance. So far, however, agreement has been reached in the EU on only the first two of these functions. The Commission has now presented its proposal on how to complete the Banking Union with a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). It is an innovative and courageous proposal. It is courageous because it will clearly be very controversial in a number of member states (especially Germany) and it is innovative because it proposes a three-stage process, starting with re-insurance, then switching to co-insurance and finally to full direct insurance of deposits via a ‘single’ Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). This final stage should be reached in 2024, which is also the date at which the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) will become the only source of financing for bank resolution. The Commission’s proposal calls for integrating the decision-making for EDIS into the decision-making entity for the SRF, namely the existing Single Resolution Board (SRB). This makes sense if one views resolution and deposit insurance as two highly interlinked dimensions of dealing with banks in trouble. In this view the two dimensions should be bundled into one institution – and one suspects that over time the two funds (the SRF and the DIF) could be merged into one. This Policy Brief argues that re-insurance should not be considered as a transitory phase, but could also provide a solution for the long run. ‘Experience rating’ could be used to ensure a proper pricing of risk and to protect the interests of the depositors in countries with safer banking systems. Moreover, EDIS should have a decision-making structure separate from and independent of the SRM, since it has mainly a macroeconomic function.

Self-selection and risk selection on the Swiss health insurance market

Abstract This thesis presents three empirical studies in the field of health insurance in Switzerland. First we investigate the link between health insurance coverage and health care expenditures. We use claims data for over 60 000 adult individuals covered by a major Swiss Health Insurance Fund, followed for four years; the data show a strong positive correlation between coverage and expenditures. Two methods are developed and estimated in order to separate selection effects (due to individual choice of coverage) and incentive effects ("ex post moral hazard"). The first method uses the comparison between inpatient and outpatient expenditures to identify both effects and we conclude that both selection and incentive effects are significantly present in our data. The second method is based on a structural model of joint demand of health care and health insurance and makes the most of the change in the marginal cost of health care to identify selection and incentive effects. We conclude that the correlation between insurance coverage and health care expenditures may be decomposed into the two effects: 75% may be attributed to selection, and 25 % to incentive effects. Moreover, we estimate that a decrease in the coinsurance rate from 100% to 10% increases the marginal demand for health care by about 90% and from 100% to 0% by about 150%. Secondly, having shown that selection and incentive effects exist in the Swiss health insurance market, we present the consequence of this result in the context of risk adjustment. We show that if individuals choose their insurance coverage in function of their health status (selection effect), the optimal compensations should be function of the se- lection and incentive effects. Therefore, a risk adjustment mechanism which ignores these effects, as it is the case presently in Switzerland, will miss his main goal to eliminate incentives for sickness funds to select risks. Using a simplified model, we show that the optimal compensations have to take into account the distribution of risks through the insurance plans in case of self-selection in order to avoid incentives to select risks.Then, we apply our propositions to Swiss data and propose a simple econometric procedure to control for self-selection in the estimation of the risk adjustment formula in order to compute the optimal compensations.

Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro

A reação da autoridade bancária frente a uma crise é de fundamental importância para a sua contenção. No Brasil, durante a crise do subprime, em 2008, observou-se a ocorrência de uma crise de liquidez em alguns bancos que levou o Banco Central a autorizar uma linha especial de captação de depósitos com limite muito superior ao habitual, denominado Depósito a Prazo com Garantia Especial (DPGE). Estes fatos propiciaram uma oportunidade de observar a reação dos depositantes frente a um choque exógeno ao sistema financeiro nacional para, em seguida, explorar a captação exógena de recursos devido à ampliação nos limites dos depósitos assegurados, com cobertura do Fundo Garantidor de Crédito (FGC). Além disso, analisou-se o efeito do DPGE sobre o crédito, considerando que depósitos assegurados e não-assegurados não são substitutos perfeitos e um aumento na oferta de depósitos assegurados deveria aumentar a oferta de crédito do mercado, como um todo. A estratégia empírica utilizada permitiu reconhecer os bancos emissores de DPGE, separando-os por outros fatores relacionados aos fundamentos bancários (tamanho, liquidez, qualidade dos ativos e retorno) e analisar os efeitos do DPGE nas taxas de juros praticadas na captação de depósitos a prazo, em geral. A base de dados utilizada também permitiu observar o comportamento desses bancos e a estratégia por eles utilizada na origem e destinação de tais recursos. Tomados em conjunto, os resultados encontrados são consistentes com a ideia de que depositantes migram seus recursos para a segurança durante a crise, na chamada “fuga para a qualidade” e retornam quando lhes dão a garantia necessária. Também é coerente com a teoria que diz que a substituição imperfeita entre depósitos assegurados e depósitos não-assegurados afeta a restrição de financiamentos dos bancos. O resultado deste estudo revela a importância da atuação da autoridade reguladora frente a situações críticas, bem como os efeitos no mercado causados pela permanência de um produto desenhado para uma situação específica.

Bank bonus compromise bodes ill for the Single Supervisory Mechanism. CEPS Commentary, 8 March 2013

The European Parliament has probably won a Pyrrhic victory with its position on bank bonuses, argues CEPS CEO Karel Lannoo in this new Commentary. In return, EU member states got what they wanted with the new Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV): no binding leverage ratio; mortgage risk weightings and capital add-ons to be determined by member states; and no obligatory consolidated capital position for bank-insurance companies. In other words, Banking Union will start out with capital rules that are more like Emmental cheese than a single rulebook. This is a huge encumbrance for a well-functioning Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), and makes a single resolution mechanism impossible.