Do Escudo ao Euro: a mudança no Banco Central

A mudança é constante dos nossos dias, tornando-se uma necessidade imperativa nas organizações para ultrapassar os desafios de uma sociedade em permanente evolução. A adesão de Portugal à União Europeia, e consequentemente ao Eurosistema e Sistema Europeu de Bancos Centrais, culminou com a adopção de uma nova moeda — o Euro. Toda a evolução experimentada neste longo caminho provocou uma enorme transformação no Banco Central. Pretende esta dissertação apresentar algumas perspectivas de mudança organizacional e também sistematizar a transformação ocorrida no Banco de Portugal ao longo da última década. / Change is constant in our days, making it an imperative need in organizations to overcome the challenges of an evolving society. Portugal's accession to the European Union and consequently the Eurosystem and the European System of Central Banks, led to the adoption of a new currency — the Euro. All developments experienced in this long road led to a huge transformation in the Central Bank. This thesis aims to present perspectives on organizational change, and also standardize the transformation in the Bank of Portugal over the last decade.

Um estudo sobre os modelos operacionais dos bancos centrais autônomos no mundo

O projeto de lei do Senado de Nº 317 de 2003, que estabelece a autonomia operacional do Banco Central do Brasil, é um grande passo em direção a uma modernização institucional do país. Sendo essa autonomia aprovada, uma questão crucial que se segue é como será o desenho institucional do Banco Central do Brasil. Quais áreas estarão ligadas ao BACEN e quais áreas estarão fora? Quem determinará a meta? Quem serão os membros do COPOM? Essas são apenas algumas questões que surgem quando se fala em autonomia do canco central. Existem diversos exemplos de bancos centrais autônomos no mundo e esse estudo irá analisar como esses cancos centrais operam, para que futuramente se possa tentar desenhar um arranjo institucional que se adapte as necessidades brasileiras.

Informe que el Grupo de Trabajo de Bancos Centrales sobre Régimen de Pagos Multilaterales eleva al Comité de Comercio de la CEPAL = Report submitted to the ECLA Trade Committee by the Central Banks Working Group on a Multilateral Payments System

Incluye Bibliografía

Desenho institucional de bancos centrais: teorias e o caso brasileiro

Este trabalho buscou contribuir para o debate sobre reformas institucionais de bancos centrais de duas maneiras. Primeiro, foi feito um modelo teórico único que permitiu derivar diversas contribuições da vasta literatura sobre o assunto. Em seguida, analisamos as implicações práticas destes resultados, considerando, em particular, o caso do Banco Central do Brasil.

When do central banks prefer to intervene secretly?

Central banks often intervene secretly in the foreign exchange market. This secrecy seems to be at odds with the signalling channel. In this article we will analyse when a central bank intervening in the foreign exchange rate market purely through the signalling channel would prefer to act secretly or publicly. By using a microstructure model, we will show that the consistency of the intervention with fundamentals, the volume of noise trading, the weight given to the effectiveness of intervention and the degree of superior information held by the central bank will influence the decision to intervene secretly or publicly. Keywords: foreign exchange intervention, market microstructure. JEL Classifi…cation: D82, E58, F31, G14.

Central banks and house prices in the run-up to the crisis

The financial crisis and the role played within it by fluctuations in house prices has reopened the debate about whether monetary policy should respond to asset prices. This paper investigates how the central banks of the euro area, the UK and the US considered, understood and responded to the trends in house prices in the six or seven years preceding the crisis, and how they have analysed those developments since the crisis. It suggests that these central banks, particularly the Anglo-Saxon ones, might have been able to take some useful action if they had devoted more intellectual resources to analysing the possible misalignments of house prices and been willing to act on them.

Independent Central Banks: Low inflation at no cost?: A model with fiscal policy

In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal policy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that, with this extension, the politically induced variance of output is not always eliminated nor reduced by delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative central bank. Further, in flation and output stabilisation will be affected by the degree of conservativeness of the central bank and by the probability of the less in flation averse party gaining power. Keywords: rational partisan theory; fiscal policy; independent central bank JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.

The Same, but Different: Central Banks, Regulatory Agencies, and the Politics of Delegation to Independent Authorities

Independent regulatory agencies are the institutional foundations of the regulatory state that, during the past 15 years, has gained prominence throughout Europe. This article studies the rise of independent authorities in European countries by comparing regulatory agencies and central banks. Delegation to independent central banks and to independent regulatory agencies is similar in many respects. In both cases, agents are deliberately made independent from political principals through a specific institutional design. Moreover, it has been argued that delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies is linked to the need for policy-makers to improve the credibility of policy commitments, to the wish of incumbent politicians to tie the hands of future majorities, and to the extent to which the institutional contexts safeguard policy stability. Through an analysis of the formal independence of central banks and regulatory agencies in Western Europe, this article identifies an empirical puzzle that casts doubts on the accuracy of current explanations. Veto players and the uncertainty of incumbent policy-makers in respect to their re-election prospects matter for delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies, but in opposite ways. Making sense of these anomalies is necessary to achieve a better understanding of delegation to independent authorities.

Do Inflation-Targeting Central Banks Implicitly Target the Price Level?

This paper reports graphical and statistical evidence that the inflation targeting regimes in Canada and the UK - but not in Australia, New Zealand, or Sweden - actually resemble price-level targeting. In particular, the price level closely tracks the path implied by the inflation target, and the time-series predictions of the "bygones-are-bygones" version of inflation targeting are rejected by the data in favor of those implied by price-level targeting. These results indicate heterogeneity in the actual application of inflation targeting across countries and, for Canada and the UK, imply that the characterization of inflation targeting as a policy where shocks are accommodated is at odds with the data. Moreover, up to extent that their current policies already resemble price-level targeting, the welfare gains of replacing inflation with (explicit) price-level targeting are likely to be small.