997 resultados para BERKELEY, GEORGE


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"List of authorities": p. 7-8.

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Life of the author is by Joseph Stock.

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v.4 also has separate title page: Life and letters of George Berkeley; and an account of his philosophy. With many writings of Bishop Berkeley hitherto unpublished: metaphysical, descriptive, theological. By Alexander Campbell Fraser.

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No sistema de Berkeley chamado de imaterialismo a substância material é negada, existindo apenas dois tipos de entes: aqueles que percebem (os espíritos) e aqueles que são percebidos (as ideias). Os objetos sensíveis não possuem qualquer existência além daquela que lhes é atribuída pelo ato da percepção. Assim, diz o autor, ser é ser percebido (esse est percipi), e tudo o que se conhece são as qualidades reveladas durante o processo de percepção sensível. No entanto, tal afirmação parece nos conduzir para uma forma bastante particular do relativismo, um subjetivismo individualista, que implica grandes problemas. Em suas duas obras mais importantes: Tratado sobre os princípios do conhecimento humano e Três diálogos entre Hylas e Philonous, Berkeley faz várias alusões à relatividade das qualidades sensíveis. Com efeito, as qualidades percebidas de cada objeto são diferentes, segundo os indivíduos. Entretanto, a opinião dos comentadores sobre a relevância que Berkeley atribui a tais referências relativistas é divergente. O objetivo do presente trabalho é, então, tentar apresentar uma possível solução para o problema das referências relativistas no imaterialismo de Berkeley. Pretendemos investigar ao longo dos quatro capítulos que se seguem, cada um abordando um aspecto relevante acerca da relação entre o relativismo e a teoria de Berkeley, como pode ser possível que o filósofo concilie as duas posições, conservando intacta a possibilidade de conhecimento objetivo do mundo, e a sintonia que alega manter com o senso comum.

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This thesis explores the debate and issues regarding the status of visual ;,iferellces in the optical writings of Rene Descartes, George Berkeley and James 1. Gibson. It gathers arguments from across their works and synthesizes an account of visual depthperception that accurately reflects the larger, metaphysical implications of their philosophical theories. Chapters 1 and 2 address the Cartesian and Berkelean theories of depth-perception, respectively. For Descartes and Berkeley the debate can be put in the following way: How is it possible that we experience objects as appearing outside of us, at various distances, if objects appear inside of us, in the representations of the individual's mind? Thus, the Descartes-Berkeley component of the debate takes place exclusively within a representationalist setting. Representational theories of depthperception are rooted in the scientific discovery that objects project a merely twodimensional patchwork of forms on the retina. I call this the "flat image" problem. This poses the problem of depth in terms of a difference between two- and three-dimensional orders (i.e., a gap to be bridged by one inferential procedure or another). Chapter 3 addresses Gibson's ecological response to the debate. Gibson argues that the perceiver cannot be flattened out into a passive, two-dimensional sensory surface. Perception is possible precisely because the body and the environment already have depth. Accordingly, the problem cannot be reduced to a gap between two- and threedimensional givens, a gap crossed with a projective geometry. The crucial difference is not one of a dimensional degree. Chapter 3 explores this theme and attempts to excavate the empirical and philosophical suppositions that lead Descartes and Berkeley to their respective theories of indirect perception. Gibson argues that the notion of visual inference, which is necessary to substantiate representational theories of indirect perception, is highly problematic. To elucidate this point, the thesis steps into the representationalist tradition, in order to show that problems that arise within it demand a tum toward Gibson's information-based doctrine of ecological specificity (which is to say, the theory of direct perception). Chapter 3 concludes with a careful examination of Gibsonian affordallces as the sole objects of direct perceptual experience. The final section provides an account of affordances that locates the moving, perceiving body at the heart of the experience of depth; an experience which emerges in the dynamical structures that cross the body and the world.

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"Originally presented under the title 'New light on Berkeley's American sojourn', at the commemoration of the two hundredth anniversary of Dean Berkeley's arrival in America ... held at the Berkeley divinity school in New Haven ... on January 23, 1929."--Pref.

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"Reprint from the University of California Chronicle. v. xix, no. 3."

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Mode of access: Internet.